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The past two decades have seen a substantial increase in the availability of numerical data that 
individuals are faced with on a daily basis. In addition, research uncovering the multiple facets of 
statistical reasoning has become increasingly prominent. Both gender differences and the effect 
of experience or training have emerged as two key factors that influence performance in 
statistics. Surprisingly, though, the combined effects of these two variables have not been 
studied. This gap in understanding the joint effect of gender and experience on statistical 
reasoning is addressed in the present dissertation with six studies. In Study 1 (N = 201), 
participants with various levels of experience in statistics were asked to complete the Statistical 
Reasoning Assessment (SRA; Garfield, 2003). Although the performance of both genders 
improved with experience, the gender gap persisted across all experience levels. Multiple 
measures of individual differences were used in a confirmatory structural equation model. This 
model supported the idea that differences in statistical reasoning are not uniquely a matter of 
cognitive ability. In fact, gender was found to influence statistical reasoning directly, as well as 
indirectly through its influence on thinking dispositions. In Studies 2 (N = 67), 3 (N = 157), and 
4 (N = 206), the role of stereotype threat was examined as a potential cause of the persisting 
gender gap in statistics, and value affirmation was tested as an intervention to overcome 
stereotype threat. Despite the fact that many women believed negative stereotypes about the 
ability of women in statistics, value affirmation had no significant impact on performance. To 
help explain this lack of effect, and in keeping with the results of the structural equation model 
suggesting a multi-pronged approach, efforts were turned towards a different (and potentially 
richer) cognitive factor. Specifically, mental representations were explored to help shed light on 
the root causes of those conceptual understanding differences in statistics. In Studies 5 and 6, 
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gender differences in mental representations of statistical features were examined using a 
categorization paradigm. In Study 5 (N = 219), extending some of the key findings in Studies 1, 
3 and 4, it was established that two courses in statistics are necessary to create a significant 
difference in the quality of mental representations of statistical concepts. More importantly, 
Study 6 (N = 208) demonstrated how constraining the task format particularly benefits women in 
that the quality of their reasoning significantly improved, where that of men was equal across 
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Statistical thinking will one day be as necessary a qualification for efficient citizenship as the 
ability to read and write.  --S.S. Wilks 
 
With the increasing amounts of numerical information that permeate modern life, work 
and civic life demand citizens to have at least some degree of statistical literacy (Wallman, 1993; 
Ben-Zvi & Garfield, 2008). The new door to knowledge is data (Lohr, 2009) and statistical 
competence holds the key to that door. Indeed, we know that statistical competence – numeracy 
paired with critical thinking – allows for proper evaluation of data to guide decision- and policy-
making. In contrast, a lack of such competence is not only disadvantageous, but can have 
undesirable effects and create ethical dilemmas, as when consent is given to take a new 
prescription drug despite a lack of proper understanding of the risks involved (e.g., Couper & 
Singer, 2009; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009; McHugh & Behar, 2009). Today, a low 
level of numeracy is detrimental to informed decision-making (e.g., choosing between two 
medical treatments), and to employability, with outcomes potentially worse for women than men 
(Parsons & Bynner, 1997, 2005).  
The new faces of work and access to information have already influenced the structure of 
education in the field of statistics. Notably, a new statistics education curriculum has been 
adopted in the United States in the recent past. The Guidelines for Assessment and Instruction in 
Statistics Education (GAISE) (ASA, 2005) are the culmination of a long process initiated by 
George Cobb in 1992, where he recommended emphasizing statistical thinking, in addition to 
focusing on data and concepts rather than calculations. Thirteen years later, GAISE (ASA, 2005) 
reprised those recommendations in setting its guidelines for a first course in statistics at the 
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college level. In particular, the report stresses the importance of developing statistical literacy 
and statistical thinking, and advocates conceptual understanding over mere procedural 
knowledge. Some of the other accepted learning goals in this new era of statistical education 
(Garfield & Gal, 1999) include understanding the purpose and logic of statistical investigations, 
learning statistical skills such as organizing data and constructing tables, developing useful 
statistical dispositions such as demonstrating critical reasoning when assessing evidence, as well 
as developing statistical reasoning – the ability to make sense of statistical information. Stressing 
conceptual understanding makes sense at a time when computer tools and software packages can 
easily handle all calculations. The question is: how well are we equipped to assess statistical 
conceptual understanding?   
Assessing statistical competence  
With the introduction of the GAISE report (ASA, 2005) came the need to measure the 
impact of GAISE recommendations on students’ learning. Assessment of statistical competence, 
as defined by the new curriculum, became an important goal for educators and researchers in the 
field of statistics. One instrument allows the accomplishment of this goal - the Statistical 
Reasoning Assessment (SRA) (Garfield, 1991, 1998, 2003; Garfield & Gal, 1999). The SRA 
allows educators to measure development and achievement in the classroom, while its ease of 
scoring provides an accessible tool to instructors of large classes and to researchers (Garfield & 
Chance, 2000). Designed to assess a wide range of statistical concepts covered in high school 
and in introduction to statistics classes at the college level, the SRA has the particular advantage 
of measuring both correct reasoning – such as distinguishing between discrete versus continuous 
data, understanding the nature of samples and the measures used to describe them, and reasoning 
about uncertainty and randomness – and misconceptions. Going beyond simple incorrect 
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reasoning, statistical misconceptions reflect beliefs, interpretations or understandings that are 
mistaken (but often intuitively plausible). Such misconceptions can be resistant to change (Chi & 
Roscoe, 2002) and impervious to instruction (Konold, 1995). Examples of misconceptions in 
statistics include thinking that groups cannot be compared if they are not the same size, failing to 
take outliers into consideration when computing the mean, judging probabilities based on 
representativeness, and assuming that small samples are as good as large ones for drawing 
conclusions. Despite their intuitive appeal, those misconceptions are at odds with a technical 
understanding of statistical principles. For example, in spite of the fact that larger samples 
improve prediction, many people still trust small samples to be representative of the population 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) and base their decisions on them.  
The inclusion of many different areas of understanding within one single research tool 
breaks from the tradition of much published research. It is common to read articles focusing on a 
single aspect of statistical reasoning such as the law of large numbers (e.g., Fong, Krantz, and 
Nisbett, 1986), the need for comparison groups (e.g., Gray & Mill, 1990), or the importance of 
base rates in probability judgments (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1980). Although the inclusion of a range of 
topics in the SRA makes for a relatively low internal consistency, its test-retest reliability of .70 
for the correct reasoning scale and of .75 for the misconception scale (Garfield, 2003) makes it a 
good choice for research (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Another important strength of the SRA is that it places significant focus on assessing 
one’s understanding of the statistical concepts rather than just the application of calculations. In 
fact, no calculations are necessary. The entire instrument is in a multiple-choice format, which 
makes it a good instrument of choice both for classroom assessments and for research. In this 
multiple-choice format, the true answers were embedded amongst incorrect answers (foils) 
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whose content was based on erroneous but plausible answers given by actual students in an early 
round of the instrument’s development. 
Variables affecting statistical competence  
Several researchers have used the SRA to assess statistical competence in a wide range of 
populations, and several important findings have emerged. Critically for the present purposes, 
Liu’s research (1998), as reported in Garfield (2003), has demonstrated a clear gender effect, 
where males outperform females in their ability to avoid misconceptions. The effect was 
marginally significant for correct reasoning. Also using the SRA, Tempeelar et al. (2006) 
replicated the gender effect in statistics both for the ability to reason correctly (p < .001, d = .24) 
and the ability to avoid well-known misconceptions (p < .001, d = .27). These differences were 
found despite little or no difference in prior education, and despite the fact that all participants 
were taking their first course in statistics. It is thus not clear what causes this gender gap. As 
Tempelaar et al. (2006) note, what is especially puzzling is the fact that this gender difference 
occurs despite similar educational backgrounds of the males and females. However, potential 
factors of interest such as individual differences in cognitive ability and motivation were not 
taken into account in their research. Nonetheless, similar results have been found in mathematics. 
Specifically, Byrnes and Takahira (1993) reported that, even when obtaining the same grades in 
the classroom, females nonetheless performed more poorly than men on the quantitative section 
of the SAT.  
Although background education does not explain the gender gap, many researchers have 
examined the impact of specific training and general class experience on statistical reasoning. In 
four experiments, Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett (1986) examined the extent to which people use the 
law of large numbers in everyday problems, and whether the frequency and the quality of their 
 5	  
statistical reasoning can be improved through specific short-term training (Experiments 1 and 2) 
and through formal in-class experience (Experiments 3 and 4). In their experiments, participants 
read three different types of scenarios: probabilistic (e.g., lottery, where randomness is obvious), 
objective (e.g., sports achievement, car reliability), and subjective (e.g., what college course to 
take), and were asked to explain the outcomes. Participants’ tendency to explain the scenarios – 
such as why a meal may not be as extraordinary on a second visit to a restaurant – in statistical 
terms (rather than blaming the chef!) improved greatly with specific short-term training sessions 
on the law of large numbers as well as with additional course experience. For instance, where 
novices rarely used statistical terms to explain the scenarios, those having completed at least one 
course in statistics provided explanations rooted in statistical terms – such as “regression to the 
mean” – up to 40% of the time, while those at the doctoral level provided statistical explanations 
closer to 80% of the time. However, Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda (1983) also warned that 
it might be the experience in a domain rather than the level of experience in statistics that 
encourages people to look at a problem in a statistical rather than in a deterministic fashion. 
Furthermore, the same reasoning skills do not develop in every domain (Gray & Mill, 1990; 
Nisbett, Fong, Lehman, & Cheng, 1987). Fong et al.’s (1986) findings also fail to control for 
cognitive ability. With regard to gender, their research sheds no light on that issue. 
Unfortunately, gender of participants was either not reported (Experiments 1-3) or limited to 
males (Experiment 4).  
Quilici and Mayer (1996) also relied on the specific short-term training of a group of 
participants who had taken zero or one course in statistics. As part of the training, they had 
participants study examples of t-test, correlation and chi-square problems that either emphasized 
the structure of the problems (e.g., all correlation examples grouped together on the same page) 
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or the surface features of the problems (e.g., all problems related to the weather presented on the 
same page) prior to completing a sorting task in which participants were to place each of 12 
statistical problems into groups with the other problems they best went with. The sorting task 
allows inferences to be made about how participants are thinking about these problems, and how 
they are representing them in memory. Although surface features (e.g., weather in the example 
above) are more salient, it is the ability to recognize structurally related problems that is the 
important skill in mathematical problem solving (Polya, 1945). Quilici and Mayer (1996) were 
the first to extend this task to statistical word problems, demonstrating that appropriate training 
lead participants to sort statistical word problems based on their deep structure rather than based 
on their surface similarity. Indeed, not only did training with structure-emphasizing examples 
lead participants to categorize the problems based on their structural features more often, it also 
lead to greater application of the appropriate statistical test for those in the structure-emphasizing 
group. Their findings were qualified by the fact that training was much more beneficial for lower 
ability students than for higher ability students. Unfortunately, gender was not included as an 
independent variable. Also, for those interested in statistical literacy in general, it is noteworthy 
that those training sessions were highly specific, covering only the notion of the law of large 
numbers (Fong et al, 1986) or a few targeted inferential tests (Quilici & Mayer, 1996). This 
narrow focus could be the reason behind the finding of a training effect.  
Although knowing about the performance of participants on a narrow statistical task may 
be interesting at the experimental level, the findings cannot be generalized easily and do not 
reflect the breadth of knowledge necessary to be considered statistically literate in today’s 
society. In contrast to the dependent variables used in the studies above, the SRA addresses 
multiple areas of statistical reasoning, including the law of large numbers, amongst others (e.g., 
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averages, probabilities, correlation versus causation, etc.). Of course, such breadth of knowledge 
cannot be communicated in a single training session. It is thus realistic to assume that 
considerably more training is necessary to generate a significant improvement. This hypothesis, 
along with others, will be tested in the current series of experiments. That being said, the effect 
of targeted training may still only have a limited effect as it is well known that even experts fail 
to achieve a perfect score on some statistical tasks (e.g., Hoffrage et al., 2002; Kahnemann, 
Tversky, & Slovic, 1982). Again, formal education does not appear sufficient on its own to 
ensure proper use outside the classroom. Yet, we know that “effective transfer is critical here 
because statistical reasoning is applicable across a wide variety of domains and in daily life; 
statistical reasoning skill is of little value if it can only be applied in the statistics classroom” 
(Lovett, 2001, p. 347). 
Overarching Research Goals 
Given the importance of statistical competence in today’s world, and knowing that any 
discrepancy may impact the long-term success of any group of lower ability, my research aimed 
to provide a strong test of whether gender differences exist in this domain. To understand the 
challenges for statistical education, as well as the changes and actions that may be required, I 
proposed an examination of factors that may help explain and close the gender gap in statistics. 
With the goal of identifying more precisely where the gap lies, the impact of experience in 
statistics was examined, especially as an interaction of experience with gender would impact 
how one might go about redressing it. Individual differences, stereotype threat, and task format 
were also considered. To accomplish this, six studies were conducted. In Study 1, it was 
hypothesized that experience and individual differences within each gender group would help 
explain, at least in part, the gender gap. Participants completed the SRA as well as multiple 
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measures of thinking dispositions and cognitive ability. Foreshadowing the results, since gender 
was found to have an effect on statistical reasoning above and beyond training and individual 
differences, the next set of studies focused on the potential negative impact of stereotype threat, a 
phenomenon that has been demonstrated to decrease performance of females in mathematics and 
other science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines (Shapiro & 
Williams, 2012). In Studies 2, 3 and 4, the self-affirmation technique promoted by Martens et al 
(2006) in mathematics and spatial reasoning and by Miyake et al (2010) in physics as an 
effective tool to counter the effect of stereotype threat was tested, in different settings and using 
different statistical assessment tools. Finally, studies 5 and 6 explored how participants mentally 
represent statistical problems in memory, and tested the effect of using general versus 
constrained instructions on performance. As each of these lines of work necessitated the 




Using the SRA, both Garfield (2003) and Tempelaar et al (2006) have demonstrated a 
disturbing gender gap in statistics. However, each of their research has focused on a different 
point in time. Garfield (2003) focused more specifically on testing knowledge at the end of an 
introductory course in statistics. When administering the SRA at the end of the semester, she 
found that males performed better than females. In an attempt to rule out the role of instruction 
and to clearly tap into any misconceptions that students might hold, Tempelaar et al. (2006) 
administered the SRA at the beginning of a semester. Despite recruiting participants with 
homogeneous education background, the gender gap was found once more. Also, a weak 
negative correlation was found between the SRA and effort-based measures (i.e., homework), 
and a weak positive correlation was found between the correct reasoning score on the SRA and 
the final exam. In contrast, Garfield (2003) had found no correlation between performance on the 
SRA and course performance. However, by limiting the range of experience in their sample, the 
question of knowing if the gender gap is persistent or transient remains unanswered.  
For other research focusing specifically on the role of experience in improving the quality 
of statistical reasoning (e.g., Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Quilici & Mayer, 1996, 2002, 
Hogan & Rabinowitz, 2008, 2009; Lavigne, Salkind, & Yan, 2008), it is then gender that is not 
included nor reported as a variable of interest. Thus, it is not possible to know whether the two 
factors of gender and experience interact. This study aims to shed light on this question. Also, 
instead of focusing on short and pointed training sessions, such as used in Fong, Krantz, and 
Nisbett (1986) and Quilici & Mayer (1996), the more ecologically valid approach of taking 
current experience in statistics as predictor variable, as utilized by Hogan and Rabinowitz (2008, 
2009), Quilici and Mayer (2002) and Nisbett et al. (1983), was used.  
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Furthermore, a question that has not been addressed in previous studies is whether the 
gender gap will decrease (or increase) with additional experience in statistics. The first study in 
this dissertation aimed to shed light on this question. If a gender gap exists, will further training 
advantage one gender in the process, or will the difference remain constant? To explore this 
question, males and females with a range of experience, operationally defined as the number of 
statistics courses taken in university, completed the SRA. Both a gender gap and a beneficial 
impact of training were expected. However, it was unknown whether an interaction would be 
found. On one hand, it could be expected that only those females with greater ability in statistics 
will actually go through the process of taking more than one course in statistics, which may 
technically lead to a reduction in the performance gap. On the other hand, it is possible that the 
gender gap will simply continue. These questions were addressed in the first study.  
A second goal of this first study was to better understand the role of individual 
differences in statistical literacy, which has become a dominant theme in cognitive psychology in 
general, and in reasoning research in particular. Here, many prominent reasoning theorists argue 
that the product of reasoning performance is the sum of more than just simple abilities (e.g., 
Stanovich, 2001; Baron, 1985; Ennis, 1987). Indeed, Stanovich and West’s research, with their 
colleagues (1997, 1998, 1999, & 2007) has demonstrated that reasoning outcomes are not fully 
explained by cognitive abilities alone. They find that after controlling for cognitive ability, a 
substantial portion of the remaining variance can be explained by thinking dispositions – which 
can be described simply as intellectual inclinations that benefit good, productive thinking 
(Ritchhart, 2001). In support of the focus of this dissertation, Hawkins (1997) highlights the 
relevance of thinking dispositions for statistical reasoning:  
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“As statisticians, we are aware that the media, our policymakers, members of the general 
public, our students, and even ourselves on occasions, are prey to many statistical and 
probabilistic misconceptions. Some of these misconceptions seem to be reasonably easy 
to address. Research shows, however, that others remain deep-seated and resistant to 
change. In fact, it is not only peoples’ misconceptions that we need to worry about. To be 
statistically literate, a person must have not only reliable understanding, but also an 
inclination for using that understanding in everyday reasoning.” [emphasis added] 
 
Thinking dispositions are an attractive focus of research because they are seen as more 
malleable than cognitive abilities (Stanovich, 2001; Baron, 1985) and as holding the power to 
regulate the use of cognitive abilities to their full potential (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; 
Stanovich, 2009). If that hypothesis holds true, this signifies that people’s performance on a 
reasoning test can be improved simply by influencing their level of motivation and dedication to 
the task. Alternatively, if two individuals possess the same amount of cognitive abilities, the one 
with the highest dispositions toward the reasoning task should perform better. This explains the 
importance Stanovich gives to thinking dispositions in his most recent model of reasoning 
(2009). Indeed, Stanovich’s model states that the level of thinking dispositions indirectly 
influences reasoning performance by directly regulating the display of cognitive abilities.  
However, as far as I am aware, the appropriateness of this model for statistical reasoning 
has not been tested directly. Thus, a secondary goal of this preliminary study was to examine the 
role of thinking dispositions and cognitive abilities in statistical reasoning using a confirmatory 
structural equation modeling approach. If the model holds for statistical reasoning, the 
moderating influence of gender on the interplay between cognitive ability and thinking 
dispositions will be examined. Finally, to eliminate the possibility that women did not engage 
fully in the task because they misjudged their performance to be good, confidence ratings were 
obtained after each question. A good awareness of their performance would result in a high 




Two hundred and one University of Waterloo undergraduate and graduate students 
proficient in English participated for course credit or monetary remuneration. Following 
Frederick (2005), two participants with scores below 10 on the Wonderlic Personnel Test were 
eliminated from the analysis, reducing the sample to 199 participants (92 males, 107 females; 
Mage = 21.57, SD = 4.59). Participants had varying levels of experience in statistics, as measured 
by the number of statistics courses they had previously taken (0: N = 76, 1: N = 46, 2 or more: N 
= 77), and – based on participants’ responses to a questionnaire item (see Materials below) – 
came from fields deemed generally non-quantitative (e.g., child care, music, art, English, 
philosophy) to extremely quantitative (e.g., mathematics, statistics) [Generally non-quantitative 
= 10 (5%), Minimally quantitative = 22 (11%), Moderately quantitative = 59 (30%), Highly 
quantitative = 82 (41%), Extremely quantitative = 26 (13%)].  
Design and Materials  
To examine the influence of gender and experience on statistical reasoning, a 2 (gender) 
x 3 (experience) between-subjects design was used to analyse performance and confidence. 
Confidence ratings were collected to gauge performance awareness and to assess calibration (i.e., 
being more confident when correct and being less confident when incorrect). Performance on the 
statistical task was further analysed in light of thinking dispositions and cognitive abilities. 
Statistical Task. The Statistical Reasoning Assessment (SRA: Garfield, 2003) was used 
as the main task. This test comprises 20 word problems assessing various components of 
statistical reasoning, such as choosing an appropriate average, understanding sampling 
variability, and distinguishing between correlation and causation. All answers are given using a 
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multiple-choice format. For each question, some of the choices represent correct reasoning, 
while other choices represent some prevalent misconceptions (i.e., beliefs, interpretation or 
understanding that are not only mistaken, but also resistant to change; Chi & Roscoe, 2002; 
Fischbein, 1987). Examples of misconceptions in statistics include thinking that groups cannot 
be compared if they are not the same size, failing to take outliers into consideration when 
computing the mean, judging probabilities based on representativeness, and assuming that small 
samples are as good as large ones for drawing conclusions. The presence of correct, incorrect 
and misconception-related items in the set of answer choices allows the calculation of two 
scores: a “correct reasoning” score (CR) and a “misconception” score (MISC). Each score is a 
weighted average of performance on eight components for each scale (see Garfield, 2003, and 
Tempelaar et al, 2006, for more details on scoring). A copy of the test and its sixteen subscales is 
available in Appendix A.  
Performance awareness and calibration were also assessed. To do so, participants were 
prompted to rate their confidence in the accuracy of their answer after each question, indicating 
their rating on a 6-point scale (ranging from 1 = not confident at all to 6 = very confident). An 
overall confidence score was obtained for each participant by averaging the ratings across all 20 
questions.  
Individual Differences. Measures of thinking dispositions (i.e., intellectual inclinations 
that benefit good, productive thinking: Ritchhart, 2001), and measures of cognitive ability were 
used. The following thinking dispositions scales were used: the Preference for Numerical 
Information Scale (PNI: Viswanathan, 1993; Coefficient alpha reported by the creator of the 
scale = .94), the Need for Cognition Scale (NC: Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; Coefficient alpha 
reported by the creators of the scale = .90), and the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale 
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(AOT: Stanovich and West, 1997, 1998, 2007; Sà, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Coefficient alpha 
reported by the creators of the scale = ranging from .81 to .88). To measure verbal, numerical 
and general cognitive abilities, the Vocabulary Checklist-with-Foils task (VOC: used as a proxy 
for cognitive ability in Stanovich & West, 1997; split-half reliability reported by the previous 
authors = .87), the Numeracy Scale (NUM: Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Coefficient alpha 
reported by the creators of the scale = ranging from 0.70 to 0.75), the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT: Frederick, 2005; no psychometric information available in the literature), and the 
Wonderlic Personnel Test – Form A (WPT: Wonderlic Inc., 2002; Coefficient alpha reported in 
the user’s manual = ranging from .88 to .94) were used1. All scales (except for the WPT due to 
copyright limitations) are available in Appendix B.  
Demographic information was also collected, including some questions drawn from 
Schield (2005). The information of interest included gender, age, university level, number of 
statistics courses completed, and number of research method courses completed. Participants 
were also asked to self-report their level of comfort with formal statistics and with informal 
statistics on a 4-point scale ranging from very uncomfortable to very comfortable, as well as the 
level of quantitative knowledge required in their field, reporting this value on a 5-point scale 
ranging from ‘generally non-quantitative’ (e.g., child care, music, art, English, philosophy) to 
‘moderately quantitative’ (e.g., psychology, sociology, market research, forecasting) to 
‘extremely quantitative’ (e.g., mathematics, statistics). This questionnaire is also available in 
Appendix B.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As the use of those measures as covariates in the analyses did not change any of the patterns of findings in Studies 
1, 2 and 4, the results of those analyses are not reported in the main results sections. Instead, for each of the six 
 15	  
Procedures 
The study was conducted in two parts. The first part occurred online, at the participant’s 
convenience prior to coming to the lab, and was scheduled for 30 minutes. Participants filled out 
three self-report questionnaires: PNI, NC, and AOT, as well as demographic information. The 
second part of the study occurred in lab and was scheduled for 60 minutes. Five paper-pencil 
tasks were completed in this order: 1) SRA (Garfield, 2003), along with confidence ratings, 2) 
VOC, 3) CRT, 4) NUM and 5) WPT – Form A. Consent was obtained from each participant at 
the start of each portion of the study, and feedback was given after the in-lab session was 
completed. 
Results 
To test the stated hypotheses, multiple analyses were necessary. The initial set of 
analyses tested the role of experience and gender on statistical reasoning. As a first step, the 
performance data from the SRA were analysed. As noted above, the SRA allows the computation 
of two separate subscales: a correct reasoning (CR) score, and a misconception (MISC) score. 
These two scores were analysed using a 2 (gender) x 3 (experience) between-subjects ANOVA. 
As a second step, the same analyses were repeated on confidence ratings. All descriptive 
statistics are available in Table 1. 
The subsequent set of analyses was concerned with the relations among cognitive ability, 
thinking dispositions, and statistical reasoning. Firstly, zero-order correlations were obtained. 
Secondly, the appropriateness of Stanovich’s (2009) tri-partite model was tested using 
confirmatory structural equation modelling. As appropriate, the role of gender as a predictor was 
examined.   
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Table 1           





 Male   Female   Total  
 n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD 
Correct 
reasoning Scale 
0 30 .57 .18 46 .49 .16 76 .52 .17 
1 17 .67 .11 29 .55 .12 46 .59 .13 
 2+ 45 .73 .13 32 .61 .13 77 .67 .14 
 Total 92 .66 .16 107 .54 .15 199 .60 .16 
Misconception 
Scale 
0  .29 .12  .32 .12  .31 .12 
1  .21 .12  .31 .10  .27 .12 
 2+  .18 .09  .26 .09  .22 .10 
 Total  .23 .12  .30 .11  .27 .12 
Confidence 0  4.72 .51  4.44 .85  4.55 .75 
1  5.21 .49  4.77 .50  4.93 .54 
 2+  5.25 .47  4.83 .63  5.08 .58 
 Total  5.07 .54  4.65 .72  4.84 .68 
 
 
Effect of Gender and Training on Performance  
As previous studies using the SRA found a gender difference (e.g., Teempelaar et al., 
2006; Garfield, 2003), we expected that males would perform better than females on the SRA. 
However, as those studies focused uniquely on the first course in statistics, and given that 
training and experience have been shown to improve statistical reasoning (e.g., Fong, Krantz, & 
Nisbett, 1986; Quilici, & Mayer, 1996, 2002; Rabinowitz & Hogan, 2008,2009), we predicted 
that the gender gap could vary with increased experience. The data were analysed with a 2 
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(gender) x 3 (experience) analysis of variance, both for the correct reasoning score (CR) and for 
the misconceptions score (MISC).  
Overall, males performed better than females (see Table 1), scoring higher on the CR 
scale by an average of 12% across experience levels  (Mm = 0.66, SD = 0.16; Mf = 0.54, SD = 
0.15), F(1, 193) = 26.31 MSE = .020, p < .001, η 2p = .120, and committing fewer mistakes, thus 
scoring lower on the MISC scale (Mm = 0.23, SD = 0.12; Mf = 0.30, SD = 0.11) by an average of 
7% across experience levels, F(1, 193) = 16.73, MSE = .012, p < .001, η2p = .080, which is 
consistent with our hypothesis. This main effect of gender occurred while effectively controlling 
for experience in the comparison above and, even after controlling for intelligence using WPT as 
the covariate, remained statistically significant for correct reasoning (p < .001, η2p = .227), but 
not for misconceptions (p = .22, η2p = .008). 
As predicted, increased experience was associated with better performance. Indeed, each 
extra course in statistics was associated with improved correct reasoning, F(2, 193) = 16.41, 
MSE = .020, p < .001, η2p = .145, which was confirmed with multiple comparisons, revealing 
that each additional level of experience corresponded to significantly higher performance than 
the previous level (Tukey HSD, p < .05). Misconceptions also varied significantly with increased 
experience, F(2, 193) = 9.87, MSE = .012, p < .001, η2p = .093. Specifically, misconceptions 
were significantly lower with increased experience, but only for those having taken at least two 
courses in statistics (Tukey HSD, p < .05). Indeed, those with one course in statistics did not fare 
any better than those with no experience in statistics (Tukey HSD, p = .17). Thus, this suggests 
that misconceptions may require more experience to change than correct reasoning. This finding 
is consistent with the literature on conceptual change (Chi & Roscoe, 2002), which has shown 
that misconceptions can be highly resistant to change. It is also worth noting that performance on 
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neither of the subscales came close to ceiling (CR) or floor (MISC) with additional experience. 
Importantly, the gender gap did not decrease with experience, as no interaction was found with 
either correct reasoning, F(2, 193) = .28, MSE = .020, p =.757, η2p = .003, or misconceptions, 
F(2, 193) = 1.44, MSE = .012, p =.241, η2p = .015.  
Effect of Gender and Training on Confidence 
If participants are well calibrated, i.e., if their confidence is an accurate reflection of their 
performance (e.g., low confidence when answer is incorrect, high confidence when answer is 
correct), then the same pattern of findings should be present in the analysis of variance of the 
confidence ratings, and the correlation between performance and confidence should approach 1.  
A 2 (gender) x 3 (experience) ANOVA revealed the same overall pattern as found with 
the performance data, with two significant main effects and no interaction. Reflecting 
performance, males (M = 5.07, SD = .539) were more confident than females (M = 4.65, SD= 
.724), F(1, 193) = 16.91, MSE = .379, p < .001, η2p = .081, and increased experience led to 
greater confidence (M0 = 4.55, SD = .746; M1 = 4.93, SD = .538; M2+ = 5.08, SD = .575), F(2, 
193) = 11.57, MSE = .379, p < .001, η 2p = .107. Nonetheless, closer examination of the effect of 
experience revealed a different pattern. Whereas experience continued to have incremental 
effects on performance with each statistics course taken, confidence increased significantly after 
having taken one course in statistics (Tukey HSD, p < .01) and then levelled off, as no further 
difference was found with increasing experience (Tukey HSD, p = .42). At this point, we cannot 
differentiate between the possibilities of those having taken one course in statistics being 
overconfident versus those having taken three courses in statistics being under-confident, 
although a preference is given to the former possibility due to past research demonstrating 
people’s bias toward overconfidence (e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Lichtenstein 
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& Fischhoff, 1977).  It is also interesting to note that males’ confidence was not as strongly 
correlated with their performance (r = .24, p = .023) as females’ confidence was with their 
performance (r = .48, p < .001); z = 1.91, p = .056. A scatterplot summarizing the performance / 





Individual Differences - Correlations 
A first examination of the correlation matrix (see Table 2) revealed that all associations 
are in the predicted direction, with all measures of individual differences (except VOC) 
correlating positively with correct reasoning and confidence, and negatively with 
misconceptions. For correct reasoning, performance correlated between r = .20 (AOT) and r = 
Figure 1. Scatterplot of the association between performance and 
confidence, by gender. Study 1. 
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.38 (PNI) with thinking dispositions, while correlating between r = .14 (VOC) and r = .56 (CRT) 
with cognitive ability2. The correlation with the Vocabulary task was exceptionally low in 
comparison to the correlations with the CRT and the WPT (r = .55). This is particularly 
surprising, as Stanovich and West (1997) have used this Vocabulary task as a proxy for cognitive 
ability without any other measures to check their assumption. For misconceptions, the 
correlations were negative, as they should be, ranging from r = -.14 (AOT) to r = -.25 (NC) for 
thinking dispositions, while correlating from r = -.14 (VOC) to r = -.41 (CRT) for cognitive 
ability. Finally, for confidence, the correlations ranged from r = .08 (AOT) to r = .48 (PNI) for 
thinking dispositions, while correlating from r = -.01 (VOC) to r = .47 (CRT) for cognitive 
ability. Overall, if the correlations from the VOC are disregarded, cognitive abilities are more 
highly associated with correct reasoning; the CRT is the best predictor of misconceptions use; 
and high scores on the PNI and on the CRT are the most predictive of a high level of confidence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Some readers may raise an eyebrow at the view of CRT being considered as a measure of cognitive ability rather 
than as a measure of thinking dispositions. However, Frederick (2005) was agnostic in its categorization of his 
measure as being one or the other: “I have proposed that the CRT measures ‘cognitive reflection’—the ability or 
disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind” [emphasis added] (p.35).” When testing whether 
CRT should be considered an indicator of CA, of TD, or of both, an additional factor loading was added from TD to 
CRT. The obtained parameter estimates clearly support the view of using the CRT solely as an indicator of CA. 
Specifically, whereas the factor loading between CA and CRT (.76) was significant (p < .001), the loading between 
TD and CRT stood merely at .03 and was clearly non-significant. On that basis, the factor loading between TD and 
CRT was considered disconfirmed, and the possibility of treating it as an indicator of both latent variables was 
abandoned.  
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Table 2         
Correlation  Matrix – Study 1         
Subscale Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. CR .60 (.16) -- -.56** .45** .38** .26** .20** .55** .56** .44** .14* 
2. MISC .27 (.12)  -- -.27** -.24** -.25** -.14 -.22** -.41** -.22** -.14* 
3. Conf 4.84 (.68)   -- .48** .30** .08 .33** .47** .37** -.01 
4. PNI 84.67 (15.66)    -- .44** .19** .42** .43** .43** -.06 
5. NC 73.31 (12.58)     -- 24** .27** .37** .30** .15* 
6. AOT 146.13 (8.13)      -- .22** .15* .12 .01 
7. WPT 28.41 (6.07)       -- .59** .52** .15* 
8. CRT 1.56 (1.17)        -- .53** .06 
9. NUM 9.78 (1.63)         -- .02 
10. VOC 21.12 (4.95)          -- 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Structural Equation Model – Gender and Individual Differences 
The persistence of the gender gap despite increased training is an alarming finding. Why 
is this occurring? What role do individual differences in thinking dispositions and cognitive 
ability play in statistical reasoning? According to Stanovich’s (2009) tri-partite model of 
reasoning, beyond the expected positive impact of higher cognitive ability on the quality of 
reasoning, higher thinking dispositions also affect reasoning indirectly by influencing the use one 
makes of their own cognitive ability. In the current context, the question of interest is how 






To examine the relations between thinking dispositions, cognitive ability and statistical 
reasoning, a structural equation model (presented in Figure 2) was used. Structural equation 
models are composite models that include both a measurement model and a path model. The 
measurement model illustrates the relation between the latent variables (unmeasured) and their 
specific indicators (measured). For instance, in the current study, cognitive ability was captured 
through four measured indicators: the Wonderlic Personnel Test, the Numeracy Scale, the 
Cognitive Reflection Test, and the Vocabulary-Test-with-Foils. Similarly, thinking dispositions 
Figure 2. First version of the Structural Equation Model based on 
Stanovich (2009).  
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were captured through three measured indicators: the Preference for Numerical Information, the 
Need for Cognition Scale, and the Actively Open-Minded Scale.  
The path model illustrates the relations among the main constructs of interest. In this 
case, the path model includes only latent variables and depicts the causal model proposed by 
Stanovich (2009), which states that thinking dispositions affect the quality of our reasoning 
indirectly through the influence they exert on the deployment and use of available cognitive 
abilities. In addition to its flexibility, the main advantage of using a structural equation model 
rests on the fact that relations among the latent variables are corrected for measurement error, 
which is not true when using regression analyses (Kline, 2011).  
The first step in the use of this structural equation model was to test the generalizability 
of Stanovich’s (2009) tri-partite model to the area of statistical reasoning. Support for the tri-
partite model would come from finding that the proposed model fits the data well. Fit indices are 
calculated based on how closely the model allows the reproduction of the correlations present in 
the actual data. The closer the reproduced correlations are to the actual data, the better the fit. 
Next, if the fit of the general model were acceptable, the equivalence of the reasoning process 
across gender would be ascertained. To do so, path coefficients are set to be equal across gender. 
If the fit remains good, this suggests that the pattern of relations is equivalent across genders. 
However, if the fit becomes poor, this suggests that the genders have different patterns among 
the latent variables. Finally, if the process can be shown to be equivalent, the influence of gender 
on each of the three parts of the model (i.e., TD, CA, SR) can be examined by including gender 
as a measured exogenous categorical predictor in the model. 
Testing the appropriateness of the model for statistical reasoning.  In their work to 
substantiate the role of thinking dispositions in reasoning, Stanovich and his colleagues (e.g., 
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Stanovich & West, 1997, 1998b; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002, 2003) have relied on multiple 
regression analysis. Their main argument to support the role of thinking dispositions is that a 
significant portion of the variance left unexplained by cognitive ability can always be explained 
by thinking dispositions. However, a main limitation of the regression approach is that its results 
do not correct for measurement errors (Kline, 2011). In contrast, structural equation models 
explicitly depict the difference between constructs that are latent and indicators that are 
observed. By definition, we know that the measures used as indicators are an imperfect snapshot 
of those constructs. SEM takes those measurement errors into consideration, correcting the 
resulting path coefficients between the latent constructs for attenuation. Also, each measure is 
given a different weight to represent its quality in relation to the construct. In this sense, 
structural equation modelling is a more rigorous method of analysis (Bollen, 1989; Bullock, 
Harlow, & Mulaik, 1994; Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989).   
In Stanovich’s (2009) tri-partite model of reasoning, one important assumption is that 
thinking dispositions influence the expression of cognitive ability, which in turn determines 
reasoning performance. In fact, this model assumes no direct path between thinking dispositions 
and statistical reasoning. This path model (see Figure 2), complemented by the aforementioned 
indicators, is the basis for the confirmatory test of the proposed model of reasoning.    
The first model (see Figure 2) included all indicators for each latent variable. Despite a 
significant Chi-square (χ2 = 46.32, df = 25, p = .006), which often occurs as the sample size 
increases, the other fit indices reveal a satisfactory fit. The comparative fit index is above .95 
(CFI = .955). The root mean square error of approximation is below .08 (RMSEA = .066) and 
the related p of close fit – which indicates whether the difference of the obtained RMSEA value 
from close fit is attributable to sampling error – is above .05 (pclose = .179). All estimates 
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(except VOC) are significant (p’s < .001), supporting the appropriateness of this dual-process 
model to the area of statistical reasoning. However, one of the indicators has a non-significant 
factor loading. The regression weight for VOC is only .12 (p > .05), which indicates that it is not 
an appropriate indicator of cognitive ability in the current model. For this reason, this indicator 
was removed and the model was re-estimated.  
For this second model (see Figure 3), the obtained Chi-square value is non-significant 
(χ2 = 28.503, df = 18, p = .055), which is a very good indication of the fit of the model. Of 
course, the other fit indices concur on this finding of good fit (CFI = .977; RMSEA = .054, pclose 
= .389). Another sign of the usefulness of removing VOC from the list of indicators is the fact 
that the expected cross-validation index (ECVI), a fit index that takes parsimony into account, 
dropped noticeably from the first to the second model (.436 to .326). Overall, this model explains 
50% of the variance in statistical reasoning as measured by the SRA in this sample. Given the 
significant paths between TD and CA, as well as between CA and SR, this analysis lends support 
to Stanovich’s idea that thinking dispositions regulate the manifestation of the algorithmic level 
represented by cognitive ability. However, one possible alternative is worth testing.  
The obvious alternative model is that thinking dispositions may have a direct effect on 
statistical reasoning. To test this possibility, a path was added between TD and SR in the model 
above. The addition of that path does not alter the fit dramatically (χ2 = 28.232, df = 17, p = 
.042; CFI = .976; RMSEA = .058, pclose = .333; ECVI = .335). Importantly, the added path, 
estimated to be .08, does not reach significance. Thus, despite the possibility that a small direct 
effect may exist between thinking dispositions and statistical reasoning, the assumption of the 





Process equivalence. To ensure that the same reasoning process applies both to males 
and females, a multi-group SEM analysis (Arbuckle, 2009) was also used. In this model, data is 
analysed concurrently for each gender, with the particularity that the critical paths (i.e., the path 
between TD and CA, and the path between CA and SR) are set to be equal across genders. If the 
equivalence assumptions added are not viable, the fit indices will indicate poor fit. In contrast, all 
Figure 3. Second version of the Structural Equation Model based on 
Stanovich (2009).  
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fit indices remained good (χ2 = 43.82, df = 38, p = .238; CFI = .986; RMSEA = .028; pclose = 
.857; ECVI = .730), indicating that the model proposed by Stanovich is applicable to both 
genders.  
Gender influence. The remaining question regards how gender exerts influence on this 
reasoning process. To test the total effect of gender on statistical reasoning, the original model 
was thus modified to include this observed categorical predictor variable, with males coded as 0, 
and females coded as 1 (see Figure 4). The analysis revealed gender as influencing statistical 
reasoning in multiple ways in this well-fitting model (χ2 = 42.67, df = 23, p = .008; CFI = .961; 
RMSEA = .066, pclose = .186; ECVI = .438). First, being female has a significant negative 
impact on thinking dispositions (-.33, p <.001), on cognitive abilities (-.15, p = .065), and on 
statistical reasoning (-.16, p = .016). Combining this information with the significant paths 
between TD, CA and SR, being female had a negative impact on SR in three separate ways. 
First, the lower thinking dispositions of females decreased the use of cognitive ability to properly 
solve the statistical problems [indirect path = (-.33)(.69)(.67) = -.15]. Second, even when holding 
thinking dispositions constant, there was a further effect of gender on cognitive abilities, which 
also predicted lower performance in statistical reasoning [indirect path = (-.15)(.67) = -.10]. 
Finally, even when controlling for cognitive ability, gender had a direct effect (-.16) on statistical 
reasoning that cannot be explained by differences in cognitive ability, or differences in thinking 
dispositions. That is, of the total effect (-.41) of gender on statistical reasoning, -.15 (37%) is 
attributable to thinking dispositions, -.10 (24%) is attributable to cognitive ability (excluding its 
role as a mediator of the effect of cognitive dispositions), and -.16 (39%) remains that is not 
explained by these two variables.  
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Taken together, these results indicate that multiple approaches can be used to attempt to 
raise the performance of females in statistics. Based on the current results, those approaches 
could include interventions to raise thinking dispositions, interventions to improve cognitive 
ability, and other interventions that may have a direct influence on statistical reasoning. 
However, given that multiple routes have the potential to benefit statistical reasoning 
performance, any attempt to influence statistical reasoning indirectly or directly will ever only 
address approximately one-third of the overall effect, as shown above by the proportion of the 
total effect attributed to each of the three effects. 




In this first study, by controlling for experience and individual differences, I provided the 
strongest evidence to date for the existence of a persistent gender gap in statistics. Even though 
increased experience in statistics was associated with an increase in performance overall, it was 
not sufficient to close the gender gap. For instance, only women having taken two courses in 
statistics reached the level of performance of men with no experience in statistics. At the same 
level of experience, men surpassed them easily, both in their ability to display correct statistical 
reasoning and in their ability to avoid misconceptions. Of course, the cross-sectional nature of 
the sample limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the role of experience, as it is possible 
that a self-selection bias may have influenced the composition of the groups at each level of 
experience. For instance, it is possible that only those higher in cognitive ability keep taking 
statistics beyond the mandatory introductory class. However, it is useful to note that the 
difference in performance across genders remained significant even after controlling for 
cognitive ability. Also notable was how much room for improvement was left for both genders, 
even after completing two courses in statistics. This is consistent with prior research by Fong, 
Krantz and Nisbett (1986). In their study, participants with 1 to 3 courses in statistics referred to 
statistical concepts such as regression to the mean and law of large numbers to explain diverse 
scenarios involving variation – one of the most important ideas in statistics – no more than 40% 
of the time. Even those at the doctoral level used statistically grounded rather than deterministic 
explanations no more than 80% of the time. In their study, Fong et al. did not examine the role of 
gender, however.   
Gender was also prominent in the examination of patterns of confidence. Whereas 
women’s level of confidence was generally consistent with their level of performance (r = .48), 
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men’s confidence was generally high regardless of their performance (r = .24). In fact, the 
correlations were statistically different. Whether directly related to the area of statistics or not, 
men’s attitude differs from that of women. Therefore, there is room to ask whether the 
performance of women does determine their level of confidence, or whether their level of 
confidence determines their performance. The nature of a possible intervention would be greatly 
influenced by the causal direction of these relationships. In the area of mathematics, the 
phenomenon of stereotype threat, where pre-existing negative stereotypes about one’s group can 
increase anxiety and, by extension, can decrease confidence in one’s abilities, would support the 
idea that confidence causally affects performance. This could be seen as being consistent with 
the fact that further education does not succeed in closing the gender gap.   
In a related fashion, the second goal of this study was to examine the role of individual 
differences, first testing the appropriateness, for the area of statistical reasoning, of the tri-partite 
theory of reasoning proposed by Stanovich (2009). Stanovich’s argument relies on the idea that 
thinking dispositions motivate the use of cognitive ability to solve reasoning problems. Using a 
structural equation model to test the relation between thinking dispositions, cognitive ability, and 
statistical reasoning, the fit of the proposed model to the data was very good, and the pattern of 
relation between individual differences and statistical reasoning was equivalent across gender. 
Adding gender as a predictor in the model demonstrated how its influence on performance is 
complex, and multi-faceted. Indeed, gender is modeled as influencing statistical reasoning both 
directly – as demonstrated by the significant path between gender and statistical reasoning – and 
indirectly through its significant influence on thinking dispositions and on cognitive abilities. 
The subsequent studies will attempt to shed some light on possible factors at play in this 
equation, keeping in mind that the model indicates that any attempt to influence statistical 
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reasoning directly or indirectly will likely address no more than one-third of the total effect of 
gender on statistical reasoning. Indeed, when examining the total effect composed by each of the 
three significant paths, one can see that 37% of the effect is explained by the influence that 
gender has on thinking dispositions; that 24% of the effect is explained by the influence that 
gender has on cognitive ability; and that 39% of the effect is explained by the direct influence of 
gender on statistical reasoning.   
Just as it has been mentioned in mathematics, multiple factors should be considered when 
studying gender and performance, ranging from an individuals level of interest in the topic, to 
cognitive processes, to socialization (Byrnes, & Takahira, 1993). For instance, expectations and 
attitudes toward the self and toward others, including stereotypes, are acquired through 
socialization. When a stereotype suggests a negative characteristic about a group to which one 
identifies, that stereotype becomes threatening and can impede one’s ability to perform to its full 
potential. This stereotype threat hypothesis (Steele, 1997; Spencer et al., 1999) has been studied 
extensively in mathematics. The next set of studies will explore the validity of this hypothesis for 
the area of statistics. 
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STUDY 2 
As shown in Study 1, individual differences in cognitive ability and in thinking 
dispositions are not sufficient to fully explain the performance gap in statistics. Gender 
influences statistical reasoning both in direct and indirect ways, and experience benefits both 
genders relatively equally. However, for females with comparable prior experience who are 
performing as well as males in class and obtaining the same grades, their performance on 
standardized tests such as the SAT-math (Byrnes & Takahira, 1993) and on statistical reasoning 
tests (Tempelaar et al., 2006) is nonetheless lower. Consistent with the model presented in Study 
1, this finding makes it difficult to explain the gender gap in terms of pure ability. In fact, Byrnes 
& Takahira (1993) recommend that multiple factors be considered when studying gender and 
mathematics, including socialization. For instance, research has shown that prior beliefs and 
societal stereotypes – such as females not being good at math – are perpetuated by family and 
teachers alike and are difficult to eradicate from the classroom (Smith & Hung, 2008). They can 
also give rise to performance deficits (Shapiro & Williams, 2012), at least in part through the 
pervasive effect of stereotype threat. Stereotype threat occurs when members of a negatively 
stereotyped group anxiously expect that their performance will confirm the stereotype attached to 
their social group (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999). This phenomenon 
has been documented in different areas, with different groups, such as intelligence testing in 
African-Americans (Steele & Aronson, 1995), athleticism in European Americans (Stone, Perry, 
& Darley, 1997), social sensitivity in men (Koening & Eagly, 2005), and mathematical abilities 
in women (Quinn & Spencer, 1999, 2001; Schmader, Johns, & Barquissau, 2004). In fact, gender 
is one of the most often cited sources of performance deficits related to stereotype threat.  
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Even though the phenomenon has not been established directly in statistics, the fact that 
statistics use mathematical tools (Moore, 1992), combined with the fact that females often show 
signs of anxiety when faced with either mathematics (Ashcraft, & Faust, 1994) or statistics 
(Onwuegbuzie & Wilson, 2003) classes, together make the field of statistics a likely candidate 
for stereotype threat. Moreover, Study 1 clearly shows that thinking dispositions influence 
statistical reasoning above and beyond differences in cognitive abilities. Reasoning theorists 
explain this phenomenon by emphasizing that, whereas cognitive ability is highly stable, 
thinking dispositions are malleable (Stanovich, 2001; Baron, 1985; Tishman, & Andrade, 1995), 
which makes thinking dispositions appropriate candidates for attempts at modification of 
behaviour. Theoretically, if we can influence females’ willingness to engage with statistical 
material, we could indirectly improve their performance on the statistical reasoning task.  
One way to encourage willingness to engage in a task is by manipulating the context of 
the task. For instance, in discussing Need for Cognition (a thinking disposition), the creators of 
the scale emphasize the stability of the trait while underlining how it is influenced by situational 
constraints (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Therefore, assuming that this and other thinking 
dispositions can be influenced by the situation, and given that stereotype threat is inherent to the 
social situation, it is possible that by reducing the negative power of the stereotype threat, 
participants’ tendency to think productively will be restored. If true, female participants – as they 
are the target of the negative stereotype - should have increased motivation to engage with the 
task and in turn perform better on the statistical reasoning task.  
There is some evidence that explicit teaching about stereotype threat could help reduce its 
detrimental effects (Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005). Another potential strategy to help 
counter the effect of stereotype threat is through “value affirmation”. Value affirmation is a 
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social-psychological intervention that aims at increasing one’s self-perception of worth (Yeager 
& Walton, 2011). By asking people to think about activities or values that are very important to 
them, value affirmation helps shift attention from the anxiety-inducing field or activity (Martens, 
Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006; Taylor & Walton, 2011). One main reason for the interest in 
this technique is the potential it holds as being easily employable by students prior to high-stake 
tests such as final exams, or at any point during learning.  
A recent in-class initiative, testing the usefulness of value affirmation to counter 
stereotype threat in the male-dominated area of physics, showed some promise. Miyake, Kost-
Smith, Finkelstein, Pollock, Cohen, and Ito (2010) randomly assigned students in an introductory 
physics class to a value affirmation group or to a control group. The manipulation was presented 
as a writing exercise that students had to complete mandatorily as part of the course. Both groups 
completed it, albeit on slightly different topics. In the control group, students were asked to write 
about a value of low importance to them. In contrast, the value affirmation group was asked to 
write about a value of high importance to them. Whereas males’ performance did not differ 
based on the group to which they were assigned, females in the value affirmation group 
outperformed females in the control group. The positive impact of value affirmation has also 
been demonstrated for females in mathematics (Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006). 
Thus, value affirmation has been shown to be a worthwhile treatment to reduce gender gap in 
some academic settings. However, this idea has not yet been tested in the area of statistics.  
In this study, we conducted a replication and extension of the Miyake et al (2010) study 
in the context of a statistics class. If stereotype threat is a viable explanation for the performance 
gap observed in statistics, then female students in a value affirmation condition should perform 
better than female students in a control condition on a statistical reasoning test at the end of the 
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term, but not at the beginning of the term as the first testing round occurred prior to the value 
affirmation manipulation. The condition they are in should not affect the performance of male 
students. However, as found in the physics class (Miyake et al., 2010), it was possible that the 
level to which females endorse the stereotype may reveal itself as a moderator of the effect, with 
the value affirmation intervention proving beneficial only for those females who believe that 
females are less skilled than males in statistics. Thus, if stereotype threat does apply to the field 
of statistics, then performance should improve for females who self-affirm their values, yet 
perhaps only for those who believe that a negative stereotype overshadows their potential.  
Method 
Participants 
Volunteers were recruited from an introduction to statistics course at the University of 
Waterloo (Psych 292 - “Basic Data Analysis”) on January 4th 2011 (first day of class). 
Participants were invited to complete a 3-phase study. In phase 1, participants received chocolate 
and a chance to win one of five prizes of $20. In phase 2, participants received a chance to win 
one of three prizes of $30. In phase 3, participants received a chance to win one of two prizes of 
$50. Sixty-seven eligible students (17 males, 50 females) completed phase 1; thirty-one students 
(7 males, 24 females) completed phase 2; and twenty-three students (5 males, 18 females) 
completed all three phases.  
Design  
A 2 (gender) x 2 (condition) between-subjects design was used. Although experience was 
homogeneous across the group at each phase, its effect was tested within- subjects for those 
participants who completed all three phases. Males and females were randomly assigned either to 
the value affirmation or to the control condition. In each condition, as in Martens et al. (2006), 
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participants first ordered a list of eleven values from the most important to them (#1) to the least 
important to them (#11) (see Appendix C). In the value affirmation group, participants were then 
asked to explain how and why the value they ranked #1 was important to them. In the control 
group, participants were asked to explain how and why the value they ranked #9 might be 
important to another UW student. Both the instructor and the teaching assistants were unaware of 
who participated in any of the phases, and were therefore blind to which condition any 
participant was in until the grades for the course had been officially submitted. All data was 
handled by a research assistant under the supervision of a faculty member, both otherwise 
uninvolved with the students of that course. 
Materials 
Five questionnaires were used in this study: (1) Statistical Reasoning Assessment (SRA: 
Garfield, 2003 – Appendix A); (2) the self-affirmation questionnaire (based on Martens et al, 
2006 – Appendix C); (3) a stereotype endorsement scale adapted for mathematics and for 
statistics (based on Miyake et al., 2010 – Appendix B); (4) the Numeracy Scale (NUM: Lipkus et 
al., 2001; Coefficient alpha = ranging from 0.70 to 0.75 – Appendix B); and (5) the Preference 
for Numerical Information Scale (PNI: Viswanathan, 1993; Coefficient alpha = ranging from 
0.94 – Appendix B). In addition, final grades from the pre-requisite to the introduction to 
statistics course (Psych 291 - “Basic Research Methods”) and final grades from the course 
(Psych 292 - “Basic Data Analysis”) were obtained for students who provided consent.  
Procedure  
Phase 1. Participants were recruited in class on the first day of the term. As per the ethics 
board guidelines, participation was voluntary. This had been established to prevent the students 
from feeling pressured to participate as the main researcher was also teaching this class. In phase 
 37	  
1, each participant received a chocolate and could enter a draw to win one of five prizes of $20. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (i.e., affirmation vs. control). 
Prior to signing the consent form, they were informed that the study had three phases. They were 
asked for their consent for the current phase of the study, and for the permission to contact them 
by email to complete the next two phases online. They were also asked to grant us permission to 
access their final grades in the pre-requisite course in research methods (Psych 291) and in the 
current introductory statistics course (Psych 292).  
During this phase, participants completed the SRA, to which the two stereotype belief 
questions had been added, followed by the value affirmation task. All participants completed the 
ranking of 11 values (see list in Appendix C) in the first place, followed by a short essay to 
complete afterward. Then again, the nature of the short essay varied, with one version focusing 
on why the value they ranked as #9 could be important to others, and the other version focusing 
on why the value they ranked as #1 is important to them.  Completion of the tasks occurred in the 
classroom and took between 30 and 40 minutes.   
Phase 2. Two weeks after Phase 1, all participants who had given their consent received 
an email and a link to take them to the Phase 2 of the study. In case someone’s email address had 
been entered wrongly, a second appeal was made through the online posting board for the class, 
given that the sample size from the first phase was smaller than expected.  
Phase 2 was included to emulate the general design used by Miyake et al. (2010), where 
the value affirmation task was repeated after a few weeks. Participants were informed that the 
task would occur online and take no longer than 10-15 minutes to complete. At the end of the 
task, participants could choose to enter a draw for one of three prizes of $30.  
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Phase 3. At the beginning of April 2011, thus three months after Phase 1, all participants 
who had previously given their consent received an email and a link to take them to the Phase 3 
of the study. This phase required 30-45 minutes to complete and took place online. Participants 
were asked to complete three different questionnaires: (1) SRA (as their post-test), (2) NUM, and 
(3) PNI. At the end of the tasks, participants could choose to enter a draw for one of two $50 
prizes. After all participants had completed the study, feedback was emailed to them.  
Results 
In this study, we were interested in examining the impact of value affirmation on the 
development of statistical reasoning. Data from phase 1 was analyzed as the baseline for the 
sample of 56 participants (out of 67) who gave access to their grade from the pre-requisite 
course, and data from phase 3 was analyzed as the post-test for the continuing 23 participants. It 
was expected that a gender effect would be present at baseline. However, if value affirmation is 
an effective intervention in statistics – implying the existence of a stereotype threat in that 
domain – females in the value affirmation condition should surpass those in the control condition 
at Phase 3, also reducing the gap between them and males in either condition. Indeed, it was not 
expected that condition would have an impact on the performance of males. Thus, the interaction 
between condition and gender should be significant. Descriptive statistics for correct reasoning, 







Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics – Study 2 – Phase 1 – Performance & Confidence 
   Male   Female   Total  
  n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD 
Correct reasoning   16 .69 .16 40 .60 .16 56 .63 .14 
Misconception Scale   .21 .10  .30 .12  .27 .12 






Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics – Study 2 – Phase 3 – Performance & Confidence 
   Male   Female   Total  
 Condition n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD 
Correct 
reasoning Scale 
Control 3 .81 .08 10 .63 .10 13 .67 .12 
Affirmation 2 .80 .04   8 .61 .17 10 .65 .17 
 Total 5 .81 .06 18 .62 .13 23 .66 .14 
Misconception 
Scale 
Control  .14 .09  .24 .103  0.21 .10 
Affirmation  .12 .07  .33 .152  0.29 .16 
 Total  .14 .08  .28 0.13  0.24 .13 
Confidence Control  5.13 .33  4.77 .79  4.85 .71 
 Affirmation  5.35 .42  5.23 .37  5.26 .36 




Phase 1 – Pre-requisite, performance & confidence 
Pre-requisite research methods (Psych 291) grade. To get a sense of the composition 
of the sample, grades from the pre-requisite course to the statistics course were obtained. An 
independent samples t-test demonstrated equal performance across gender in the basic research 
course, despite females (M = 85.80, SD = 8.68, with grades ranging from 60 to 100) scoring even 
slightly higher than males (M = 82.63, SD = 10.84, with grades ranging from 55 to 95), although 
not significantly so, t(54) =1.15, SE = 3.18, p = .26.    
Performance. In contrast, females underperformed on the statistical reasoning 
assessment, t(54) = 2.15, SE = .041, p = .036, scoring 9% less than males on the correct 
reasoning scale (Mf = .60, SD = .13; Mm = .69, SD = .16), and adhering to 9% more 
misconceptions than males, t(54) = 2.76, SE = .03, p = .008, (Mf = .30, SD = .12; Mm = .21, SD = 
.10). Thus, despite an equal performance on a pre-requisite for a statistics course, the gender gap 
easily appears when the same group is submitted to a statistical test.  
In this sample, 64% of participants disagreed with the gender stereotype in statistics. In 
other words, only 25% of males and 40% of females agreed with the potential stereotype in 
statistics that men generally do better in statistics than women. Using the level of endorsement of 
the stereotypes as a covariate (p = .94) in the general linear model to analyze correct reasoning 
left the gender effect intact (p = .041). Finally, controlling for the grade obtained in the 
prerequisite course in research methods (Psych 291) – a significant covariate (p = .001) – did not 
influence the obtained gender effect (p = .006). The same patterns of results were found when 
analyzing the misconceptions scores with the same covariates. Summary tables of results for the 
ANCOVA analyses are presented in Appendix D. 
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Confidence. Reflecting the results on the performance measure, females were less 
confident than males (Mf = 4.50, SD = .90; Mm = 4.92, SD = .59), even though the difference did 
not quite reach significance, t(54) = 1.68, SE = .25, p = .10. Unlike Study 1, males’ and females’ 
confidence was calibrated with their performance [r(14) = .56, p = .024 and r(38) = .33, p = .038, 
respectively]; however, their degree of calibration did not differ from each other (z = .9, p = .37).  
A scatterplot of the relation between performance and confidence is presented in Figure 5, and 









Figure 5. Scatterplot of the association between performance and 





Correlation Matrix – Study 2 – Phase 1 
Subscale Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. CR .63 (.14) -- -.62** .41** -.05 -.15 .38** .30* 
2. MISC .27 (.12)  -- -.27* .05 .11 -.17 -.11 
3. Confidence 4.62 (.84)   -- -.09 -.03 .20 .18 
4. SE_Stats 2.80 (1.43)    -- .95** -.04 -.19 
5. SE_Math 3.05 (1.65)     -- -.05 -.16 
6. Pre-req.grade  84.89 (9.36)      -- .60** 
7. Course grade 80.91 (10.86)       -- 
 Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
 
Phase 3 – Performance & confidence  
For this phase, the value affirmation condition can be used as an independent variable of 
interest. Performance scores and confidence ratings were analyzed using a 2 (gender) x 2 
(condition) analysis of variance. When appropriate, a covariate was added to this general linear 
model. The expectation was that females in the value affirmation condition would perform better 
than females in the control condition, and that males’ performance and confidence would not be 
affected by the condition, thus leading to a gender by condition interaction. Descriptive statistics 
for all three dependent variables can be found in Table 4.  
Performance. As with Phase 1, a gender effect was present on both reasoning scales 
(CR: F(1, 19) = 8.46, MSE = .016, p = .008, η2p = .308; MISC: F(1, 19) = 5.62, MSE = .029, p 
= .029, η2p = .228), with females underperforming on the correct reasoning scale by 19% (Mf = 
.62, SD = .13; Mm = .81, SD = .06), and adhering to significantly more misconceptions than 
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males by 14% (Mf = .28, SD = .13, Mm = .14, SD=.08). Unfortunately, the value affirmation 
condition did not help improve the performance of women on the SRA, neither as a main effect 
of condition, (CR: F(1, 19) = .04, MSE = .016, p = .853, η2p = .002; MISC: F(1, 19) = .31, MSE 
= .015, p = .587, η2p = .016) nor a gender by condition interaction, (CR: F(1, 19) = .01, MSE = 
.016, p = .912, η2p = .001; MISC: F(1, 19) = .82, MSE = .015, p = .377, η2p = .041), was 
present. This pattern of effects held true even when controlling for the level of endorsement (CR: 
p = .24; MISC: p = .75) of the gender stereotype in statistics (see Appendix D for summary 
tables of these and other ANCOVA analyses). Condition was again not significant when limiting 
the analysis to females (CR: t(16)= .31, SE = .063, p = .76; MISC: t(16)= 1.51, SE = .060, p = 
.15). Also, when splitting the group by whether participants agreed or disagreed with the 
stereotype, as done in Miyake et al. (2010), although the effect of condition was significant for 
the correct reasoning, F(1, 5) = 11.746, MSE = .002, p = .019, η2p = .701, the overly small 
sample size of eight, which includes only one female in the affirmation condition, prevented 
drawing any meaningful conclusion.  
Confidence. Despite females having a slightly lower level of confidence than males (Mf  
= 4.98, SD = .66; Mm = 5.22, SD = .34), and despite those in the affirmation condition having a 
slightly higher level of confidence (Maffirmation = 5.26, SD = .36; Mcontrol = 4.85, SD = .71), neither 
gender, F(1, 19) = .60, MSE = .366, p = .448, η2p = .031, condition, F(1, 19) = 1.19, MSE = 
.366, p = .289, η2p = .059, nor their interaction, F(1, 19) = .16, MSE = .366, p = .699, η2p = .008, 
had a statistically significant effect on confidence. Also, males’ and females’ confidence was not 
significantly calibrated with their performance (r(3) = .57, p = .319 and (r(16) = .10, p = .695. 
respectively); possibly due to the overly small sample, their degree of calibration did not differ 
 44	  
from each other (z = .72, p = .47). A scatterplot of the relation between performance and 











Figure 6. Scatterplot of relation between performance and 
confidence, by gender. Study 2, Phase 3.  
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Table 6          
Correlation Matrix – Study 2 – Phase 3       
Subscale Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. CR .65 (.14) -- -.66** .20 .21 .38 -.09 -.34 .36 .07 -.47* 
2. MISC .25 (.11)  -- -.21 -.20 -.24 -.03 .12 -.14 -.03 .33 
3. Conf 4.95 (.64)   -- .34 .30 -.29 -.19 -.18 -.06 -.08 
4. PNI 83.35 (12.42)    -- .39 -.42* -.45* .32 .16 .02 
5. NUM 8.57 (1.65)     -- -.01 -.03 .45* .47* -.01 
6. STstats 2.83 (1.44)      -- .91** -.13 .19 -.09 
7. STmath 3.22 (1.70)       -- -.25 .19 .05 
8. 291 86.90 (8.11)        -- .60** -.14 
9. 292 84.40 (9.32)         -- .15 
10.  
Word Count 
80.09 (31.50)          -- 
 Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Discussion 
In this study, the gender gap observed in Study 1 was replicated. As the grades of 
students were not different on the pre-requisite course, this gender gap on the SRA could be seen 
as somewhat surprising. Then again, Tempelaar et al. (2006) also found the gender gap despite 
the equivalent background experience of males and females. Importantly, no effect of value 
affirmation was found, and taking participants’ belief in the gender stereotype into account did 
not moderate its effect. Although not statistically significant, males demonstrated a trend toward 
higher confidence than women in Phase 3. However, value affirmation did not yield higher 
confidence. Also, unlike Study 1, the calibration of males and females did not differ. Given the 
small sample sizes, this lack of significant differences between correlation coefficients is not 
surprising.  
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The finding of lack of effect of the technique of value affirmation is disappointing, but 
there are a few reasons why it may have been ineffective in this case. First, it is possible that the 
sample was atypical given that participants were self-selected. Unlike Miyake et al. (2010), we 
were not given the permission to enlist the entire class in the research project. Despite the fact 
that grades from the pre-requisite course ranged from 55 to 100 for the sample in Phase 1 and 
ranged from 71 to 100 for the sample in Phase 3, the group average was around 85% in each 
phase, which supports the idea that the sample contained higher-performing students. In fact, 
their average is higher than the overall group average of 79% in the pre-requisite course for their 
cohort. Thus, it is possible that this high-performing group could have been less susceptible to 
the self-affirmation manipulation. Another sign of their distinction from the norm comes from 
comparing SRA scores in Study 2 to those in Study 1. At Phase 1, females scored 11% higher 
than females with no experience in statistics in Study 1, and males scored 12% higher than males 
with no experience in statistics in Study 1. At Phase 3, females scored 7% higher than females 
with one course in statistics, and males scored 14% higher than males with one course in 
statistics.  
A second possibility to explain the lack of effect of value affirmation is that statistics is 
not processed the same way as mathematics. Indeed, statistics educators strongly argue that 
statistics are fundamentally different from mathematics (Moore, 1992; Iversen, 1992). Even 
though statistics uses the mathematical language, just as economics and physics do, it deals with 
different issues from mathematics, especially that of uncertainty (Iversen, 1992). In fact, 
statistics is the science of data and it deals specifically with numbers within contexts (Moore, 
1992). Therefore, if statistics is not technically a branch of mathematics, this could suggest that 
stereotype threat may not be at play in statistics. However, this was not evident from 
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participants’ responses in the current study as no difference between the level of endorsement of 
the stereotype in mathematics and the level of endorsement of the stereotype in statistics was 
observed. The levels of endorsement in the current study were also similar to those reported by 
Martens et al. (2006).  
Third, the class context may have played a role. Stereotype threat is often associated with 
being a minority (Steele, 1997; Shapiro & Williams, 2012). However, in the context of this 
statistics class for psychology majors, women are in the majority (i.e., 69% were women). 
Nevertheless, this may be offset by the fact that such negative stereotypes would be pernicious, 
especially on a campus populated greatly by the male-dominated mathematics, engineering, and 
computer science majors.  
Finally, the most likely reason for this lack of a positive effect of value affirmation is the 
very limited sample size and the related lack of power. This project began ambitiously with the 
goal of replicating Miyake et al. (2010) in a statistics class. Ethical restrictions, especially the 
impossibility of making participation mandatory, prevented this project from achieving its entire 
potential. Although repeating this study in class was not an option, a replication was conducted 
in the lab. This allowed the recruitment of a larger sample and, as in Study 1, the inclusion of 





While it was not possible to repeat the in-class experiment, Study 3 maintained the goal 
of testing the usefulness of value affirmation in statistics. Using a larger sample also provided the 
opportunity to reprise experience as a between-subject factor. In addition to allowing a 
replication of Study 1 (due to the inclusion of Gender and Experience as independent variables), 
it was possible to verify if experience moderates the usefulness of value affirmation for females.  
If a stereotype threat does exist in statistics, not only is it expected that the gender gap 
will again be found, with males outperforming females, but taking action to reduce the impact of 
the stereotype threat should help improve performance of women in statistics. Specifically, 
females who affirm their values should perform better than females who do not affirm their 
values. However, given that value affirmation for those who are not under the threat of the 
negative stereotype (i.e., males in statistics) should have limited or no influence on their 
performance, we expected to find an interaction between gender and condition, with only 
females benefiting from the value affirmation manipulation. 
In addition, as with the previous studies, confidence was measured to complement the 
performance-related results. In general, if participants are well calibrated, their confidence 
ratings should correlate positively with their performance. Given the results of Study 1, males 
were expected to report high confidence regardless of their performance, whereas women’s 
confidence level should track their performance more closely. Although this pattern was not 
found in Study 2, the limitation in power discussed earlier is nonetheless a likely reason for this 
failure to replicate. Then again, if value affirmation does indeed reduce the fear of confirming 
the negative stereotype, females in the affirmation condition may also display higher confidence 




One hundred and fifty-seven undergraduate students (69 males, 88 females; Mage = 20.31, 
SD = 3.29) from the University of Waterloo were recruited through SONA, an experiment 
management system, and participated for course credit in any eligible psychology course. 
Participants had varying levels of experience in statistics, as measured by the number of statistics 
courses they had previously taken (0: N = 79; 1: N = 49; 2 or more: N = 29)3.  
Design & Materials 
For this study, a 2 (gender) x 2 (condition) x 3 (experience) between-subjects design was 
used. As in Study 1, condition was randomly assigned and determined by the version of the value 
affirmation exercise that participants completed (see Appendix C). As with Studies 1 and 2, the 
SRA was used, and the dependent variables included correct reasoning scores (CR) and 
misconception scores (MISC), as well as confidence ratings.                                        
The level of endorsement of the stereotype in statistics and in mathematics was measured. 
Unlike Study 2, the two questions were added at the end of the PNI scale. Although this meant 
that the rating would now be given on a 7-point rather than on a 6-point scale, it seemed more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Despite conducting testing for this study for two terms, it proved difficult to recruit participants having taken at 
least two courses in statistics. Given that 29 is quite small in comparison to 79 in the ‘stats = 0’ condition, analyses 
were repeated after combining all participants with any level of experience within one group of 78 participants. This 
2 (gender) x 2 (condition) x 2 (experience) ANOVA revealed the same two effects for correct reasoning 
performance as when three levels of experience were used. Specifically, females (M = .54, SD = .16) 
underperformed as expected in comparison to males (M = .62, SD = .16), F(1, 149) = 9.37, MSE = .025, p = .003, 
η2p = .059, and gender interacted with experience, F(1, 149) = 6.24, MSE = .025, p = .014, η2p = .040.  
When reasoning turns to avoiding misconceptions, the results of the omnibus ANOVA revealed the same 
main effect of experience, F(1, 149) = 6.44, MSE = .014, p = .012, η2p = .041.  Only one small difference emerged 
in this version of the analysis, with gender interacting with experience, F(1, 149) = 4.25, MSE = .014, p = .041, η2p 
= .028, as females benefited more greatly from experience (9% average decrease in misconceptions) than males (1% 
average decrease in misconceptions). 
Finally, analysis of the confidence ratings revealed the same experience by condition interaction, F(1, 149) 
= 5.02, MSE = .494, p = .027, η2p = .033. Overall, using 3 levels versus 2 levels of experience in the analysis made 
very little difference.  
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natural and less disruptive to ask for participants’ beliefs at the end of a self-report questionnaire 
rather than at the end of the assessment tool. The level of endorsement of the stereotype in 
statistics was subsequently used both as a continuous predictor in the general linear model, and 
as a basis to split the group to better examine whether believing in the stereotype moderated the 
effect of the value affirmation exercise.  
Along with the other covariates presented in Appendix D (e.g., CRT, PNI), the number of 
words participants used in the writing exercise was counted and used as an additional covariate. 
This was done to control for the possibility that one’s level of involvement in the task could 
influence the effectiveness of the value affirmation exercise.  
Procedure  
Participants came to the lab for this study and were tested in groups of one to three. After 
reading the informed letter and signing a consent form, participants were asked to complete four 
tasks: (1) the value affirmation task, (2) the SRA with its associated confidence ratings, (3) the 
CRT, and (4) the PNI, which ended with the two questions about their level of belief in a gender 
stereotype in math and in stats. At the end of the session, participants had the opportunity to ask 
questions about the study and received a feedback form.  
Results 
Performance and confidence scores were analysed using a 2 (gender) x 2 (condition) x 3 
(experience) between-subjects ANOVA. It was expected that, as in Study 1, males would 
perform better than females and that experience would be equally beneficial to both genders. If 
the value affirmation exercise is effective at combating stereotype threat in statistics, women in 
the value affirmation condition should score higher than those in the control condition. However, 
this may only hold for women who believe in a stereotype in statistics. Based on the findings 
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from Study 1, confidence was expected to be high and homogeneous for males irrespective of 
performance, while it was expected that confidence would be related to performance for women. 
In addition, if value affirmation does indeed reduce stereotype threat, females in the affirmation 
condition may also display higher confidence than women in the control condition. Prior to 
running the analyses, data exploration identified one extreme outlier that was removed from the 
analyses involving confidence ratings. The sample size for the subsequent analyses involving 
confidence scores was thus 156. The descriptive statistics for this sample are presented in Table 
7.   
Performance. A first look at the results of the omnibus ANOVA for correct reasoning 
performance revealed a single main effect of gender, F(1, 145) = 4.60, MSE = .025, p = .034, η2p 
= .031, with females underperforming as expected in comparison to males (Mf = .54, SD = .161; 
Mm = .62, SD = .159). The only other significant effect in this analysis was the interaction of 
gender by experience, F(2, 145) = 3.15, MSE = .025, p = .046, η2p = .042. To better understand 
this effect, the data file was split by gender. The follow-up one-way ANOVA revealed no 
significant effect of experience for males, F(2, 82) = 1.68, MSE = .025, p = .19, whereas the 
same analysis revealed a marginally significant effect of experience for females, F(2, 82) = 2.95, 
MSE = .025, p = .058, where only those with the most experience scored better than the group 
with no experience (p = .057 using a conservative Tukey HSD test, or p = .022 using Fischer’s 
LSD, which is the most powerful while keeping the alpha level at .05 when only three groups are 
compared; Howell, 2007). 
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Table 7 





 Male   Female   Total  




0 35 .65 .14 44 .51 .15 79 .57 .16 
1 22 .57 .15 27 .56 .17 49 .57 .16 
2+ 12 .65 .21 17 .61 .14 29 .63 .17 
 Total 69 .62 .16 88 .54 .16 157 .58 .16 
Misconception 
Scale 
0  .27 .13  .35 .114  .31 .13 
1  .29 .12  .28 .111  .28 .12 
 2+  .22 .13  .24 .097  .23 .11 
 Total  .27 .13  .30 .118  .29 .12 
Confidence 0  4.88 .59 (43) 4.78 .64  4.82 .61 
1  4.69 .74  4.79 .57  4.75 .65 
 2+  4.95 .76  4.96 .64  4.96 .68 
 Total  4.83 .67 (87) 4.82 .62 (156) 4.82 .64 
 
  
The non-significant effect of condition could be a sign that, as the results from Miyake et 
al. (2010) suggest, the value affirmation procedure is only effective for those who agree with the 
stereotype. To account for this possibility, the omnibus analysis was repeated, this time 
controlling for participants’ level of endorsement of the stereotype in statistics. Although the 
overall pattern of results of the analysis did not change, stereotype endorsement appeared as a 
significant covariate (p = .025) (see detailed results of this and other ANCOVA analyses in 
Appendix D).  Subsequently, participants’ levels of endorsement of the stereotype were used to 
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create two groups: one group in disagreement with the stereotype, and one group in agreement 
with the stereotype (with the neutral answer being integrated with the “agree” group in an 
attempt to equalize sample sizes)4. As in Study 2, a wide majority of participants (65%) 
disagreed with the stereotype in statistics. However, this time, more males (43%) than females 
(28%) agreed with the stats stereotype. This is virtually identical to the levels of endorsement of 
the stereotype in mathematics by the same sample (64% disagree; 43% of males and 31% of 
females agree). For the next analysis, to avoid creating very small cells (e.g., n = 2), the 
experience variable was dropped, and the sample was divided by endorsement type (agree vs. 
disagree). Conducting the same 2 (gender) x 2 (condition) ANOVA separately for each group, 
the results did not replicate Miyake’s findings. Indeed, for both groups, although critically for the 
“agree” group, the affirmation condition did not lead to an improvement in performance. 
However, the habitual gender gap was present [“disagree”: F(1, 98) = 6.33, MSE = .027, p = 
.014, η2p = .061; “agree”: F(1, 51) = 4.76, MSE = .023, p = .034, η2p = .085] and was not 
qualified, in either group, by an interaction of condition with gender. 
When reasoning turns to avoiding misconceptions, the results of the omnibus ANOVA 
revealed a single main effect of experience, F(2, 145) = 4.98, MSE = .014, p = .008, η2p = .064.  
Specifically, one course is not enough. As found in Study 1, it takes at least two courses in 
statistics to witness a significant decrease in the number of misconceptions that one uses (Tukey 
HSD, p = .004; M0 = .31, SD = .13; M1 = .28, SD = .12; M2+ = .23, SD = .11). No other effect was 
present. In addition, the level of belief in the stereotype was not a significant covariate (p = .24), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 If those with a neutral answer are removed, 130 participants are included in the analysis instead of 157. Of those 
130, only 28 (22%) of those agreed with the stereotype. For all three dependent variables (CR, MISC, confidence), 
the effects of gender, condition, and their interactions were not significant. Except for the effect of gender in regard 
to CR [F(1, 24) = 2.50, MSE = .030, p = .127, η2p = .094] and MISC [F(1, 24) = 1.36, MSE = .030, p = .255, η2p = 
.054], all other F values were less than 1.  Of course, this lack of effects is compounded by the fact that so few 
participants were now included in the analyses, with all four cells including less than 10 participants.  
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and its inclusion did not change the pattern of results. The 2 (gender) x 2 (condition) ANOVA on 
each endorsement group corroborated this, as all effects were non-significant (all six Fs < 1, see 
Appendix D). 
Confidence. Confidence ratings were analyzed using a 2 (gender) x 2 (condition) x 3 
(experience) ANOVA. A single interaction effect of experience by condition was present, F(2, 
144) = 3.10, MSE = .402, p = .048, η2p = .041. To better understand this effect, the sample was 
split by condition and the effect of experience was further analyzed. Whereas confidence did not 
change with experience in the control group, for the group who affirmed their values, those with 
the most experience had higher levels of confidence than those with no experience in statistics (p 
= .092 when the conservative Tukey HSD is used, but p = .037 when Fischer’s LSD is used, as it 
is an appropriate choice when no more than three groups are being compared).  
Endorsement level, used either as a covariate (p = .65) or to split the group, did not 
change the pattern of results. Mirroring performance, agreeing with the stereotype and affirming 
one’s values did not have any beneficial effect on confidence. The full set of analyses 
(ANCOVA and split groups included) is available in Appendix D.  
Finally, the calibration of males (r = .20, p = .105) was compared to that of females (r = 
.33, p = .002), but the difference found in Study 1 was not replicated (z = .85, p = .40). Here, 
males and females were comparably calibrated. A scatterplot of those correlations is presented in 






Figure 7.  Scatterplot of association between performance and 
confidence, by gender. Study 3. 
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Table 8 
Correlation Matrix – Study 3 
Subscale Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. CR .58 (.16) -- -.65** .26** .33** .45** -.14 -.14 -.01 
2. MISC .29 (.12)  -- -.27** -.32** -.38** .07 .10 .06 
3. Confidence 4.82 (.64)   -- .14 .06 -.05 -.02 -.04 
4. PNI 92.75 (15.24)    -- .47** -.02 .01 -.09 
5. CRT 1.45 (1.15)     -- .08 .10 .04 
6. STstats 2.70 (1.67)      -- .88** .16* 
7. STmath 2.73 (1.77)       -- .15 
8. Word Count  60.59 (32.63)        -- 
 Note. All correlations involving confidence are based on N=156 instead of N=157.  
          * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
 
Discussion 
In this study, the gender gap was once again evident on the correct reasoning 
performance, whereas experience was found to be useful in reducing – but not fully eliminating – 
misconceptions. Using a larger sample, it was hoped that value affirmation would reveal itself as 
a useful tool to improve performance on a statistical reasoning test. Even for the group who 
believed in the stereotype, this was not the case. As in Study 2, affirming one’s prized values had 
no impact on reasoning or confidence.  
There are a few ways in which this lack of effect could be explained. First, as mentioned 
in Study 2, it is possible that statistical reasoning is different from mathematical reasoning, and 
that this domain is not susceptible to the negative influence of a stereotype. The finding that 
those who agree with the stereotype do not benefit from value affirmation supports this idea. In 
addition, everyone does not consider statistics a subfield of mathematics. Moore (1992) is the 
great defender of the idea that statistics, despite using tools from the area of mathematics, is a 
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separate field. Statistics are not simply calculations but rather the science of data – of making 
sense of numbers presented in a specific context. Onwuegbuzie and Wilson (2003) also argue 
that the assumption that statistics and mathematics are the same is outdated. Since statistical 
software became mainstream in the early 1990s, statistics no longer requires long mathematical 
equations to be solved by hand. The focus of statistics is now on big ideas rather than on heavy 
calculations. As such, these authors suggest that the literature needs to adapt and stop equating 
statistics with mathematics.   
Second, some will question the choice of not making the stereotype more salient, by 
asking participants to report their gender at the beginning of the study, for instance. Sackett et al. 
(2004, 2008) have questioned the external validity of the findings of a stereotype threat in the 
laboratory. As such, there is a need for studies that examine the stereotype threat hypothesis in a 
more natural setting. Given that, in real-life, the negative stereotype surrounding the ability of 
females in mathematics is pervasive and communicated through a variety of sources (Walton & 
Spencer, 2009), it seemed appropriate to capitalize on this pervasiveness alone to improve the 
external validity of the findings. In addition, literature on the stereotype threat in mathematics 
also notes that the stereotype does not need to be made explicit to take its toll (Steele, 1997; 
Spencer et al., 1999). Furthermore, the importance of statistical reasoning is obvious in everyday 
life, both in personal and in work spheres. In those contexts, women are not repeatedly asked to 
report their gender prior to making decisions, nor should they be. Also, despite not emphasizing 
the inherent threat of the situation in the design of the study, the gender gap in performance is 
apparent. Thus, something is at play in creating the gender gap. It is simply not convincing yet 
that stereotype threat is the factor of interest.      
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Prior to accepting that value affirmation is not useful in reducing the gender gap in 
statistics, there is room to question the testing instrument. The SRA is a fairly short test that 
represents a limited number of topics (Garfield & Chance, 2000), and which has been criticized 
for focusing too much on the topic of probabilities (Garfield, 2003). After the creation of and 
some work with the SRA, Garfield and her colleagues (delMas, Garfield, Ooms, & Chance, 
2007) proposed a new test. The Comprehensive Assessment of Outcomes in Statistics (CAOS) 
comprises many of the questions of the SRA, also uses a multiple-choices format, and shares the 
same goal of evaluating knowledge related to a first course in statistics. However, it covers a 
wider range of topics and focuses less on probability. In addition, the internal consistency of the 
test is very good (DeVellis, 1991) with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.82, which is higher 
than the reliability reported by Garfield (2003) for the SRA (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient equal 
to .70 for the correct reasoning scale and to .75 for the misconception scale). For those reasons, 
the next study used the same design; however, I used the CAOS as the primary measure of 




Given the absence of a positive effect of the value affirmation manipulation in the 
previous study, it was decided to replace the statistical reasoning task to verify if this lack of 
finding is simply contextual and linked to the test material being used. Therefore, in this fourth 
study, the aim is to examine whether the test used previously can account for not finding the 
expected effect of the value affirmation manipulation in statistics. To do so, I administered the 
CAOS instead of the SRA. As mentioned earlier, the CAOS is a test that is comprised of 40 
multiple-choice questions, many of which were part of the SRA. The goal of the CAOS is also to 
evaluate the knowledge students should possess after a first course in statistics (see Appendix E 
for a list of the learning objectives associated with each question). In addition, the reliability of 
the CAOS is higher than that on the SRA (delMas, Garfield, Ooms, & Chance, 2007). These 
similarities and improvements make the CAOS an appropriate replacement choice for an 
attempted replication and extension of the previous study.  
Logistically, given that the CAOS includes 40 questions instead of 20, it was also decided 
to modify the method for the collection of confidence ratings to avoid increasing the total length 
of the session. Therefore, instead of asking participants to report their level of confidence for 
each question, participants were asked at the end of the test to report what percentage of the 
questions they believed to have gotten right. In addition to keeping the testing time reasonable 
(and comparable to prior experiments), this change removes the possibility that confidence 
ratings could be distorted over time from the act of repetitively having to report them after each 
problem. The percentage scale may also reveal itself to be a more sensitive tool to measure the 
impact of value affirmation. 
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If value affirmation is sensitive to the test material used, we expect that performance on 
this new test could improve for those in the value affirmation condition, although possibly only 
for those who agree with the stereotype. On the other hand, if stereotype threat is not a reality in 
the domain of statistics, then we expect that the value affirmation manipulation will have no 
effect despite using a new test. If this alternative format for probing confidence (i.e., only once 
after the test is done) is more sensitive than asking for a rating after each question, then condition 
may, for once, appear to increase confidence for those females in the affirmation group, 
especially if they believe in a stereotype in statistics.  
Method 
Participants  
Two hundred and six undergraduate and graduate students (97 males, 109 females; Mage 
= 21.33, SD = 4.56) from the University of Waterloo participated for course credit or 
remuneration. Participants had varying levels of experience in statistics, as measured by the 
number of statistics courses they had previously taken (0: N = 73, 1: N = 68, 2+: N = 65), and 
came from fields deemed generally non-quantitative to extremely quantitative [Generally non-
quantitative = 13 (6%), Minimally quantitative = 25 (12%), Moderately quantitative = 82 (40%), 
Highly quantitative = 69 (34%), Extremely quantitative = 15 (7%)]. 
Design & Materials 
As in study 3, a 2 (gender) x 2 (condition) x 3 (experience) between-subjects design was 
used. Given that the CAOS was used, the number of dependent variables was reduced to two: 
correct reasoning performance and confidence. Indeed, the CAOS does not include a 
misconception subscale, making it a simpler instrument to use and score. Participants’ levels of 
endorsement in the gender stereotype in statistics and in mathematics were collected to use as 
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covariates. Other covariates included the CRT (as a proxy for cognitive ability), PNI (as a proxy 
for thinking dispositions), and the number of words used in the writing exercise (as a proxy for 
involvement in the task). Except for the analysis of covariance using the level of endorsement of 
a statistics stereotype, all other analysis results are presented in Appendix D to avoid 
overcrowding the results section.  
As with Studies 2 and 3, participants were randomly assigned to a condition, which was 
determined by the version of the value affirmation exercise that participants completed. As 
before, all participants first completed the ranking of 11 values (see list in Appendix C), 
followed by a short essay. However, the nature of the short essay varied, with one version 
focusing on why the value they ranked as #9 could be important to others, and the other version 
focusing on why the value they ranked as #1 is important to them.  
Procedure  
This study took place in a lab. After reading the informed consent letter and signing a 
consent form, participants were asked to complete (1) the value affirmation task, (2) the CAOS 
with its associated confidence rating, (3) the CRT, (4) the PNI along with the two stereotype 
endorsement questions, as well as (5) the demographic information based on Schield (2005). At 
the end of the session, participants had the opportunity to ask questions about the study and 
received a feedback form.   
Results 
As in Study 3, performance and confidence scores were analyzed using a 2 (gender) x 2 
(condition) x 3 (experience) between-subjects ANOVA, with the difference that only one correct 
reasoning score captured performance. It was expected that, as in all three previous studies, 
males would perform better than females and that experience would be equally beneficial to both 
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genders. If the value affirmation exercise is effective at combating stereotype threat in statistics, 
then women in the value affirmation condition should score higher than those in the control 
condition. However, this pattern may only be evident for those who agree with the gender 
stereotype in statistics.  
For women, it is expected that confidence would be positively related to performance. In 
addition, if value affirmation does indeed reduce stereotype threat and improve performance, 
females in the affirmation condition may also display higher confidence than women in the 
control condition. For men, however, the pattern emerging from Studies 1 and 3 is not as clear. 
Thus, their confidence could be high and homogeneous irrespective of performance (as in Study 
1), or it could follow performance (as in Studies 2 and 3). At the very least, men’s confidence 
should be higher than women’s confidence level. Descriptive statistics for performance and 
confidence are available in Table 9.  
Performance 
Performance on the CAOS test was first analyzed using 2 (gender) x 2 (condition) x 3 
(experience) between-subjects ANOVA. The results replicated Studies 1, 2 and 3, with a 
significant gender effect where females (M = .48, SD = .108) score 12% lower than males (M = 
.56, SD = .143), F(1, 194) = 17.62, MSE = .015, p < .001, η2p = .083, and a significant effect of 
experience, F(2, 194) = 6.87, MSE = .015, p = .001, η2p = .066. Specifically, participants with 
any level of experience perform better than those with no experience in statistics (Tukey HSD, p 
< .015). Despite those with the most experience (M2+ = 0.56, SD = 0.14) scoring higher than 
those with only one course in statistics (M1 = 0.53, SD = 0.12), the difference was not statistically 
significant (Tukey HSD, p > .05). Noticeably again, the effect of condition was not significant, 
and entering the level of belief in the stereotype as a covariate (p = .20) did not change the 
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Table 9  





 Male   Female   Total  
 n Mean SD n Mean SD N Mean SD 
Performance – 
CAOS 
0 30 .54 .12 43 .42 .09 73 .47 .12 
1 32 .55 .13 36 .52 .11 68 .55 .13 
 2+ 35 .60 .17 30 .52 .10 65 .56 .14 
 Total 97 .56 .14 109 .48 .11 206 .52 .13 
Confidence 0  61.28 19.42  56.60 17.08  58.53 18.10 
1  57.68 22.29  57.61 17.61  66.55 17.70 
 2+  70.27 17.00  63.97 20.51  67.36 18.82 
 Total  63.34 20.15  58.96 18.35  61.02 19.30 
 
 
pattern of results. When further splitting the group between those in agreement (43% of males 
and 36% of females) and those in disagreement (61% of the overall sample) with a stereotype in 
statistics, the same effects of gender (“disagree”: F(1, 113) = 5.37, MSE = .016, p = .022, η2p = 
.045; “agree”: F(1, 69) = 13.69, MSE = .015, p < .001, η2p = .166) and experience (“disagree”: 
F(2, 113) = 4.28, MSE = .013, p = .016, η2p = .070; “agree”: F(2, 69) = 4.01, MSE = .013, p = 
.023, η2p = .104) were present in each group, with the notable absence of an effect of condition in 
either group.  
Confidence 
The confidence ratings were collected only once at the very end of the test, by asking 
participants to report the proportion of problems that they thought they answered correctly. The 
same 2 (gender) x 2 (condition) x 3 (experience) between-subjects ANOVA was used. Only the 
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main effect of experience was present, F(2, 194) = 4.43, MSE = 360.71, p = .013, η2p = .044, 
wherein the general level of confidence only increased significantly after having taken two 
courses in statistics (Tukey HSD, p < .020). Unlike performance, males and females displayed an 
equivalent level of confidence, F(1, 193) = 1.27, MSE = 361.72, p = .261, η2p = .007. Again, 
value affirmation did not influence the scores, F(1, 193) = .27, MSE = 361.72, p = .603, η2p = 
.001, and did not interact with gender, F(1, 193) = .415, MSE = 361.72, p = .520, η2p = .002). 
The addition of the level of endorsement of the stereotype in statistics as a covariate (p = .99) did 
not change this pattern of results. Detailed results of this and other ANCOVAs are reported in 
Appendix D. For consistency, the sample was split between those in agreement versus those in 
disagreement with the stereotype. Whereas the “disagree” group showed the same single main 
effect of experience, F(2, 113) = 4.43, MSE = 325.25, p = .014, η2p = .073, the “agree” group 
showed no effect at all.  
Finally, the calibration of males [r(95) = .42, p < .001] was compared to that of females 
[r(107) = .30, p = .001], but, as in Studies 2 and 3, the difference found in Study 1 was not 
replicated (z = .92, p = .36). A scatterplot of those correlations is presented in Figure 8. All other 









Figure 8.  Scatterplot of association between performance and 
confidence, by gender. Study 4.  
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Table 10 
Correlation Matrix – Study 4 
Subscale Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. CAOS .52 (.13) -- .38** .36** .57** -.04 -.06 .25** .22** .24** -.07 
2. Conf 61.02 (19.30)  -- 24** .29** .02 .05 .19** .25** .18* -.01 
3. PNI 46.36 (9.97)   -- .45** .01 .03 .38** .19** .29** -.06 
4. CRT 1.43 (1.15)    -- -.01 -.04 .28** .13 .13 -.22** 
5. STstats 2.83 (1.68)     -- .92** .03 -.09 -.08 -.12 
6. STmath 2.87 (1.77)      -- .06 -.04 -.07 -.10 
7. Area  3.20 (1.03)       -- .20** .17* -.12 
8. Formal 2.37 (.82)        -- .54** -.04 
9. Informal 2.98 (.84)         -- .02 
10.  
Word Count 
48.84 (33.19)           -- 
 Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Discussion 
Some trends are becoming clear with the addition of this third study examining the 
potential role of stereotype threat in statistical reasoning. First, there is an inescapable 
discrepancy in the performance of males and females in statistics – a difference that is not easily 
explained away or dealt with. Although experience is clearly beneficial for improvement, it does 
not succeed in closing the gender gap. The hope was that value affirmation, a simple self-focused 
affirmation technique that has been shown to help reduce performance gaps in some male-
dominated areas such as mathematics and physics (e.g., Martens et al., 2006; Miyake et al., 
2010), would also help close the gap in statistics. Unfortunately, in three different studies, with 
various samples, sample sizes, and measures, no effect of value affirmation was found.  
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The stereotype threat literature also mentions that those who explicitly state their belief in 
the stereotype are more likely to benefit from any intervention such as value affirmation (e.g., 
Steele, 1997; Miyake, 2010; Martens et al., 2006), despite the fact that one doesn’t necessarily 
need to believe the stereotype to be affected by it (Steele, 1997). To ascertain that the lack of 
effect was not due to the inclusion of people without an explicit belief in the stereotype, the 
analysis was limited to those in agreement with it. Contrary to our expectations, even that 
subgroup showed no improvement in the value affirmation condition. Overall, we are left with 
evidence against the existence of a stereotype threat in statistics.  
This overall finding is consistent, however, with a recent meta-analysis on the topic of 
stereotype threat in mathematics (Stoet, & Geary, 2012). Examining the results of replications of 
the original paper on stereotype threat in mathematics by Spencer, Steele and Quinn (1999), 
Stoet and Geary found that no more than 55% of those attempts were successful at replicating the 
original results. In fact, when restricting their sample to the unconfounded studies, that 
percentage dropped to 30%.  
Given these observations, the authors remind researchers to keep deploying research 
efforts to understand the gender gap on other potentially fruitful avenues as well. For that reason, 
and given the results of Studies 2, 3 and 4, the next studies will focus on a different factor that 
purposely targets the cognitive factor of the structural equation model. Specifically, Studies 5 





The goal of this fifth study is to examine further the root cause and manifestations of the 
gender gap in statistics. As seen so far, statistical proficiency does not seem to grace males and 
females equally, even when prior experience, preparation and grades are the same (Tempelaar, 
2006), a finding that is also found in mathematics (Byrnes & Takahira, 1993). Study 2 replicated 
this finding. Despite equal grades on the prerequisite course, this equivalent preparation 
nonetheless yielded different scores on the statistical reasoning test. As mentioned by Garfield 
and Gal (2007), the SRA and the CAOS are designed to probe understanding of statistical 
concepts. In that sense, they are not surprised when the scores obtained by students on those tests 
are much lower than the grades obtained on courses that very often emphasize the mastery of 
computational skills. This implies that, to truly understand the root cause of the gender difference 
in statistical reasoning, it may be necessary to focus on conceptual understanding rather than on 
computation.  
This is similar to what Quinn & Spencer (2001) suggested in math. In their study, they 
used mathematical word problems. The task involved identifying the strategy one should use to 
solve each problem. However, participants did not have to solve the problems. By focusing on 
the ability of participants to formulate an appropriate solution strategy, which requires 
identifying the nature of the problems, the researchers eliminated the computational aspects of 
the solution from being cited as alternative explanations to any gender difference. In addition, 
participants were later presented with the same problems, with one crucial difference. The 
problem was now presented in the proper numerical format, thus eliminating the requirement to 
find the appropriate strategy. Interestingly, where women performed just as well as men when 
asked to solve the numerical versions of the problems, they were found to underperform in 
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finding a proper strategy to the equivalent word problems in comparison to men. Their 
performance was also lower on the word problems version than on the numerical problems 
version. Given those results, the authors concluded that females have more difficulty than males 
deciphering the nature of mathematical word problems and planning a strategy to solve those 
problems.  
Similarly, the difficulty in identifying the category to which a problem belongs is a great 
struggle encountered by students in statistics classes (Quilici & Mayer, 2002). Yet, this ability is 
crucial to the successful solving of statistical problems. Without a clear understanding of the 
structural features to which one should attend, one is doomed to be unable to compute the 
appropriate solution before even beginning any calculation. As identifying the type of problem is 
just as important in statistics as it is in mathematics, the following study will concentrate on the 
mental representations that participants hold of word problems in statistics, and on their ability to 
recognize important features in statistical problems.   
Quilici and Mayer (2002) argue that structural awareness – the ability to recognize shared 
structural features that indicate that problems should be solved by the same method – is a 
necessary quality to reach proficiency in statistics. Structural features are those characteristics 
important to properly understand and solve a problem, such as underlying principles in physics, 
underlying problem category in mathematics, or appropriate procedures to solve a problem in 
statistics. In contrast, surface features are those characteristics that are salient but not necessary 
to the solution, such as the story line or the shape of the objects depicted on the page. The ability 
to recognize and use the structural features of problems, both in categorizing and in solving 
problems, is a sign of expertise (Chi, Feltovich, Glaser, 1981). New standards in the statistics 
curriculum established by College GAISE recommendations (ASA, 2005) also emphasize the 
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necessity to stress conceptual understanding over the mere knowledge of procedures. In their 
review, Chi and Roscoe (2002) similarly emphasize the importance of conceptual understanding 
for expertise.  
However, between the novice and the expert, a wide gap exists and the acquisition of this 
structural awareness can be a lengthy process. For instance, Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1981) 
examined this question in physics. To understand the differences in thinking between novices 
and experts, participants were asked to categorize 24 physics problems based on how they should 
be solved. Novices were found to rely heavily on the surface features of the problems. Basically, 
characteristics of the shapes in the accompanying diagrams (e.g., circular surface, inclined plane) 
were often offered as the reason behind the classifications made by novices. In contrast, experts 
were sensitive to the deep, structural features of the problems, i.e., the physics principles that 
were at the heart of each problem, regardless of the shapes present in the diagrams. Thus, it was 
claimed that experts, unlike novices, are able to look past the superficial surface features of 
problems, focusing instead on the deep or structural features that represent principles when 
thinking about how they would solve the problems. 
The same holds true for statistics. For example, Rabinowitz and Hogan (2008) used a 
triad task requiring participants to select the best match to a target problem. For each target 
problem, participants could select between problems that were similar to the target problem 
either due to the surface features of the storyline, or due to the underlying statistical 
characteristics. They found that even participants with extensive statistics training, i.e., those 
with over 4 courses in statistics, matched some of the problems based on their surface 
characteristics, although less often than those with less experience. This finding was also 
replicated with teachers of various experience levels (Hogan & Rabinowitz, 2009).  
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Quillici and Mayer (1996) also found that structural awareness could be fostered through 
direct instruction. Participants were exposed to examples of problems that could be solved by 
calculating a t-test, a correlation, or a chi-square test. However, where some participants saw 
examples that made salient the tests to use (the structure-emphasizing condition), others saw 
examples that made salient the theme (e.g., weather) of the problem (the surface-emphasizing 
condition). After training, participants were asked to categorize 12 problems. Crucially, those 
problems could be sorted either by one of the three tests (e.g., classifying together all problems 
that can be solved with a correlation) or by one of the four themes e.g., classifying together all 
problems that have a weather- related storyline). Those exposed to structure-emphasizing 
examples sorted the problems based on structure more often than students trained with surface-
emphasizing examples, and also showed greater proficiency in choosing the appropriate test to 
actually solve problems in a subsequent experiment. However, even after some specific short-
term training sessions, students were still having difficulty distinguishing between t-test versus 
chi-square problems. The same results were obtained when experience was measured 
(categorizing based on how many statistics courses participants had taken) rather than 
manipulated (providing short training sessions) (Quilici & Mayer, 2002).  
One limitation to the interpretation of the Quilici and Mayer’s (2002) results is that, 
unlike Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1981), participants’ rationales for their classifications were not 
collected. Thus, it is uncertain whether poor performance was due to a lack of knowledge or 
simply due to inattention errors. Collecting rationales behind performance would have allowed a 
deeper, qualitative analysis of the data. Therefore, in the current study of this dissertation, a 
combination of Chi et al.’s (1981) framework and Quilici and Mayer’s (2002) methodology is 
used, with some modifications. For instance, Chi et al.’s (1981) paradigm to test the development 
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of expertise and its related conceptual understanding is used, though extending it to the statistical 
realm. Then, unlike prior research by Quilici and Mayer (1996; 2002), data characteristics (i.e., 
type of data and number of variables) rather than just different types of tests (i.e., t-test, 
correlation, chi-square) are used to serve as deep, structural features. However, consistent with 
statistical decision trees found in textbooks and online, the combination of both data 
characteristics (type of data and number of variables) allows the identification of what statistical 
test should be used to analyze the data at hand (e.g., whether to use a one-way ANOVA, two-
way ANOVA, chi-square test of goodness of fit, chi-square test of independence). In that sense, 
classifying over only one characteristic, in comparison to classifying each problem based on the 
combination of the two characteristics, can be seen as representing an intermediate level of 
statistical sophistication.  
Multiple authors have referred to intermediate levels of sophistication in studying 
statistical reasoning. For example, in coding the responses of participants to scenarios involving 
the law of large numbers, Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett (1986) used three levels: Non-statistical, 
poor statistical reasoning, and good statistical reasoning. A response coded as “poor statistical” 
was one that did not focus on the surface features of the problem, but did not provide the correct 
statistical explanation either. Similarly, Lavigne, Salkind, and Yan (2008) also used multiple 
levels in coding participants’ rationales. In addition to the surface-based (focused on the storyline 
or context) and the principled (organized around principles or solution methods), a pre-structural 
representation category was created. This category allowed the researchers to better capture the 
variation in rationales, and resonates with the idea that learning keeps building on previous 
conceptions (Biggs & Collis, 1982). This “principled problem representation in the making” 
includes abstraction of problem features that help the decision process, as when using a statistical 
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decision tree for instance. Their final coding scheme actually included five levels of 
sophistication, with three of them related to the pre-structural level of understanding.  
Halfway between the three levels of Fong et al. (1986) and the five levels of Lavigne et 
al. (2008), Shaughnessy (1992) propose four levels of statistical sophistication in his cognitive 
development model. The first level achieved, non-statistical, is equivalent to the surface-based 
reasoning discussed earlier. Those in the second level, naive-statistical, are still influenced by 
salient characteristics of the data and their reasoning does not demonstrate a deep understanding 
of the statistical ideas. In line with the inclusion of experience as a variable in this study, 
Shaughnessy sees the upper two levels as resulting from formal instruction in statistics. Thus, 
only those with previous experience in statistics should be able to display these levels of 
statistical reasoning. Those at the emergent-statistical level will display a higher level of 
understanding of statistical ideas. As with Lavigne et al.’s (2008) upper levels of pre-structural 
understanding, multiple characteristics of the data should be recognized and integrated. Finally, 
Shaughnessy notes that very few people will ever reach the pragmatic-statistical level of 
sophistication. This level is comparable to the principled understanding characteristic of experts 
(Chi et al., 1981; Silver, 1981).  
With these previous findings in mind, it was decided in the current study to combine the 
categorization paradigm used in Chi et al (1981) with the use of statistical word problems. The 
problems that participants were asked to categorize included both statistical characteristics (i.e., 
type of data, number of variables) reflecting the deep structural features, and content themes 
(akin to the weather problems) reflecting surface features. In that sense, novices should be more 
likely to create sets corresponding to the content themes; intermediates should be more likely to 
create sets corresponding to either one of the data characteristics; and those with more 
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experience should be more likely to create sets corresponding to the test appropriate when taking 
both types of data characteristics into consideration (e.g., One-way ANOVA). The task also 
required participants to explain the reasoning behind each of their classifications. Logistically, 
problems were presented individually on cards (as done by Chi et al., 1981) rather than all on a 
same sheet (as done by Quilici & Mayer, 2002). Indeed, research in the area of embodied 
cognition suggests that physically manipulating stimuli, especially varying the distance between 
them, may help performance when separate categories are involved (e.g., Lakens, Schneider, 
Jostmann, & Schubert, 2011). Thus, using cards to physically sort the problems into categories 
should help participants better discriminate among them and improve their performance.  
Overall, it was predicted that males would perform better than females, with good 
performance defined as classifying problems more accurately (i.e., sorting based on deep, 
structural features) and as providing rationales reflecting an awareness of the deep features of the 
problems. In addition, it was expected that increased experience would lead to better 
performance on both measures, and (based on the findings from Studies 1 to 4) that no 
interaction would be found between experience and gender. 
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo participated for course credit. 
Eight students with missing data on any of the two main predictor variables (i.e., gender, number 
of stats courses taken) and six students who indicated not being fluent in English were eliminated 
from the analysis. In the end, 219 participants (103 males, 116 females; Mage = 19.87, SD = 2.03 
– ranging from 17 to 31) with varying levels of experience (0: N = 91, 1: N = 88, 2+: N = 40) 
were included in the analysis. Participants came from fields deemed generally non-quantitative 
 75	  
(e.g., music, philosophy) to extremely quantitative (e.g., mathematics, statistics) [Generally non-
quantitative = 16 (7%), Minimally quantitative = 20 (9%), Moderately quantitative = 65 (30%), 
Highly quantitative = 104 (47%), Extremely quantitative = 14 (6%)].  
Design  
Two of the between-subject predictor variables used in the previous studies were relevant 
for this study, namely experience - operationalized as the number of statistics courses taken in 
university  (i.e., 0, 1, and 2+) - and gender. Three new dependent variables of interest were 
assessed: (1) the number of sets created, (2) the number of deviations from the ideal 
categorization that are committed (see explanation below), as well as (3) the quality of the 
rationales provided to explain why each set was created.  
Materials  
Twenty-four problems selected from an introduction to statistics textbook by Goldman 
and Weinberg (1985) were modified slightly to fit the purpose of this study. The problems were 
distributed equally among twelve cells within three different 2 x 2 tables. Each of the three tables 
is related to one of three main themes (i.e., A- health; B- demographics; C- goods and services), 
which represent the surface features of the problems. More importantly, each theme contains 
eight problems that are defined by two structural characteristics: Type of data (i.e., continuous 
vs. categorical) and number of independent variables (i.e., one variable vs. two variables). Those 
characteristics represented the deep features of the problems – those that inform the type of 
statistical test required to analyze the data at hand. Stated differently, each of the four ideal 
groupings contains six problems. Each problem was randomly assigned a number from 1 to 24 
when the problem cards were created. The list of all problems – organized based on the four 
ideal groupings (1- continuous DV/one IV; 2- continuous DV/two IVs; 3- categorical DV/one 
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IV; 4- categorical DV/two IVs) – is available in Appendix F. To help facilitate comprehension, it 
should be noted that set refers to “a group of problems created by the participant”; classification 
refers to “the overall distribution of problems into sets by the participant”; category refers to “the 
feature of interest for the analysis, whether superficial or structural”; grouping refers to “a 
specific group of problems determined by the category of interest”; and categorization refers to 
“the ideal overall distribution of problems as determined by the category of interest.” 
The task instructions were consistent with the task instructions used by Chi et al. (1981). 
They were strikingly simple and open to interpretation, only specifying that the goal was to 
classify the problems based on how the participant would solve them (see Appendix F). The sets 
created by participants were reported in an arbitrary order, and identified in alphabetical order 
(e.g., A, B, C, D, E…). The content of each set was determined and reported by the participant 
on their answer sheet. The task structure thus allowed the determination of two quantitative 
measures as proxies for statistical sophistication, namely (1) the number of sets created and (2) 
the number of deviations from the ideal categorization (to be explained shortly).  
The number of sets created is of interest given that the instructions do not specify how 
many sets should be created. This measure involves counting the number of sets reported by 
participants on their answer sheet. Simply, if a participant distributed the 24 problems among six 
sets, her score for the number of sets would be 6. If the problems are distributed among three 
sets, the score is 3.  
For the calculation of the number of deviations from the ideal categorization, the steps 
are described below and illustrated in Figure 9. Essentially, they involve comparing the sets 
created by participants to the ideal four groupings solution (1- continuous DV/one IV; 2- 





grouping contains six of the 24 problems. Categorizing the problems based on the combination 
of the two types of deep structural features in the problems thus yields four groupings:  Grouping 
A includes problems #5, 10, 20, 21, 22, 23; grouping B includes problems #1, 4, 8, 16, 17, 19; 
grouping C includes problems #7, 11, 12, 13, 18, 24; and grouping D includes problems #2, 3, 6, 
9, 14, 15. These groupings then serve as the basis to calculate the deviation score.  
Concretely, suppose that you are comparing the participant’s classification in sets to the 
ideal grouping C above, which contains the following six problems: #7, 11, 12, 13, 18, 24. First, 
you need to know whether the participant has classified these problems together or not. To do so, 
the letter of the set in which each of those six problems appears in her classification is noted. For 
example, problems #11-13-24 could appear in set A, problems #7 and 12 appear in set B, and 
problem #18 appear in set C. For any participant, the problems of interest will always appear 
Figure 9. Calculation process for deviation scores.  
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either in one same set (e.g., all in set A), or in different sets (e.g., some in set A, some in set B, 
and some in set C). Counting the number of sets in which the six problems of interest are 
classified constitutes the next step. In the example above, the participant has classified the six 
problems of interest into three sets. Thus, the participant receives a classification score of 3, 
indicating that three different sets had been used in classifying the problems from this ideal 
grouping. If all six problems had been classified in set A, the participant would have received a 
classification score of 1, indicating a perfect classification. On the other hand, if each of the six 
problems of interest had appeared in different sets, the participant would have received a 
classification score of 6. The same process is done for each of the remaining ideal groupings. 
The number of classifications for each grouping could range from 1 (perfect classification) to 6 
(poorest classification). Finally, to obtain a deviation score, 1 was subtracted from the 
classification score for that grouping – to represent the fact that a minimum of one set must 
obligatorily appear in each grouping. Therefore, when dealing with four ideal sets, the total 
number of misclassifications can range from 0 to 20, which is equivalent to an average of 0 to 5 
possible deviations per ideal grouping. Lastly, a proportion score is calculated to facilitate 
interpretation of the measure5. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Of course, the same process can be done to compare the number of deviations for any other category of interest 
(i.e., based on themes, based on type of data, or based on number of independent variables). The only difference is 
that the possible number of deviations would vary based on the number of problems that the category of interest 
establishes for each grouping. For instance, given that two groupings of twelve problems are ideal when based on 
the type of data, the total number of deviations can vary from 0 to 22, which is equivalent to an average of 0 to 11 
deviations for each of the two groupings in that category. For the category based on the surface features (i.e., 
themes), this represents three groupings of eight problems. Thus, the number of deviations can range between 0 and 
21, which is equivalent to an average of 0 to 7 deviations for each of the three groupings in that category. Given the 
variable number of deviations based on the category of interest, a proportion score can be calculated for each 
category to allow a comparison of the deviation scores across categories. This proportion is calculated by dividing 
the number of deviations committed in a specific category by the highest possible number of deviations in that 
category. It is important to note that, whereas a low proportion of deviations is desirable when dealing with 
structural features, a high proportion of deviations is preferable when dealing with surface features.	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 Another important aspect of the participant’s task involves providing a rationale for each 
set created. These qualitative data allow us to prevent spurious classifications – either correct or 
incorrect – from biasing the results by affecting the quantitative proxies. For instance, it can be 
uncertain whether poor performance on the classification task was due to a lack of knowledge or 
simply due to inattention errors. Thus, the rationales provided by participants with each of their 
sets provided an additional proxy for statistical sophistication. Research assistants – blind to the 
gender and experience level of the participants – were trained to code the quality of those 
rationales. The coding proceeded as follows. First, an initial coding scheme was established (see 
Table 11). Two research assistants were then briefed on the different categories and coded the 
entire dataset once. Difficulties with the initial coding scheme were discussed and the scale was 
modified to improve the precision of the coding. A third research assistant joined the team of 
coders for the second round of coding. The RAs first coded approximately 300 items each with 
the new coding scheme. As no substantial problem was encountered with the new scale, the full 
set of data was coded by the three RAs. At the end of this round, the inter-rater reliability 
(average intra-class correlation coefficient) was .95. Given the very good agreement, focus was 
turned to mismatches in coding. RAs were given the list of rationales for which there was 
disagreement and asked to reconsider the coding of those items. Any remaining mismatched 
ratings were discussed between the three coders and the main researcher until perfect agreement 
was met.  
The original coding scheme was then modified to match Shaughnessy’s (1992) 
framework for statistical sophistication (see Table 11). Shaughnessy’s (1992) framework was 
used for three reasons. Firstly, each level of that 4-point scale corresponds squarely to two levels 
of the initial 8-point scale (see Table 11). Secondly, this rating system produced homogeneous 
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variance across the groups, thus circumventing the problem of heterogeneity of variance present 
when using the scores of the 8-point scale. Thirdly, this scale provided a stronger theoretical 
grounding for the results. Using this new scoring system, each rationale provided by participants 
received a score. To represent simply the collection of rationales provided by each participant, 
the modal score for each participant was calculated and used in all subsequent analyses. The 
mode was chosen as the most stable representation of the ability of the participants, and as a way 
to protect against potential coding errors, especially when the number of sets created was low. If 
multiple modes were present, the mean value of those modes was calculated and used for 
analysis.  
 
Table 11  
Coding Scheme  
Sophistication Level Reasoning included in each level (original scheme) 
(1) Non-statistical 
No reason given. / Say that it does not fit with other problems. 
Focus on theme in the problem. 
(2) Naïve-statistical 
Focus on type of conclusion that could be drawn, without clear statistical 
consideration. 
Noticing the types of data reported (e.g., means). 
-OR- Noticing the breakdown of variables into levels. 
(3) Emergent-statistical 
Recognizing that the solution bears an association of some kind between the 
variables. Inappropriate test mentioned. 
Recognizing the type of data reported and the need to compare the various 
groups. 
(4) Pragmatic-statistical 
Stating a statistical test appropriate for the type of data. 
Stating a statistical test appropriate for the type of data, while acknowledging 
the number of variables as influencing the choice of test. 




The study took place in a lab and participants were tested in groups of 1 to 3. Participants 
read the information letter and signed the consent form prior to completing the tasks. First, a set 
of 24 problems, each appearing on a separate card, was distributed to participants. The task 
instructions asked participants to group the problems based on how they would solve them, as 
per Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser (1981) (see Appendix F). Importantly, participants did not have to 
solve the problems. Second, once their classification was completed, participants were asked to 
write down the problem numbers included in each of their sets and to provide a brief written 
explanation of the basis on which they created each set. Once the main task was done, 
participants were asked to complete a short demographic questionnaire based on Schield (2005). 
Finally, participants were given the opportunity to ask questions about the study and received a 
feedback letter.  
Results 
In this study, two independent variables were of interest: gender and experience in 
statistics. As noted above, the analyses centred around three different dependent variables: 
number of sets created, number of deviations from the ideal categorization (i.e., based on deep, 
structural features), and quality of rationales provided. It was expected that females’ 
classifications would reveal a greater number of deviations, and that the quality of their 
rationales would be lower than that of males. It was also expected that the number of deviations 
would decrease with increased experience, and that the quality of rationales would be higher 
with increased experience. The number of sets created is a relevant dependent variable as it may 
influence the other, more conceptually relevant  
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Table 12  





 Male   Female   Total  
 n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD 
Number of 
Sets 
0 45 5.62 2.67 46 5.74 2.33 91 5.68 2.49 
1 37 4.73 1.63 51 5.86 2.80 88 5.39 2.43 
2+ 21 4.90 1.64 19 5.47 2.57 40 5.17 2.12 
Total 103 5.16 2.17 116 5.75 2.57 219 5.47 2.40 
Deviations  0  .47 .25  .49 .28  .48 .26 
1  .36 .20  .48 .30  .43 .27 
 2+  .40 .22  .45 .29  .42 .25 
 Total  .41 .23  .48 .29  .45 .26 
Rationales 0  1.58 .65  1.48 .55  1.53 .60 
1  1.68 .63  1.65 .66  1.66 .64 
 2+  2.05 .86  1.68 .67  1.88 .79 




DVs. For that reason, it needed to be analysed first, even though no systematic effects were 
expected. Descriptive statistics for all three dependent variables are presented in Table 12. 
Quantitative measures: Number of Sets & Deviations from Ideal 
Number of Sets. The task instructions did not specify how many sets were to be created, 
thus allowing this variable to be analysed. Participants each created between 2 and 12 sets (M = 
5.47, SD = 2.403, Median = 5, Mode = 4). The highest numbers of sets occurred mostly when 
participants focused on pure surface features (e.g., “Looked at health problems”, “Looked at 
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family income, unemployment”).  Despite males creating slightly fewer sets than females on 
average (Mm = 5.16, SD = 2.17; Mf = 5.75, SD = 2.57), the difference did not reach significance, 
F(1, 213) = 3.03, MSE = 5.725, p = .083, η2p = .014. Experience did not influence the number of 
sets created either, F(2, 213) = .834, MSE = 5.725, p = .436, η2p = .008, even though the number 
of sets did decrease slightly with increased experience. Finally, the two independent variables 
did not interact, F(2, 213) = 1.00, MSE = 5.725, p = .371, η2p = .009. Thus, the results did not 
support the hypothesis that experience would lead to the creation of a different number of sets.  
Number of Deviations from Ideal. From the sets’ composition (i.e., what problems a 
participant placed in any given set s/he created), a measure of deviation from the ideal 
categorization was computed. The specifics of the scoring process are explained above in the 
method section and illustrated in Figure 8. The expectation was that increased experience would 
lead to a decreased number of deviations. A 2 (gender) x 3 (experience) between-subjects 
ANOVA was used to analyze these data. Surprisingly, no main effects were found, even though 
the means were in the expected direction, with females’ classifications deviating more from ideal 
than males’ classifications, F(1, 213) = 2.90, MSE = .069, p = .090, η2p = .013., and with 
deviations decreasing with experience, F(2, 213) = 1.228, MSE = .069, p = .295, η2p = .011. 
Gender and experience also did not interact, F(2, 213) = .77, MSE = .069, p = .463, η2p = .007 .  
To address the possibility that high levels of deviations may only be reflective of how 
many sets one created, a second analysis of variance was conducted, this time using the number 
of sets created as a covariate. Even though number of sets emerged as a significant covariate (p < 
.001), this finding did not influence the previous results.  
So far, this focus on quantitative indicators provides limited insight into variations in 
mental representations and statistical sophistication. Thus, to further examine mental 
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representations in statistical reasoning, a qualitative indicator was also analysed, as it is well 
known that using multiple measures can increase the richness of our understanding of a 
phenomenon (e.g., Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Qualitative Measure 
Quality of Rationales. A main goal of this study is to examine the impact of experience 
on the quality of statistical reasoning. Even more so, it is hoped that it can help shed light on the 
underlying cause of the gender gap. To obtain a qualitative picture of individuals’ mental 
representations in statistics, participants were required to explain why they had created each set, 
i.e., why they saw those problems as fitting together. As discussed above, the scores were 
obtained through rigorous rounds of coding. A 2 (gender) x 3 (experience) between-subjects 
ANOVA was used to analyse those scores. Although the quality of the rationales provided by 
males and females was more similar than expected, F(1, 213) = 2.97, MSE = .426, p = .086, η2p = 
.014, a main effect of experience was present, F(2, 213) = 3.77, MSE = .426, p = .025, η2p = .034, 
with the quality of rationales increasing with experience (Tukey HSD, p = .015) after two courses 
in statistics, though only in comparison to those with no experience (M0 = 1.53, SD = .60; M1 = 
1.66, SD = .64 ; M2+ = 1.88, SD = .79). Even when using the more liberal Fisher’s LSD instead 
of Tukey’s HSD, the comparison of those with one versus those with at least two courses in 
statistics remained non-significant (p = .084). 
Despite the lack of an interaction between gender and experience, F(2, 213) = .915, MSE 
= .426, p = .402, η2p = .009, it felt prudent to nonetheless explore the possibility that each gender 
responds differently to experience, and to verify at what point in the process the quality of 
rationales becomes increasingly and significantly better. For each gender, a one-way ANOVA 
was used to analyse the impact of experience. Interestingly, whereas males appeared to improve 
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the quality of their rationales with added experience, F(2, 100) = 3.39, MSE = .475, p = .038, 
females’ quality of rationales appeared to stagnate, F(2, 113) = 1.19, MSE = .475, p = .309.  
Indeed, using Fisher’s Least Significant Difference test for multiple comparisons, the reasoning 
of males with the most experience significantly differed both from the reasoning of those with no 
experience (p = .011) and of those with the experience of only one stats course (p = .051), which 
was not the case for females with the most experience when compared to either females with no 
(p = .225) or with only one (p = .824) stats course.  
Discussion  
In this study, both quantitative and qualitative measures were used to index participants’ 
level of statistical sophistication. The inclusion of coded rationales as a measure proved 
particularly useful. With added experience, participants explained their classifications with 
increased reference to statistical features contained in the problems. Further investigation of this 
effect demonstrated that it is males, but not females, who show a change in the quality of their 
rationales with added experience. This lack of improvement for females in the ability to detect 
and use structural features in statistical problems could be one clue toward the explanation of the 
gender gap in statistics.   
On the other hand, quantitative indicators were not as informative. Despite some trends in 
mean differences, those differences were not statistically significant. The freedom participants 
had to create as many sets as they wanted could have negatively impacted their propensity to 
generate sets based on deep structural features. Rather, the lack of clear guidelines may have 
encouraged them to rely on the most salient solution. Indeed, surface rather than structural 
features are naturally more salient for non-experts (Lavigne, Salkind, & Yan, 2008). 
Alternatively, the findings could truly represent participants’ level of knowledge and their lack of 
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integration of statistical entities into functional representations in memory. However, to make 
sure that participants did not rely on surface features simply due to a lack of understanding of the 
instructions or due to a tendency to settle for the most salient solution, a follow up study was 
included with a critical change: an additional task constraint to control the number of sets 
created.  
Lavigne, Salkind, and Yan (2008) were the first to examine the impact of varying task 
format on mental representations in statistics, asking whether one type of representation is more 
likely to be elicited when the instructions are modified. However, their findings – that a more 
constrained or specific task format helps the identification of structural features – were based on 
a sample of three participants. In the next study (Study 6), the task will be constrained, as 
participants will be instructed to create exactly four sets. Where some may argue that this 
constraint may lead to fewer deviations from the ideal, this is an empirical question. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in math (Quinn & Spencer, 2001), females’ difficulty with 
establishing a solution strategy may be the root cause of their general difficulties in mathematics. 
In their study, females showed the same ability as males in solving numerical math problems, a 
task with well-defined constraints. Yet, when asked to plan how they would solve some math 
word problems, which were a more complex and less constrained but equivalent form of the 
numerical problems mentioned earlier, the performance of females dropped. In contrast, the 
performance of males was comparable across the two tasks. Thus, it is possible that constraining 
the task will especially benefit the performance of women and leave males’ performance intact. 
Another concern in this study was the unequal cell sizes due to the difficulty of finding 
participants with higher levels of experience. In the following study, one goal was to achieve a 
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minimum of 25-30 participants per cell. To achieve that goal in a timely manner, graduate 
students – as in Study 1 – were also recruited.  
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STUDY 6 
In this study, we address the possibility that an overly unconstrained task format may 
have impeded the performance of participants on the task. Here, the same procedure as for Study 
5 was used, except for the fact that participants were instructed to classify the problems in 
exactly four categories. Based on Lavigne, Salkind, and Yan (2008), we know that different 
instructions can lead to different mental representations in the domain of statistics. However, 
their study used a meagre sample of three males. This finding is thus in dire need of replication 
and extension. Nonetheless, a change in task format could potentially have a very positive impact 
on women. As demonstrated by Quinn and Spencer (2001), when women are shown clearly 
defined mathematics problems, they can solve them just as well as men. The authors concluded 
that women have difficulty identifying the type of problem and the appropriate course of action 
when faced with word problems, but that they can solve the problem just as well as men when 
the problem category is well defined, such as when a mathematical word problem has been 
translated into its numerical form. If women also struggle with identifying the appropriate 
strategy when presented with statistics word problems, then constraining the task should help 
females improve their performance on the classification task.  
With these new instructions, the number of sets created is constant and no longer needs to 
be analyzed. Again, it is expected that increased experience will lead to more accurate 
classifications by participants (i.e., based on deep, structural features). In addition, the rationales 
provided by participants should reflect their awareness of the deep features of the problems, and 
become increasingly sophisticated with experience. In line with studies 1-4, and speculating that 
the open instructions may have blurred the results from study 5, we also expected that males 
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would perform better than females on both measures, but that the change in task format might be 
particularly beneficial for females’ performance.  
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate and graduate students from the University of Waterloo participated in this 
study for course credit or remuneration. Graduate students were recruited in this study due to the 
difficulty of signing up participants having taken two courses in statistics in Study 5. This 
ensured that enough participants were included in each cell for the analyses. All participants 
having taken at least two courses in statistics were included in the same level of experience (i.e., 
2+). Participants with missing data on any of the two main predictor variables (i.e., gender, 
number of stats courses taken), participants who indicated not being fluent in English, and 
participants who indicated having taken more than 10 courses in statistics were eliminated from 
the analysis.  In the end, 208 participants (101 males and 107 females; 0: N = 83, 1: N = 68, 2+: 
N = 57; Mage = 21.27, SD = 3.16, ranging from 18 to 35) were included in the analysis. The 
distribution of participants across areas was comparable to the previous studies [Generally non-
quantitative = 10 (5%), Minimally quantitative = 28 (14%), Moderately quantitative = 69 (33%), 
Highly quantitative = 88 (43%), Extremely quantitative = 12 (6%)]. 
Design and Materials 
Apart from the elimination of number of sets from the list of dependent variables, the 
design was the same as in the previous study, with gender and experience as independent 
variables, and deviations and rationales as dependent variables. As with Study 5, a deviation 
score of 0 represents a perfect classification of the problems, whereas a deviation score of 1 
represents a total departure from the ideal categorization. For the rationales, the same procedure 
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and coding scheme as Study 5 are used. The scores thus range from 1 (non-statistical) to 4 
(pragmatic-statistical) (see Table 11). 
The answer sheet was modified to reflect the need to create a fixed number of sets, and 
the instructions were reworded slightly to make sure that participants understood the goal of 
classifying the problems based on how they should be solved (see Appendix F). To test the 
influence of this instructional manipulation, data from the two studies were combined in a final 
series of analyses. 
Procedure 
Excluding the new limitation to the number of sets that one could create, the same 
procedure as in Study 5 was used.  
Results 
For this second study addressing mental representations, gender and experience remained 
as independent variables of interest, with deviations from ideal categorization and quality of 
rationales used as dependent variables. Given the change in task format, the results could 
potentially diverge from the ones found in Study 5. This change in task format was likely to 
increase the salience of ideal categorization and to yield better performance. In particular, the 
number of deviations was expected to decrease and the quality of the rationales provided 
expected to increase. Results for Study 6 will be presented first, followed by the analyses testing 
the impact of constraining the task format across the two studies. When task format is analyzed, 
the sample size for the combined studies increases to N = 427, thus influencing the degrees of 
freedom reported. Descriptive statistics for Study 6 are presented in Table 13. 
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Table 13  





 Male   Female   Total  
n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD 
Deviations  0 43 .54 .27 40 .45 .27 83 .50 .27 
1 33 .45 .26 35 .43 .25 68 .44 .25 
 2+ 25 .41 .24 32 .45 .25 57 .44 .24 
 Total 101 .48 .26 107 .45 .25 208 .46 .26 
Rationales 0  1.83 .64  1.98 .59  1.98 .59 
1  1.88 .64  2.04 .62  2.04 .62 
 2+  1.72 .71  2.13 .79  2.13 .79 




Quantitative Measure: Deviations from Ideal 
As with the previous study, a 2 (gender) x 3 (experience) between-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted, with the expectation that males would outperform females and that the number of 
deviations would decrease with experience. In the current study, neither gender, F(1, 202) = .36, 
MSE = .066, p = .550, η2p = .002, nor experience, F(2, 202) = 1.41, MSE = .066, p = .248, η2p = 
.014, had an effect on the proportion of deviations from ideal. Their interaction was not 
significant either, F(2, 202) = 1.09, MSE = .066, p = .340, η2p = .011. This pattern is similar to 
what was found in Study 5, which the next analysis confirms. The new analysis of interest 
examines whether the constrained task format, now requiring participants to create four and only 
four sets, helps improve performance. Unfortunately, despite the more restrictive set of 
instructions, participants’ classifications deviated from the ideal categorization just as much as in 
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the previous study, F(1, 415) = .45, MSE = .067, p = .501, η2p = .001. Adding covariates to the 
analyses did not change the overall patterns of results (see Appendix D).  
Qualitative Measure: Quality of Rationales 
To establish the role of gender and experience in statistical sophistication, a 2 (gender) x 
3 (experience) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the rationales given with each set. 
Again, based on Shaughnessy’s (1992) framework, the scores range from 1 (“non-statistical”) to 
4 (“pragmatic-statistical”) (see Table 11). Except for the non-significant interaction, the pattern 
of results was quite different from that observed in Study 5. This is confirmed with a main effect 
of task format when it is added as a factor in the analysis, F(1, 415) = 13.29, MSE = .439, p < 
.001, η2p = .031. First, unlike Study 5, experience did not lead to better performance, F(2, 202) = 
.16, MSE = .439, p = .486, η2p = .007. Second, despite the presence of a significant gender 
difference, F(1, 202) = 6.59, MSE = .439, p = .011, η2p = .032, the direction of the effect was 
contrary to the prediction. Indeed, in this experiment, it was the quality of females’ rationales 
that surpassed the quality of males’ rationales. This change of trend is corroborated by a 
significant interaction of gender with instructions type when both Study 5 and Study 6 are 
combined within one analysis, F(1, 415) = 9.17, MSE = .432, p = .003, η2p = .022. In other 
words, where males’ performance did not vary with the constrained task format, t(202) = 1.13, 
SE = .10, p = .258, females’ performance benefited significantly from an increasingly 
constrained task format, t(221) = 5.31, SE = .09, p < .001.    
Discussion  
Once again, both quantitative and qualitative indicators were used to measure 
performance on this classification task. As in Study 5, using a quantitative measure did not allow 
the distinction of performance across genders and experience levels, whereas using the 
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qualitative measure revealed significant variations in performance. The most important 
difference occurred due to the change in task format. Indeed, females not only improved upon 
their previous performance, but also performed significantly better than males in this study when 
the task format was constrained. In contrast, males’ performance on the task remained 
unchanged despite the more constrained task format. 
It is important to note that the differences in findings across the studies cannot be due to 
coding. For both studies, coders were blind to the gender and experience of the participants. As 
such, this difference could not have been created due to an expectation bias. Rather, this finding 
is congruent with the cognitive approach used by Byrnes and Takahira (1993) in their 
examination of gender differences on SAT-math items. This cognitive approach identifies the 
ability to define a problem as an important component of skilled performance and stipulates that 
gender differences exist because males perform certain cognitive operations more effectively 
than women. Those operations include deciding on the proper problem solving strategy. This 
lower ability of women to decide on the proper strategy may make them look more readily for 
cues to support their choice. Although more research is needed to fully understand the 
underlying cause of this differential effect of task format on gender, it is possible that males 
simply did not pay further attention to the additional cue that the constrained task format 
provided.  
Noticeably, experience did not have its expected effect in this study. Even though the 
means typically varied in the expected direction, the effects were not significant. Shaughnessy 
(1992) does warn us that progression through the various levels of statistical sophistication is 
usually slow. Reaching the third level, emergent-statistical, requires a good amount of formal 
education. As such, only a very small percentage of the population will ever reach the pragmatic-
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statistical level. Even when they reach a high level of statistical sophistication, consistent use of 
that knowledge is not guaranteed (Hoffrage et al., 2000; Kahneman et al., 1982). For example, in 
Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett’s (1986) study, when presented with a series of multiple problems, the 
technical experts were found to think statistically about those problems only 80% of the time. 
Rabinowitz and Hogan (2008) also found that graduate students revert to using surface features a 
sizable amount of time to guide them in sorting statistical problems. Perhaps the range of 
experience used in this study was too limited. For instance, Chi et al. (1981) contrasted the 
performance of novices to that of experts who were professors in physics. Graduate students 
were only considered intermediates. Although having access to a greater range of levels of 
experience could help us better understand the development of statistical sophistication, the 
sample used in this study is of great interest as it represents more closely the level of experience 
that today’s citizens and knowledge workers are likely to have in general.  
Again, modifying the task format from ‘unconstrained’ in Study 5 to ‘constrained’ Study 
6 had different effects across genders on the quality of the rationales that participants provided, 
but not on the quantitative measure of deviations from ideal. Specifically, for males, this 
modification in task format had no impact on their performance. Indeed, the quality of their 
rationales was at par across the studies. In contrast, constraining the problem boundaries helped 
females provide better rationales. This is similar to the finding in mathematics where females’ 
performance drops when they are faced with ill-defined word problems rather than simple, well-
defined numerical problems (Quinn & Spencer, 2001). This finding can be seen as grim from the 
standpoint of everyday life where data are often messy, as this may prevent women from 
performing at their full potential. On the other hand, the identification of such an important 
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aspect for the success of women in statistical reasoning can be positively used as a stepping stone 
for the development of effective individualized pedagogical interventions. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The unprecedented amount of data available in today’s society is both exciting and 
challenging. Making sense of these data to inform personal, business, and societal choices 
requires citizens and decision-makers to have at least some degree of statistical literacy. The new 
faces of work and access to information have already influenced the structure of education in the 
field of statistics, but some puzzles remain unsolved, notably that of a gender difference. This 
underperformance of women in statistics is particularly concerning in light of the finding that 
low numeracy is detrimental to employability, especially for women (Parsons & Bynner, 1997, 
2005).  
This interest in statistical reasoning also comes at a time when statistics education is 
redefining itself, notably as a science of data separate from mathematics. New recommendations 
in line with the GAISE report (ASA, 2005), a set of guidelines for statistics education, are now 
being implemented in the classroom. For instance, the use of computer tools to perform 
computations is encouraged to allow students to focus more on the conceptual understanding of 
statistics rather than the mechanics of conducting the analysis.  
New assessment tools have been created to evaluate conceptual understanding and 
statistical competence, as defined by the new curriculum. In particular, the SRA and the CAOS 
are designed to assess a wide range of statistical concepts covered in high school and in 
introduction to statistics classes at the college level. Both tests have been used in research and 
are recognized as standardized instruments in the field of statistics education. An advantage of 
the SRA over the CAOS is how it measures both correct reasoning and misconceptions. 
Misconceptions are an especially informative metric from an educational standpoint as they are 
generally considered to be resistant to change (Chi & Roscoe, 2002) and relatively impervious to 
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instruction (Konold, 1995). Using the SRA, researchers have found a gender gap, where women 
underperform in comparison to men, both by scoring lower on the correct reasoning scale and by 
demonstrating more misconceptions. In contrast, research using the CAOS has not examined 
gender as a factor of interest in statistical performance. However, it is becoming the gold 
standard in research on statistical competence in recent years (Lovett, Mayer, & Thille, 2008) 
The inclusion of many different areas of understanding within those two research tools 
breaks from the tradition of published statistical reasoning research in psychology. Typically, 
those articles focused on a single aspect of statistical reasoning such as the law of large numbers 
(e.g., Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett, 1986), the need for comparison groups (e.g., Gray & Mill, 
1990), or the importance of base rates in probability judgments (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1980). Another 
important strength of these two scales is how they succeed at assessing students’ understanding 
of statistical concepts without having recourse to calculations. Their multiple-choice format 
makes the SRA and the CAOS instruments of choice for classroom assessments and research.  
As noted above, gender has emerged as a clear factor influencing statistical competence, 
as measured by the SRA. As found in mathematics, females tend to do more poorly than males. 
This finding has been called puzzling given that the gap occurs despite little or no difference in 
prior education (Tempelaar et al., 2006). It is thus not clear what causes this gender gap.  
When research includes experience in statistics as the factor of interest, additional 
training does help augment the frequency and the quality of statistical answers. However, it is 
well known that even experts and professionals fail to achieve a perfect score on some statistical 
tasks (e.g., Hoffrage et al., 2002; Kahnemann et al., 1982). Thus, formal education does not 
appear sufficient on its own to ensure proper use of statistics outside the classroom. Yet, we 
know that “effective transfer is critical here because statistical reasoning is applicable across a 
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wide variety of domains and in daily life; statistical reasoning skill is of little value if it can only 
be applied in the statistics classroom” (Lovett, 2001, p. 347).  
An obvious gap in the literature is that when the impact of specific training and general 
class experience on statistical reasoning is examined, gender is typically not examined. Yet, we 
know that students of lower ability in statistics sometimes benefit more from training than those 
with higher ability (Quilici & Mayer, 1996). The interaction between gender and experience 
beyond that of a first course in statistics deserves attention given the particularly negative impact 
that the underperformance of women can have on their work prospects and success as citizens. 
Given this critical void in the literature, it was my goal in this dissertation to use a multipronged 
approach to shed light on the potential mechanisms underlying this gender difference in 
statistical reasoning, while at the same time examining the effect of experience. Besides 
experience, the three main factors examined included individual differences, stereotype threat, 
and task format. 
Individual Differences 
 In Study 1, participants completed the SRA as well as multiple measures of thinking 
dispositions and cognitive ability to test the hypothesis that experience and individual differences 
would help explain the gender gap. As expected, the gender gap was observed on both types of 
reasoning scales (Correct reasoning and Misconceptions). Although added experience, as defined 
as the number of statistics courses taken in university, did lead to better performance on both the 
correct reasoning scale and on the misconceptions scale, it did not influence the size of the 
gender gap.  
To further understand the contribution of individual differences, a confirmatory approach 
to structural equation modeling was used. Based on Stanovich’s (2009) tri-partite model of 
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reasoning, it was expected that both cognitive ability and thinking dispositions would influence 
statistical reasoning. Beyond the obvious role of cognitive ability, it was confirmed that thinking 
dispositions have a positive impact on statistical reasoning even when cognitive ability is 
controlled for. Those results provided evidence that Stanovich’s (2009) tri-partite model of 
reasoning is appropriate and applicable to statistical reasoning, with the confirmation that the 
same process applies to both genders. As well, the addition of gender as a predictor in the model 
provided more information. Specifically, gender was found to significantly explain variation in 
statistical reasoning in three ways: Indirectly through its influence on cognitive ability; again 
indirectly but through its influence on thinking dispositions when cognitive ability is controlled 
for; and directly – thus above and beyond its indirect effect through cognitive ability and 
thinking dispositions. Hence, there are multiple ways in which performance in statistics can be 
influenced.  
Given the significant role of thinking dispositions on statistical reasoning observed in 
Study 1, it was hypothesised that statistical performance may improve for women if one can 
influence the degree to which females are willing to cognitively engage with the task. This is in 
line with the idea that thinking dispositions, as opposed to cognitive ability, are relatively 
malleable and are thus a good target for interventions to improve reasoning performance (Baron, 
1985; Stanovich, 2001). For studies 2, 3, and 4, efforts were focused on influencing thinking 
dispositions to increase engagement in the task, which, based on the results of the structural 
equation model, should improve performance.  
Stereotype Threat 
In an attempt to influence thinking dispositions, the phenomenon of stereotype threat was 
explored in Studies 2, 3 and 4. Stereotype threat is a situational phenomenon where the negative 
 100	  
stereotype weighing on the reputation of a specific group reduces the ability of members of that 
targeted group to perform to their full potential. Reducing the threat is seen as a major way 
toward equal performance. Indeed, if the ability to focus on and engage in the task is restored, 
performance should increase for those affected by the threat. Thus, in Studies 2, 3, and 4, the 
self-affirmation technique promoted by Martens et al (2006) [in mathematics] and by Miyake et 
al (2010) [in physics] as an effective tool to counter the effect of stereotype threat was tested. 
Unlike some of the other methods suggested to counter stereotype threat (e.g., providing a 
female role model; providing a friendly environment), the great interest of this intervention lies 
in the potential it holds for use at time of testing by the stereotyped individual herself.  
Unfortunately, value affirmation proved ineffective at influencing the performance and 
confidence of women on statistical reasoning tasks. This finding was replicated using two 
different tests (SRA, CAOS) in three separate studies, and held true even when the analysis was 
limited to those participants who agreed with a negative stereotype in statistics. This finding 
alone is inconsistent with the idea that level of agreement with a negative stereotype acts as a 
moderator to the effectiveness of the value affirmation exercise. Alternatively, this can be seen as 
evidence that stereotype threat is not a key mechanism underlying the observed gender 
differences in statistics. This possibility is consistent with a recent meta-analysis by Stoet and 
Geary (2012) that questions the importance of stereotype threat as a cause of a gender gap in 
mathematics. Some researchers also criticize stereotype threat as potentially being an effect 
limited to the laboratory (Sackett, Hardison, & Cullen, 2004; Sackett, Borneman, & Connellly, 
2008), questioning the extent to which it applies to real-life settings. For instance, it is common 
for researchers to increase the saliency of gender prior to a test to create a performance gap and 
argue for the existence of a stereotype threat.  
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One potential limitation of the current studies is the fact that stereotype was not made 
salient through the manipulation of the context. However, this can be seen as both a limitation 
and strength. It is a limitation in the sense that the stereotype may need to be made more salient 
to truly impede women to perform at their best. On ecological validity grounds, it was chosen not 
to do this in the current series of experiments as it likely deviates significantly from real world 
experience. That is, one’s gender typically is not made salient before one takes a statistics test.  
Nonetheless, despite not manipulating the saliency of gender, the performance gap on the 
SRA (and CAOS in Study 4) was present. This could indicate one of two things. First, the 
stereotype in statistics may be largely prevalent, thus making priming the stereotype unnecessary 
in statistics to influence the performance of women – which would imply that value affirmation 
may not be a powerful enough intervention in statistics. Second, it could alternatively be that 
stereotype threat is not a factor of interest in statistical reasoning – which would explain why 
value affirmation did not have the expected effect. 
However, not using a saliency manipulation helps answer the concern about the validity 
of the stereotype threat phenomenon outside the laboratory. In fact, the lack of impact of the 
value affirmation exercise in this context brings support to the idea that stereotype threat is not as 
important in real-life as what the literature of the past 20 years on the topic would like us to 
believe. It also concurs with the findings of Stoet and Geary (2012) that the beneficial effect of 
value affirmation is replicated in only 30 to 50% of the cases. Of course, their meta-analysis 
examined findings in mathematics, which may or may not apply directly to statistics.  
It is also possible to criticize the format of the value affirmation exercise adopted in the 
current series of studies. For instance, Miyake et al. (2010) used a much longer set of questions 
in their field study. This higher level of engagement may be the key to an effective manipulation. 
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However, Martens et al. (2006) did report a positive effect of value affirmation with a shorter 
exercise, like that used in the current studies. In addition, controlling for level of engagement did 
not influence the pattern of results in the analyses. So, if the goal is to influence the disposition 
of women to engage in a statistical task, other interventions will have to be examined in future 
research. It addition, given the results obtained in the structural equation model, it is important to 
keep in mind that only about one-third of the effect in performance was related to the indirect 
effect of thinking dispositions. Thus, it should be expected that any intervention would have a 
limited impact on performance, and that any one intervention alone might not be sufficient.  
Task Format and Mental Representations 
As discussed above, both the SRA and the CAOS are designed to test the understanding 
of big statistical ideas without recourse to computations, formulas, or recall of definitions. The 
two tests rather focus on conceptual understanding. In contrast, statistics courses often follow the 
textbook, with chapters and notions tested sequentially and with little integration (Garfield, 
1995). Students also tend to view what they learn as a set of isolated facts (Schoenfeld, 1987; 
Chi, 2005; diSessa, 2004). This is perhaps the reason females are often found to perform as well 
as males in the classroom. However, it does not specifically explain why a gender gap was found 
for the SRA and the CAOS.  
Thus, for Studies 5 and 6, a different approach was used, this time focusing on the 
cognitive variable depicted in the structural equation model. Here, I explored the mental 
representations that participants held of statistical problems and tested the effect of using general 
versus constrained instructions on performance. These studies were designed to better understand 
the level of statistical sophistication of participants, and to examine whether males hold mental 
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representations that are better assimilated than those of females, which would help explain their 
higher performance on the conceptual tasks used previously. 
In these studies, a categorization task was used. Very few categorizing sorting tasks have 
been used to study statistical cognitive representations (Quilici & Mayer, 1996, 2002, Lavigne, 
Salkind & Yan, 2008, as well as Rabinowitz and Hogan, 2008, 2009, are the exceptions).  In 
Studies 5 and 6, the seminal study of Chi et al. (1981) to study the development of mental 
representations was extended to the domain of statistics. In general, quantitative measures 
capturing the total number of sets created and the number of deviations from an ideal 
categorization did not inform the issue of changes in statistical sophistication through 
experience, or the issue of differences across genders. The qualitative measure, which was based 
on the quality of the rationales provided with each set, however, was much more informative. As 
with the previous studies, a change was observed only after two courses in statistics. That change 
was limited and, as noted by Shaughnessy (1992), very few people reached the pragmatic-
statistical stage. However, there was an increasing tendency toward noticing the presence of 
statistical elements with added experience.  
In Study 5, the task was unconstrained: there was no specification of how many sets 
participants should create, but only the instruction to classify the problems based on how they 
would solve them. Participants created anywhere between 2 and 12 sets. To eliminate the 
possibility that the number of sets created had influenced individuals’ deviation scores and 
quality of rationales, and to examine the degree to which these unconstrained task instructions 
impacted the primary dependent variables, the study was replicated with a slight change to the 
task format. Simply, in Study 6, the task was constrained: participants were instructed to create 
exactly four sets, the number of sets dictated by the ideal solution. Once again, the total number 
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of deviations from the ideal solution did not vary with experience and gender. However, this 
change in task format had a dramatic impact on the performance of females as reflected in the 
significant improvement of the quality of their rationales for their classifications. In contrast, 
males’ rationales did not improve with the constrained task format.  
Taken together, the findings from Study 5 and 6 are consistent with the idea that females 
seem to approach statistics word problems differently than males, which is consistent with the 
finding in mathematics. Specifically, despite being equally skilled at computing the solution 
when the problem is well defined for them, females have difficulty identifying and translating 
the strategy to use when faced with word problems (Quinn & Spencer, 2001). The current 
finding also suggests that the ability to identify the structural features of a problem is what offers 
the most room for growth in females. This finding implies that more effort must be deployed to 
have students in general (and females in particular) practice this skill. Unless students of 
statistics can identify the problem at hand, they are unlikely to conduct the proper calculations. 
Furthermore, they will learn to do well only what they practice doing (Garfield, 1995; Anderson, 
Corbett, & Conrad, 1989). 
Implications and Future Directions  
In summary, this dissertation aimed to shed light on the gender gap in statistics. Taken as 
a whole, Studies 1 to 4 established the presence of the same gender gap on two tests geared 
toward conceptual understanding in statistics, and value affirmation did not succeed as a 
manipulation to help close that gap.  In contrast, even though it was not found to interact with 
gender to close the performance gap, on the SRA or the CAOS, incorporating experience as an 
additional factor was informative. With the inclusion of experience as an independent variable, it 
became obvious that a minimum of two courses is often necessary to create a significant change 
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in performance. This finding is in line with a current argument among statistics educators: the 
need for a second course in statistics. Prominent statistics educators recently debated this topic at 
the first edition of the Electronic Conference on Teaching Statistics (eCOTS, 2012). Although 
the content of that second course is still disputed, high agreement exists in regard to the necessity 
of that second course (Isaacson & Schield, 2012). This need is obvious when considering that in 
all studies, even participants with two or more courses were far from achieving perfect 
performance. Indeed, the scores on the SRA and on the CAOS were far from ceiling (or floor 
when misconceptions are involved) in all four studies concerned. This is a typical finding with 
these tests, even though the low scores obtained by their students surprise even statistics 
instructors (delMas et al., 2007). delMas and his colleagues (2007) also found very little gains 
from pre-test to post-test on the CAOS. The same result was found in Study 2 using the SRA.  
Studies 5 and 6 explored the influence of a cognitive factor – mental representations – in 
creating the gender gap. Critically, the format of the task was shown to be essential to the 
performance level of females, even leading them to perform better than males when the task was 
constrained. This finding holds great potential, both for future research and for in-class 
interventions. In research, it will be important to continue asking why females do not assimilate 
the big ideas in statistics as well as their male counterparts, even when they are able to obtain 
comparable grades on the typical in-class examinations. For instance, are they too focused on the 
details of the calculations to see the big picture? One avenue to explore this possibility could 
involve manipulating construal levels using Navon figures – where participants are instructed to 
report one of the two letters presented in a display characterized by a series of smaller (local) 
letters spatially arranged to form a larger (global) letter – prior to the completion of the CAOS or 
SRA. Perhaps, focusing on the global rather than on the local aspect of the task could help 
 106	  
females perform better on those conceptual tests. For instance, past research with the local-global 
paradigm has demonstrated that using a local processing style makes it harder to pay attention to 
the relations between individual elements (Macrae & Lewis, 2002) and to judge complex stimuli 
(Dijkstra, van der Pligt, van Kleef, & Kerstholt, 2012). In addition, adopting a global processing 
style encourages integration of knowledge to make sense of a stimulus (Förster & Dannenberg, 
2010).   
At the practical level, it is important to ask how educators can design a female-friendly 
curriculum. To start with, educational research in statistics could make a point to report 
systematically the scores of males and females in their research. It is also important to establish 
the degree to which mathematics and statistics are similar and different, especially as the 
evolution of the computer tools that easily carry the mathematical calculations should now allow 
everyone to truly focus on the big ideas of statistics when encountering data.  
This focus on the higher-level skills and knowledge of statistics has been recommended 
for the past two decades now that computer tools can easily compute the statistics of interest 
(Moore, 1992). Such change in focus requires a great commitment on the part of statistics 
educators, as they will have to think of ways to go beyond the compartmentalized textbook. 
Recent uses of online technology to complement in-class learning may offer part of the solution. 
For instance, Lovett, Mayer, and Thille (2008) followed the learning of students in three 
different versions of an introduction to statistics course: a traditional instructor-led course, a 
stand-alone web-based course, and a hybrid course. Those who accessed the lecture material 
online and met with the instructor in class to address the difficulties encountered through 
completion of the online activities, i.e., those in the hybrid format, progressed faster through the 
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course material and obtained higher scores then those in traditional courses, both on the final 
exam and on the CAOS.  
In the current context, more exercises – both online and in-class – could be developed to 
help students master the integration of topics studied across the multiple sessions, focusing 
specifically on the identification of the required solution strategy, which would first necessitate 
the identification of the underlying nature of the problem at hand. In keeping with the principles 
of learning in statistics, providing immediate feedback will help students consolidate their 
learning (Butler & Winne, 1995; Corbett & Anderson, 2001). Of course, the gender gap should 
be given more consideration when testing new pedagogical tools to ensure that all students will 
benefit equally from it.  
One solution is unlikely to fit all. Efforts to improve attitudes of students, with the use of 
fun elements in class for instance (e.g., Lesser et al., in press), and efforts to ameliorate the 
quality of statistical education are all important. In a time when the field of statistics education is 
still defining itself, and when the world of data is growing exponentially, opportunities to 
contribute to the increased success of our citizens abound. Without a doubt, this challenge and 
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Appendix A – Statistical Reasoning Assessment (including subscales) 
 
A1. List of Correct Reasoning and Misconceptions subscales on the SRA  
(from Tempelaar et al, 2006) 
Correct Reasoning Subscales: 
Subscale # Outcome assessed 
CR1: 
 
Correctly interprets probabilities. Assesses the understanding and use of ideas of 
randomness, chance to make judgments about uncertain events 
CR2: 
 
Understands how to select an appropriate average. Assesses the understanding what 
measures of center tell about a data set, and which are best to use under different conditions. 
CR3: 
 
Correctly computes probability, both understanding probabilities as ratios, and using 
combinatorial reasoning. 
Assesses the knowledge that in uncertain events not all outcomes are equally likely, and 
how to determine the likelihood of different events using an appropriate method. 
CR4: Understands independence. 
CR5: Understands sampling variability 
CR6: Distinguishes between correlation and causation. Assesses the knowledge that a strong 
correlation between two variables does not mean that one causes the other. 
CR7: Correctly interprets two-way tables. Assesses the knowledge how to judge and interpret a 
relationship between two variables, knowing how to examine and interpret a two-way table. 
CR8: Understands the importance of large samples. Assesses the knowledge of how samples are 
related to a population and what may be inferred from a sample; knowing that a larger, well 
chosen sample will more accurately represent a population; being cautious when making 
inferences made on small samples. 
 
Misconception scales: 
Subscale # Outcome assessed 
MISC1 Misconceptions involving averages. This category includes the following pitfalls: averages 
are the most common number; failing to take outliers into consideration when computing 
the mean; comparing groups on their averages only; and confusing mean with median. 
MISC2 Outcome orientation. Students use an intuitive model of probability that lead them to make 
yes or no decisions about single events rather than looking at the series of events; see 
Konold (1989). 
MISC3 Good samples have to represent a high percentage of the population. Size of the sample 
and how it is chosen is not important, but it must represent a large part of the population to 
be a good sample. 
MISC4 Law of small numbers. Small samples best resemble the populations from which they are 
sampled, so are to be preferred over larger samples. 
MISC5 Representativeness misconception. In this misconception the likelihood of a sample is 
estimated on the basis how closely it resembles the population. Documented in Kahneman, 
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Slovic, & Tversky (1982). 
MISC6 Correlation implies causation. 
MISC7 Equiprobability bias. Events of unequal chance tend to be viewed as equally likely; see 
Lecoutre (1992). 
MISC8 Groups can only be compared if they have the same size. 
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A2. Statistical Reasoning Assessment (SRA) 
 Question 1. [CR2/CR7/MISC1]5 A small object was weighed on the same scale, separately by nine students, in a 
science class. The weights (in grams) recorded by each student are shown below. 
 
6.2   6.0   6.0   15.3   6.1   6.3   6.2   6.15   6.2 
 
The students want to determine as accurately as they can the actual weight of this object. Of the following methods, 
which would you recommend they use? 
a. Use the most common number, which is 6.2. 
b. Use the 6.15 since it is the most accurate weighing. 
c. Add up the 9 numbers and divide by 9. 
d. Throw out the 15.3, add up the other 8 numbers and divide by 8. 
 
Indicate how confident you are that you correctly answered the previous question.6 
   1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6 
             Very                                                                      Very 
            Low                                                                       High 
 
 
Question 2. [CR1/MISC2] The following message is printed on a bottle of prescription medication: 
WARNING: For applications to skin areas there is a 15% chance of developing a rash. If a rash develops, consult 
your physician. 
 Which of the following is the best interpretation of this warning? 
a. Don’t use the medication on your skin, there’s a good chance of developing a rash. 
b. For application to the skin, apply only 15% of the recommended dose. 
c. If a rash develops, it will probably involve only 15% of the skin. 
d. About 15 of 100 people who use this medication develop a rash. 
e. There is hardly a chance of getting a rash using this medication. 
 
 
Question 3. [CR1/ MISC2] The Springfield Meteorological Center wanted to determine the accuracy of their 
weather forecasts. They searched their records for those days when the forecaster had reported a 70% chance of rain. 
They compared these forecasts to records of whether or not it actually rained on those particular days. 
 
The forecast of 70% chance of rain can be considered very accurate if it rained on: 
 
a. 95% - 100% of those days. 
b. 85% - 94% of those days. 
c. 75% - 84% of those days. 
d. 65% - 74% of those days. 
e. 55% - 64% of those days. 
 
 
Question 4. [CR2] A teacher wants to change the seating arrangement in her class in the hope that it will increase 
the number of comments her students make. She first decides to see how many comments students make with the 
current seating arrangement. A record of the number of comments made by her 8 students during one class period is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 These codes refer to the notions tested in the question and correspond to the subscales presented on pp.124-125. 
6 This question was inserted after each of the 20 questions on the SRA to prompt participants to report their level of 




Student Initials          
 A.A. R.F. A.G. J.G. C.K. N.K. J.L. A.W. 
Number of comments 0 5 2 22 3 2 1 2 
 
She wants to summarize this data by computing a typical number of comments made that day. Of the following 
methods, which would you recommend she use? 
 
a. Use the most common number, which is 2. 
b. Add up the 8 numbers and divide by 8. 
c. Throw out the 22, add up the other 7 numbers and divide by 7. 
d. Throw out the 0, add up the other 7 numbers and divide by 7. 
 
 
Question 5. [CR7] A new medication is being tested to determine its effectiveness in the treatment of eczema, an 
inflammatory condition of the skin. Thirty patients with eczema were selected to participate in the study. The 
patients were randomly divided into two groups. Twenty patients in an experimental group received the medication, 
while ten patients in a control group received no medication. The results after two months are shown below. 
 
 Experimental group (Medication) Control group (No Medication) 
Improved 8 2 
No Improvement 12 8 
 
Based on the data, I think the medication was: 
 
1. Somewhat effective     2. Basically ineffective 
 
If you chose option 1, select the one explanation below 
that best describes your reasoning. 
If you chose option 2, select the one explanation below 
that best describes your reasoning. 
a.  40% of the people (8/20) in the experimental group 
improved. 
       a.    In the control group, 2 people improved    
              even without medication. 
b.  8 people improved in the experimental group while 
only 2 improved in the control group. 
       b.    In the experimental group, more people  
              didn’t get better than did (12 vs 8). 
c.  In the experimental group, the number of people 
who improved is only 4 less than the number who 
didn’t improve (12-8), while in the control group, the 
difference is 6 (8-2). 
       c.    The difference between the numbers who  
              improved and didn’t improve is about the  
              same in each group (4 vs 6). 
d.  40% of the patients in the experimental group 
improved (8/20), while only 20% improved in the 
control group. 
      d.    In the experimental group, only 40% of the  
             patients improved (8/20). 
 
Question 6. [CR8/ MISC8] Listed below are several possible reasons one might question the results of the 
experiment described above. Circle on your answer sheet every statement that you agree with. 
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a. It’s not legitimate to compare the two groups because there are different numbers of patients in each group. 
b. The sample of 30 is too small to permit drawing conclusions. 
c. The patients should not have been randomly put into groups, because the most severe cases may have just by 
chance ended up in one of the groups 
d. I’m not given enough information about how doctors decided whether or not patients improved. Doctors may 
have been biased in their judgments. 
e. I don’t agree with any of these statements 
 
 
Question 7. [MISC3] A marketing research company was asked to determine how much money teenagers (ages 13-
19) spend on recorded music (cassette tapes, CDs and records). The company randomly selected 80 malls located 
around the country. A field researcher stood in a central location in the mall and asked passers-by who appeared to 
be the appropriate age to fill out a questionnaire. A total of 2, 050 questionnaires were completed by teenagers. On 
the basis of this survey, the research company reported that the average teenager in this country spends $155 each 
year on recorded music. 
 
Listed below are several statements concerning this survey. Circle on your answer sheet every statement that you 
agree with. 
 
a. The average is based on teenagers’ estimates of what they spend and therefore could be quite different from what 
teenagers actually spend 
b. They should have done the survey at more than 80 malls if they wanted an average based on teenagers throughout 
the country. 
c. The sample of 2, 050 teenagers is too small to permit drawing conclusions about the entire country. 
d. They should have asked teenagers coming out of music stores. 
e. The average could be a poor estimate of the spending of all teenagers given that teenagers were not randomly 
chosen to fill out the questionnaire. 
f. The average could be a poor estimate of the spending of all teenagers given that only teenagers in malls were 
sampled 
g. Calculating an average in this case is inappropriate since there is a lot of variation in how much teenagers spend. 
h. I don’t agree with any of these statements. 
 
 
Question 8. [CR3] Two containers, labelled A and B, are filled with red and blue marbles in the following 
quantities: 
Container Red Blue 
A 6 4 
B 60 40 
 
Each container is shaken vigorously. After choosing one of the containers, you will reach in and, without looking, 
draw out a marble. If the marble is blue, you win $50. Which container gives you the best chance of drawing a blue 
marble? 
a. Container A (with 6 red and 4 blue) 
b. Container B (with 60 red and 40 blue) 
c. Equal chances from each container 
 
 
Question 9. [CR4/ MISC5] Which of the following sequences is most likely to results from flipping a fair coin 5 
times? 
 
a. H H H T T 
 125	  
b. T H H T H 
c. T H T T T 
d. H T H T H 
e. All four sequences are equally likely. 
 
 
Question 10. [CR4/ MISC5] Select one or more explanations for the answer you gave for the item above. 
 
a. Since the coin is fair, you ought to get roughly equal numbers of heads and tails. 
b. Since coin flipping is random, the coin ought to alternate frequently between landing heads and tails. 
c. Any of the sequences could occur. 
d. If you repeatedly flipped a coin five times, each of these sequences would occur about as often as any other 
sequence. 
e. If you get a couple of heads in a row, the probability of a tails on the next flip increases. 
f. Every sequence of five flips has exactly the same probability of occurring. 
 
 
Question 11. [CR4/MISC2/MISC5] Which of the following sequences is least likely to result from flipping a fair 
coin 5 times? 
 
a. H H H T T 
b. T H H T H 
c. T H T T T 
d. H T H T H 
e. All four sequences are equally unlikely 
 
 
Question 12. [CR8/MISC2/MISC4] The Caldwells want to buy a new car, and they have narrowed their choices to 
a Buick or a Oldsmobile. They first consulted an issue of Consumer Reports, which compared rates of repair for 
various cars. Records of repairs done on 400 cars of each type showed somewhat fewer mechanical problems with 
the Buick than with the Oldsmobile. 
The Caldwells then talked to three friends, two Oldsmobile owners, and one former Buick owner. Both Oldsmobile 
owners reported having a few mechanical problems, but nothing major. The Buick owner, however, exploded when 
asked how he liked his car: 
First, the fuel injection went out - $250 bucks. Next, I started having trouble with the rear end and had to replace it. I 
finally decided to sell it after the transmission went. I’d never buy another Buick. 
 
The Caldwells want to buy the car that is less likely to require major repair work. Given what they currently know, 
which car would you recommend that they buy? 
 
a. I would recommend that they buy the Oldsmobile, primarily because of all the trouble their friend had with his 
Buick. Since they haven’t heard similar horror stories about the Oldsmobile, they should go with it. 
b. I would recommend that they buy the Buick in spite of their friend’s bad experience. That is just one case, while 
the information reported in Consumer Reports is based on many cases. And according to that data, the Buick is 
somewhat less likely to require repairs. 
c. I would tell them that it didn’t matter which car they bought. Even though one of the models might be more likely 
than the other to require repairs, they could still, just by chance, get stuck with a particular car that would need a lot 
of repairs. They may as well toss a coin to decide. 
 
 
Question 13. [CR3/ MISC2/MISC7] Five faces of a fair die are painted black, and one face is painted white. The 
die is rolled six times. Which of the following results is more likely? 
 
a. Black side up on five of the rolls; white side up on the other roll 
b. Black side up on all six rolls 




Question 14. [CR5/ MISC4] Half of all newborns are girls and half are boys. Hospital A records and average of 50 
births a day. Hospital B records an average of 10 births a day. On a particular day, which hospital is more likely to 
record 80% or more female births? 
 
a. Hospital A (with 50 births a day) 
b. Hospital B (with 10 births a day) 
c. The two hospitals are equally likely to record such an event 
 
 
Question 15. [CR5/MISC1] Forty college students participated in a study of the effect of sleep on test scores. 
Twenty of the students volunteered to stay up all night studying the night before the test (no-sleep group). The other 
20 students (the control group) went to bed by 11:00pm on the evening before the test. The test scores for each 
group are shown in the graphs below. Each dot on the graph represents a particular student’s score. For example, the 
two dots above the 80 in the bottom graph indicate that two students in the sleep group scored 80 on the test.            
 
Examine the two graphs carefully. Then choose from the 6 possible conclusions listed below the one you most agree 
with. 
 
a. The no-sleep group did better because none of these students scored below 40 and the highest score was achieved 
by a student in this group. 
b. The no-sleep group did better because its average appears to be a little higher than the average of the sleep group. 
c. There is no difference between the two groups because there is considerable overlap in the scores of the two 
groups. 
d. There is no difference between the two groups because the difference between their averages is small compared to 
the amount of variation in the scores. 
e. The sleep group did better because more students in this group scored 80 or above. 
f. The sleep group did better because its average appears to be a little higher than the average of the no-sleep group. 
 
 
 Question 16. [CR6/MISC2/MISC6] For one month, 500 elementary students kept a daily record of the hours they 
spent watching television. The average number of hours per week spent watching television was 28. The researchers 
conducting the study also obtained report cards for each of the students. They found that the students who did well 
in school spent less time watching television than those students who did poorly. Listed below are several possible 
statements concerning the results of this research. Circle on your answer sheet every statement that you agree with. 
 
a. The sample of 500 is too small to permit drawing conclusions. 
b. If a student decreased the amount of time spent watching television, his or her performance in school would 
improve. 
c. Even though students who did well watched less television, this doesn’t necessarily mean that watching television 
hurts school performance. 
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d. One month is not a long enough period of time to estimate how many hours the students really spend watching 
television. 
e. The research demonstrates that watching television causes poorer performance in school 
f. I don’t agree with any of these statements 
 
 
Question 17.  [CR2/ MISC1] The school committee of a small town wanted to determine the average number of 
children per household in their town. They divided the total number of children in the town by 50, the total number 
of households. Which of the following statements must be true if the average children per household is 2.2? 
a. Half the households in the town have more than 2 children. 
b. More households in the town have 3 children than have 2 children. 
c. There are a total of 110 children in the town. 
d. There are 2.2 children in the town for every adult. 
e. The most common number of children in a household is 2. 
f. None of the above. 
 
 
Question 18. [CR3/ MISC7] When two dice are simultaneously thrown it is possible that one of the following two 
results occurs: Result 1: A 5 and a 6 are obtained. Result 2: A 5 is obtained twice. 
 
Select the response that you agree with the most: 
 
a. The chance of obtaining each of these results is equal. 
b. There is more chance of obtaining result 1. 
c. There is more chance of obtaining result 2. 
d. It is impossible to give an answer. 
 
 
Question 19. [CR3/MISC7] When three dice are simultaneously thrown, which of the following results is MOST 
LIKELY to be obtained? 
 
a. Result 1: “A 5, a 3 and a 6” 
b. Result 2: “A 5 three times” 
c. Result 3: “A 5 twice and a 3” 
d. All three results are equally likely 
 
 
Question 20. [CR3/ MISC7] When three dice are simultaneously thrown, which of these three results is LEAST 
LIKELY to be obtained? 
 
a. Result 1: “A 5, a 3 and a 6” 
b. Result 2: “A 5 three times” 
c. Result 3: “A 5 twice and a 3” 








Appendix B – Measures of Individual Differences 
B1. Thinking Dispositions: Preference for Numerical Information (PNI) Scale  
& Level of Endorsement of the Stereotype 
 
1. I enjoy work that requires the use of numbers. ________ 
2. I think quantitative information is difficult to understand. ________  
3. I find it satisfying to solve day-to-day problems involving numbers. ________ 
4. Numerical information is very useful in everyday life. ________ 
5. I prefer not to pay attention to information involving numbers. ________ 
6. I think more information should be available in numerical form. ________ 
7. I don’t like to think about issues involving numbers. ________ 
8. Numbers are not necessary for most situations. ________ 
9. Thinking is enjoyable when it does not involve quantitative information. ________ 
10. I like to make calculations using numerical information. ________ 
11. Quantitative information is vital for accurate decisions. ________ 
12. I enjoy thinking about issues that do not involve numerical information. ________ 
13. Understanding numbers is as important in daily life as reading or writing. ________ 
14. I easily lose interest in graphs, percentages, and other quantitative information. ________ 
15. I don’t find numerical information to be relevant for most situations. ________ 
16. I think it is important to learn and use numerical information to make well-informed decisions. __ 
17. Numbers are redundant for most situations. ________ 
18. It is a waste of time to learn information containing a lot of numbers. ________ 
19. I like to go over numbers in my mind. _______ 
20. It helps me to think if I put down information as numbers. ________ 
 
*21. According to my own personal beliefs, I expect men to generally do better in math than women. 
*22. According to my own personal beliefs, I expect men to generally do better in statistics than women. 
*These questions were included to probe levels of agreement with the stereotypes. They were used in studies 2,3, 
and 4, but not in Study 1. In Phase 1 of Study 2, these two questions were included at the end of the SRA instead of 




B2. Thinking Dispositions: Need for Cognition (NC) Scale 
 
1. I would prefer complex problems to simple ones. _______ 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. _______ 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. _______ 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking 
abilities. _______ 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance that I will have to think in depth about 
something. _______ 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. _______ 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. _______ 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. _______ 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. _______ 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. _______ 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. _______ 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t appeal to me very much. _______ 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. _______ 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. _______ 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not 
require much thought. ______ 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort. ____ 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works. _______ 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. _______ 
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B3. Thinking Dispositions: Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT) Scale 
 
1.  Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the 
freedom of certain political groups. (Reflected) 
2.  What beliefs you hold have more to do with your own personal character than the experiences that may have 
given rise to them. (Reflected) 
3.  I tend to classify people as either for me or against me. (Reflected) 
4.  A person should always consider new possibilities. 
5.  There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth. 
(Reflected) 
6.  Changing your mind is a sign of weakness. (Reflected) 
7.  I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues. (Reflected) 
8.  I think there are many wrong ways, but only one right way, to almost anything. (Reflected) 
9.  It makes me happy and proud when someone famous holds the same beliefs that I do. (Reflected) 
10. Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than through waiting for good 
fortune. 
11. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for. (Reflected) 
12. Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of strong character. 
13. No one can talk me out of something I know is right. (Reflected) 
14. Basically, I know everything I need to know about the important things in life. (Reflected) 
15. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear against them. (Reflected) 
16. Considering too many different opinions often leads to bad decisions. (Reflected) 
17. There are basically two kinds of people in this world, good and bad. (Reflected) 
18. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles. 
19. Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be made against them. 
(Reflected) 
20. Most people just don't know what's good for them. (Reflected) 
21. It is a noble thing when someone holds the same beliefs as their parents. (Reflected) 
22. Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom. (Reflected) 
23. I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and principles is more important than "open-mindedness." (Reflected) 
24. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only one which is correct. (Reflected) 
25. My beliefs would not have been very different if I had been raised by a different set of parents. (Reflected) 
26. If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it. 
27. I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have may be valid for them. 
28. Even if my environment (family, neighborhood, schools) had been different, I probably would have the same 
religious views. (Reflected) 
29. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues. 
30. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a changing world. 
31. My blood boils over whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong. (Reflected) 
32. I believe that the "new morality" of permissiveness is no morality at all. (Reflected) 
33. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with your established beliefs. (Reflected) 
34. Someone who attacks my beliefs is not insulting me personally. 
35. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its members cannot exist for long. (Reflected) 
36. Often, when people criticize me, they don't have their facts straight. (Reflected) 
37. Beliefs should always be revised in response to new information or evidence. 
38. I think that if people don't know what they believe in by the time they're 25, there's something wrong with them. 
(Reflected) 
39. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead them. (Reflected) 
40. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions. (Reflected) 








B4. Cognitive Ability: Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
 
 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ____ 
cents 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
____ minutes 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to 












B6. Cognitive Ability: Vocabulary Checklist-with-Foils (VOC) 
 
 
For this task, you will see 60 letter strings. Some are actual words and others are not actual words. Read through the 









B7. Demographic questionnaire 
1. How comfortable are you with formal statistics (e.g., chance, confidence intervals & hypothesis test)? 
a. Very uncomfortable  
b. Somewhat uncomfortable  
c. Somewhat comfortable  
d. Very comfortable 
 
2. How comfortable are you with informal statistics (e.g., reading tables & graphs of rates & percents)? 
a. Very uncomfortable  
b. Somewhat uncomfortable  
c. Somewhat comfortable  
d. Very comfortable 
 
3. How quantitative is your work, area of study/teaching or daily life? [If retired, use prior occupation.] 
a. Generally non-quantitative (e.g., child care, music, art, English, philosophy) 
b. Minimally quantitative (e.g., business management, education, journalism, health care) 
c. Moderately quantitative (e.g., psychology, sociology, MIS, market research, forecasting) 
d. Highly quantitative (e.g., finance, econometrics, accounting, science, engineering) 
e. Extremely quantitative (e.g., mathematics, statistics) 
 
4. What best describes your occupation? [If retired, you may use your prior occupation.] 
a. Full-time student (not working) 
b. Teacher, elementary/secondary 
c. Teacher, college 
d. Other professions (working full time) 
e. Other (e.g., working part time, homemaker) 
 
5. What best describes your highest level of schooling completed? 
a. Primary school  
b. Secondary school/ High school  
c. Two-year college (associate's degree) 
d. Four year college (bachelor's degree)  
e. Graduate degree (master's or Ph.D) 
 
6. What best describes your fluency in English? 
a. English was a native language in primary school 
b. Became fluent in speaking and reading English after primary school 
c. Not yet fluent in speaking and reading English 
 
7. How many undergraduate &/or graduate statistics courses  (e.g., Psych 292) have you completed?   
 
8. How many research method courses (e.g., Psych 291) have you completed?  
 
9. What is your age?  
 
10. What is your program of study and university level? 
 






Appendix C – Value affirmation exercise 
Ranking of Personal Characteristics and Values 
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, some of which may be 
unimportant.  Please rank these values and qualities in order of their importance to you, from 1 to 11 (“1” being the 
most important item, “11” being the least important).  Use each number only once. 
 
____  Artistic skills/Aesthetic appreciation 
____  Sense of Humour 
____  Relations with friends/Family 
____  Spontaneity/Living life in the moment 
____  Social Skills 
____  Athletics 
____  Musical ability/Appreciation 
____  Physical attractiveness 
____  Creativity 
____  Business/Money 




*On the reverse of the page, the participants were asked to answer two questions, which varied based on their 
condition:  
 
If in the value-affirmation condition 
1) What was your most important value listed on the previous page?   
(the value you ranked number 1) 
 
2) Why do you think this value might be important to you?  Describe a time in your life when it has been important.  




If in the control condition:  
1) What was your ninth most important value listed on the previous page?   
(the value you ranked number 9)  
 
2) Why do you think this value might be important to a typical U of W student?  Describe a time in the typical 




Appendix D – Tables of Results (main, with covariates, and split-groups) 
 
D1. Study 1 
Table 1.1 
Analysis of Variance  – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .53   .529      26.31   .000    .120 
Experience 2 .66   .330      16.41   .000    .145 
G *Exp 2 .01   .006         .28   .757    .003 
Error 193 3.88   .020    
Total 198 5.32     
 
Table 1.2 
Analysis of Variance  – Misconceptions Performance – Study1 
Source df SS MS F p      η2p 
Gender 1 .20 .203 16.73 .000        .080 
Experience 2 .24 .119 9.87 .000        .093 
G *Exp 2 .04 .017 1.44 .241        .015 
Error 193 2.34 .012    
Total 198 2.88     
 
Table 1.3 
Analysis of Variance  – Confidence – Study1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 6.41 6.409 16.91 .000 .081 
Experience 2 8.77 4.386 11.57 .000 .107 
G *Exp 2 .25 .126     .33 .717 .003 
Error 193 73.14 .379    
Total 198 90.83     
 
Study 1 - Correct Reasoning – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   CRT 
3.   WPT 
4.   Area of Study 
 
Table 1.1.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study1 
Source      df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1 .29 .287 15.33 .000 .074 
Gender 1 .39 .388 20.74 .000 .098 
Experience 2 .48 .237 12.69 .000 .117 
G *Exp 2 .01 .005    .26 .776 .003 
Error 192 3.59 .019    
Total 198 5.32     
 
Table 1.1.2 
Analysis of Covariance (CRT) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
CRT 1 .29 .287 15.33 .000 .074 
Gender 1 .39 .388 20.74 .000 .098 
Experience 2 .48 .237 12.69 .000 .117 
G *Exp 2 .01 .005    .26 .776 .003 
Error 192 3.59 .019    
Total 198 5.32     
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Table 1.1.3 
Analysis of Covariance (WPT) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
WPT 1 .88 .882 56.50 .000 .227 
Gender 1 .32 .323 20.65 .000 .097 
Experience 2 .26 .129 8.25 .000 .079 
G *Exp 2 .01 .003 .21 .810 .002 
Error 192 3.00 .016    
Total 198 5.32     
 
Table 1.1.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area 1  .20 .201 10.46 .001 .052 
Gender 1 .34 .344 17.96 .000 .086 
Experience 2 .57 .285 14.85 .000 .134 
G *Exp 2 .02 .010    .50 .608 .005 
Error 192 3.68 .019    
Total 198 5.32     
 
Study 1 - Misconceptions – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   CRT 
3.   WPT 
4.   Area of Study 
 
Table 1.2.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI) – Misconception  – Study 1 
Source       df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1      .04 .035      2.96   .087 .015 
Gender 1      .17 .168    14.05   .000 .068 
Experience 2      .19 .097      8.08   .000 .078 
G *Exp 2      .03 .017      1.39   .252 .014 
Error 192    2.30 .012    
Total 198    2.88     
 
Table 1.2.2 
Analysis of Covariance (CRT) – Misconception – Study 1 
Source      df SS MS F p η2p 
CRT 1      .15 .149 13.11 .000 .064 
Gender 1      .08 .077 6.76 .010 .034 
Experience 2      .11 .054 4.74 .010 .047 
G *Exp 2      .03 .013 1.11 .332 .011 
Error 192    2.19 .011    
Total 198    2.88     
 
Table 1.2.3 
Analysis of Covariance (WPT) – Misconception – Study 1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
WPT 1 .02 .019 1.55 .215 .008 
Gender 1 .18 .178     14.78 .000 .071 
Experience 2 .18 .092 7.62 .001 .074 
G *Exp 2        .03 .016 1.33 .267 .014 
Error 192 2.32 .012    
Total 198  2.88     
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Table 1.2.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Misconception – Study 1 
Source    df SS MS F p     η2p 
Area 1 .06 .057 4.78 .030 .024 
Gender 1 .14 .139 11.72 .001 .058 
Experience 2 .21 .104 8.77 .000 .084 
G *Exp 2 .04 .021 1.73 .179 .018 
Error 192 2.28 .012    
Total 198 2.88     
 
Study 1 - Confidence – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   CRT 
3.   WPT 
4.   Area of Study 
 
Table 1.3.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI) – Confidence – Study1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1     12.92 12.915 41.17 .000 .177 
Gender 1  3.49 3.489 11.12 .001 .055 
Experience 2  5.69 2.847    9.08 .000 .086 
G *Exp 2    .19 .094      .30 .741 .003 
Error 192 60.23 .314    
Total 198  90.83     
 
Table 1.3.2 
Analysis of Covariance (CRT) – Confidence – Study1 
Source     df SS MS F p η2p 
CRT 1      8.28 8.279 24.51 .000 .113 
Gender 1 1.70 1.700 5.03 .026 .026 
Experience 2 3.95 1.977 5.85 .003 .057 
G *Exp 2   .11    .057   .17 .846 .002 
Error 192    64.86   .338    
Total 198    90.83     
 
Table 1.3.3 
Analysis of Covariance (WPT) – Confidence – Study1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
WPT 1 3.62 3.619 1.00 .002 .049 
Gender 1 4.82 4.819 13.31 .000 .065 
Experience 2 5.35 2.68 7.39 .001 .072 
G *Exp 2 .19 .095 .26 .771 .003 
Error 192 69.52 .362    
Total 198 90.83     
 
Table 1.3.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Confidence – Study1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area 1 5.05 5.054 14.25 .000 .069 
Gender 1 3.47 3.473 9.79 .002 .049 
Experience 2 7.83 3.916 11.04 .000 .103 
G *Exp 2   .44 .217   .61 .543 .006 
Error 192 68.09 .355    
Total 198 90.83     
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D2a. STUDY 2 – Phase 1 
 
Table 2a.1 
Analysis of Variance  – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 2 Phase 1 
Source df SS MS F p            η2p 
Gender 1 .13 .133 8.46 .009           .308 
Condition 1 .00 .001   .04 .853           .002 
G *Cond 1 .00 .000  .01 .912           .001 
Error 19 .30 .016    
Total 22 .44     
 
Table 2a.2 
Analysis of Variance  – Misconceptions Performance – Study 2 Phase 1 
Source df SS MS F         p η2p 
Gender                 1 .08 .082 5.62  .029 .228 
Condition 1 .00 .004 .31  .587 .016 
G *Cond 1 .01 .012 .82  .377 .041 
Error 19 .28 .015    
Total 22 .39     
 
Table 2a.3 
Analysis of Variance  – Confidence – Study 2 Phase 1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .22 .220  .60 .448 .031 
Condition 1 .43 .434 1.19 .289 .059 
G *Cond 1 .06 .057 .16 .699 .008 
Error 19 6.95 .366    
Total 22 8.18     
 
Study 2 – Phase 1 - Correct Reasoning – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
2.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
3.   Grade 291 
 
Table 2a.1.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Stats) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 2a 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .00 .000 .01 .937 .821 
Gender 1 .09 .087 4.40 .041 .077 
Error 53      1.05 .020    
Total 55      1.14     
 
Table 2a.1.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement_Math) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 2a 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .00 .009 .45 .507 .008 
Gender 1 .07 .074 3.78 .057 .067 
Error 53 1.04 .020    









Analysis of Covariance (Grade_291) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 2a 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Grade_291 1 .20 .204 12.77 .001 .194 
Gender 1 .13 .134 8.38 .006 .136 
Error 53 .85 .016    
Total 55 1.14     
 
Study 2 – Phase 1  - Misconceptions – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
2.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
3.   Grade 291 
 
Table 2a.2.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement_Stats) – Misconceptions Performance – Study 2a 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .00 .000 .00 .985 .000 
Gender 1 .09 .093 7.35 .009 .122 
Error 53 .67 .013    
Total 55 .77     
 
Table 2a.2.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement_Math) – Misconceptions Performance – Study 2a 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .00 .001 .076 .784 .001 
Gender 1 .09 .087 6.82 .012 .114 
Error 53 .67 .013    
Total 55 .76     
 
Table 2a.1.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Grade_291) – Misconceptions Performance – Study 2a 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Grade_291 1 .04 .040 3.39 .071 .060 
Gender 1 .11 .113 9.43 .003 .151 
Error 53 .63 .012    
Total 55 .77     
 
Study 2 – Phase 1  - Confidence – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
2.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
3.   Grade 291 
 
Table 2a.3.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement_Stats)- Confidence- Study 2 Phase 1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .12 .120 .17 .680 .003 
Gender 1 1.77 1.766 2.53 .118 .046 
Error 53 36.98 .698    









Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement_Math)- Confidence- Study 2 Phase 1  
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .00 .001 .08 .784 .001 
Gender 1 .09 .087 6.83 .012 .114 
Error 53 .67 .013    
Total 55 .76     
 
Table 2a.3.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Grade_291) - Confidence- Study 2 Phase 1 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Grade_291 1 2.12 2.115 3.21 .079 .057 
Gender 1 2.55 2.549 3.86 .055 .068 
Error 53 34.98 .660    
Total 55 39.02     
 
  
D2b. STUDY 2 – Phase 3  
Table 2b.1 
Analysis of Variance – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .13 .133 8.46 .009 .308 
Condition 1 .00 .001 .04 .853 .002 
G *Cond 1 .00 .000 .01 .912 .001 
Error 19 .30 .016    
Total 22 .44     
 
Table 2b.2 
Analysis of Variance – Misconceptions Performance – Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .08 .082 5.62 .029 .228 
Condition 1 .00 .004 .31 .587 .016 
G *Cond 1 .01 .012 .82 .377 .041 
Error 19 .28 .015    
Total 22 .39     
 
Table 2b.3 
Analysis of Variance – Confidence Performance – Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .22 .220 .60 .448 .031 
Condition 1 .43 .434 1.19 .289 .059 
G *Cond 1 .06 .057 .16 .699 .008 
Error 19 6.95 .366    













Study 2 – Phase 3 - Correct Reasoning – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   NUM 
3.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
4.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
5.   Grade 291 




Analysis of Covariance (PNI)- Correct Reasoning Performance- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1 .04 .040 2.80 .112 .135 
Gender 1 .15 .151 10.48 .005 .368 
Condition 1 .00 .001 .09 .764 .005 
G*Cond 1 .01 .005 .35 .559 .019 
Error 18 .26 .014    
Total 22 .44     
 
Table 2b.1.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Numeracy)- Correct Reasoning Performance- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Numeracy 1 .01 .013 .79 .385 .042 
Gender 1 .09 .087 5.50 .031 .234 
Condition 1 .00 .00 .00 .980 .000 
G*Cond 1 .00 .001 .08 .783 .004 
Error 18 .29 .016    
Total 22 .44     
 
Table 2b.1.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Stats)- Correct Reasoning Performance- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .02 .023 1.49 .238 .076 
Gender 1 .15 .154 10.07 .005 .359 
Condition 1 .00 .001 .05 .825 .003 
G*Cond 1 .01 .010 .67 .423 .036 
Error 18 .28 .015    
Total 22 .44     
 
Table 2b.1.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Math)- Correct Reasoning Performance- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .08 .078 6.35 .021 .261 
Gender 1 .15 .153 12.44 .002 .409 
Condition 1 .00 .002 .15 .700 .008 
G *Cond 1 .03 .025 2.06 .169 .103 
Error 18 .22 .012    










Analysis of Covariance (Grade 291)- Correct Reasoning Performance- Study 2 Phase 3  
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Grade_291 1 .06 .059 4.29 .056 .222 
Gender 1 .12 .119 8.62 .010 .365 
Condition 1 .00 .00 .00 .974 .000 
G*Cond 1 .01 .008 .61 .447 .039 
Error 15 .21 .016    
Total 19 .39     
 
Table 2b.1.6 
Analysis of Covariance (Word Count)- Correct Reasoning Performance- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Word_Count 1 .09 .088 7.54 .013 .295 
Gender 1 .10 .100 8.59 .009 .323 
Condition 1 .01 .012 1.03 .323 .054 
G*Cond 1 .00 .000 .00 .986 .000 
Error 18 .21 .012    
Total 22 .44     
 
 
Study 2 – Phase 3  - Misconceptions – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   NUM 
3.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
4.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
5.   Grade 291 
6.   Word Count 
 
Table 2b.2.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI)- MISC- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1 .06 .058 4.76 .043 .209 
Gender 1 .10 .100 8.19 .010 .313 
Condition 1 .01 .007 .56 .465 .030 
G*Cond 1 .03 .030 2.49 .132 .121 
Error 18 .22 .012    
Total 22 .39     
 
Table 2b.2.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Numeracy)- MISC- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Numeracy 1 .00 .003 .19 .669 .010 
Gender 1 .06 .060 3.94 .063 .180 
Condition 1 .00 .003 .21 .654 .011 
G*Cond 1 .01 .014 .91 .354 .048 
Error 18 .28 .015    










Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Stats)- MISC- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .02 .015 1.03 .324 .054 
Gender 1 .10 .096 6.57 .020 .268 
Condition 1 .00 .001 .04 .854 .002 
G*Cond 1 .03 .026 1.77 .200 .090 
Error 18 .26 .015    
Total 22 .39     
 
Table 2b.2.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Math)- MISC- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .03 .030 2.16 .159 .107 
Gender 1 .09 .092 6.64 .019 .269 
Condition 1 .00 .001 .04 .841 .002 
G*Cond 1 .03 .034 2.45 .135 .120 
Error 18 .25 .014    
Total 22 .39     
 
Table 2b.2.5 
Analysis of Covariance (Grade 291)- MISC- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Grade_291 1 .01 .01 .78 .390 .050 
Gender 1 .07 .07 5.42 .034 .265 
Condition 1 .01 .01 .36 .557 .024 
G *Cond 1 .02 .02 1.72 .209 .103 
Error 15 .19 .01    
Total 19 .32     
 
Table 2b.2.6 
Analysis of Covariance (Word Count)- MISC- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Word_Count 1 .05 .054 4.30 .053 .193 
Gender 1 .06 .062 4.99 .038 .217 
Condition 1 .02 .017 1.40 .252 .072 
G*Cond 1 .01 .009 .75 .398 .040 
Error 18 .23 .012    


















Study 2 – Phase 3  - Confidence – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   NUM 
3.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
4.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
5.   Grade 291 
6.   Word Count 
 
Table 2b.3.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI)- Confidence- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1 .56 .564 1.59 .224 .081 
Gender 1 .32 .319 .90 .356 .048 
Condition 1 .37 .370 1.04 .320 .055 
G *Cond 1 .00 .000 .00 .985 .000 
Error 18 6.38 .355    
Total 22 8.18     
 
Table 2b.3.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Numeracy Total)- Confidence- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Numeracy 1 .58 .580 1.64 .217 .084 
Gender 1 .02 .022 .06 .806 .003 
Condition 1 .61 .614 1.73 .204 .088 
G*Cond 1 .01 .008 .02 .884 .001 
Error 18 6.37 .354    
Total 22 8.18     
 
Table 2b.3.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Stats)- Confidence- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .77 .766 2.23 .153 .110 
Gender 1 .50 .495 1.44 .245 .074 
Condition 1 .83 .831 2.42 .137 .118 
G *Cond 1 .11 .109 .32 .579 .017 
Error 18 6.18 .343    
Total 22 8.18     
 
Table 2b.3.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Math)- Confidence- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .03 .030 2.16 .159 .107 
Gender 1 .09 .092 6.64 .019 .269 
Condition 1 .00 .001 .04 .841 .002 
G *Cond 1 .03 .034 2.45 .135 .120 
Error 18 .25 .014    











Analysis of Covariance (Grade 291)- Confidence- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Grade_291 1 .04 .038 .33 .574 .022 
Gender 1 .02 .020            .18   .677 .012 
Condition 1 .09 .090 .80 .386 .050 
G*Cond 1 .00 .001 .01 .937 .000 
Error 15 1.70 .113    
Total 19 1.89     
 
Table 2b.3.6 
Analysis of Covariance (Word Count)- Confidence- Study 2 Phase 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Word_Count 1 .02 .017 .04 .836 .002 
Gender 1 .23 .233            .61 .447 .033 
Condition 1 .45 .446 1.16 .296 .061 
G *Cond 1 .05 .053 .14 .715 .008 
Error 18 6.93 .385    
Total 22 8.18     
 
Split Groups Analyses  
Table 2b.1.s 
Analysis of Variance – Correct Reasoning – Study 2 Phase 3 – Split Groups 
Group Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Disagree Gender 1 .03 .034 1.71 .216 .124 
 Condition 1 .02 .022 1.07 .321 .082 
 G *Cond 0 .00 … … … .000 
 Error 12 .24 .020    
 Total 14 .35     
Agree Gender 1 .00 .001 .58 .482 .103 
 Condition 1 .03 .026 11.75 .019 .701 
 G *Cond 0 .00 … … … .000 
 Error 5 .01 .002    
 Total    7 .09     
 
Table 2b.2.s 
Analysis of Variance – Misconception – Study 2 Phase 3 – Split Groups 
Group Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Disagree Gender 1 .01 .008 .52 .483 .042 
 Condition 1 .05 .046 3.02 .108 .201 
 G *Cond 0 .00 … … … .000 
 Error 12 .18 .025    
 Total 14 .27     
Agree Gender 1 .01 .014 .83 .403 .143 
 Condition 1 .00 .000 .00 .960 .001 
 G *Cond 0 .00 … … … .000 
 Error 5 .09 .017    







Analysis of Variance – Confidence – Study 2 Phase 3 – Split Groups 
Group Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Disagree Gender 1 .07 .070 .24 .636 .019 
 Condition 1 .17 .166 .56 .470 .044 
 G *Cond 0 .00 … … … .000 
 Error 12 3.57 .298    
 Total 14 3.75     
Agree Gender 1 .04 .042 .07 .800 .014 
 Condition 1 .83 .833 1.42 .287 .221 
 G *Cond 0 .00 … … … .000 
 Error 5 2.93 .586    











































D3. STUDY 3  
Table 3.1 
Analysis of Variance  – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .12 .116 4.60 .034 .031 
Condition 1 .04 .042 1.66 .200 .011 
Experience 2 .06 .031 1.24 .291 .017 
G *Cond 1 .01 .007 .27 .604 .002 
G *Exp 2 .16 .080 3.15 .046 .042 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .08 .923 .001 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .01 .009 .35 .707 .005 
Error 145 3.66 .025    
Total 156 4.21     
 
Table 3.2 
Analysis of Variance  – Misconceptions Performance – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .02 .016 1.14 .287 .008 
Condition 1 .00 .003 .24 .627 .002 
Experience 2 .14 .071 4.98 .008 .064 
G *Cond 1 .01 .005 .33 .568 .002 
G *Exp 2 .07 .032 2.28 .106 .030 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .14 .867 .002 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .16 .854 .002 
Error 145   2.06 .014    
Total 156 2.35     
 
Table 3.1 
Analysis of Variance  – Confidence – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .02 .023 .05 .830 .000 
Condition 1 .55 .545 1.10 .296 .008 
Experience 2 .60 .302 .61 .545 .008 
G *Cond 1 .07 .070 .14 .709 .001 
G *Exp 2 .76 .378 .76 .468 .010 
Cond *Exp 2 3.23 1.612 3.25 .042 .043 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .54 .269 .54 .582 .007 
Error 145 71.93 .496    


















Study 3 - Correct Reasoning – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   CRT 
3.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
4.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
5.   Word Count 
 
Table 3.1.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1 .30 .304 13.06 .000 .083 
Gender 1 .05 .048 2.08 .152 .014 
Condition 1 .03 .031 1.32 .252 .009 
Experience 2 .03 .015 .64 .527 .009 
G *Cond 1 .00 .004 .15 .698 .001 
G *Exp 2 .18 .089 3.84 .024 .051 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .07 .929 .001 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .09 .914 .001 
Error 144 3.35 .023    
Total 156 4.21     
 
Table 3.1.2 
Analysis of Covariance (CRT) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
CRT 1 .56 .561 26.08 .000 .153 
Gender 1 .04 .040 1.86 .174 .013 
Condition 1 .02 .022 1.02 .314 .007 
Experience 2 .06 .030 1.40 .249 .019 
G *Cond 1 .00 .001 .04 .846 .000 
G *Exp 2 .08 .041 1.89 .155 .026 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .07 .930 .001 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .01 .003 .13 .879 .002 
Error 144 3.10 .021    
Total 156 4.21     
 
Table 3.1.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Stats) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .13 .125 5.12 .025 .034 
Gender 1 .15 .153 6.25 .014 .042 
Condition 1 .03 .029 1.18 .279 .008 
Experience 2 .06 .030 1.21 .300 .017 
G *Cond 1 .01 .006 .26 .614 .002 
G *Exp 2 .17 .082 3.37 .037 .045 
Cond *Exp 2 .01 .002 .10 .906 .001 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .02 .010 .41 .666 .006 
Error 144 3.53 .025    









Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Math) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .10 .103 4.17 .043 .028 
Gender 1 .15 .149 6.05 .015 .040 
Condition 1 .03 .031 1.25 .266 .009 
Experience 2 .05 .024 .98 .377 .013 
G *Cond 1 .01 .007 .30 .583 .002 
G *Exp 2 .15 .076 3.07 .049 .041 
Cond *Exp 2 .01 .003 .11 .892 .002 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .02 .011 .43 .649 .006 
Error 144 3.55 .025    
Total 156 4.21     
 
Table 3.1.5 
Analysis of Covariance (Word Count) – Correct Reasoning Performance – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Word_Count 1 .01 .005 .20 .655 .001 
Gender 1 .12 .119 4.70 .032 .032 
Condition 1 .04 .041 1.62 .205 .011 
Experience 2 .06 .032 1.27 .285 .017 
G *Cond 1 .00 .004 .17 .679 .001 
G *Exp 2 .16 .081 3.19 .044 .042 
Cond *Exp 2 .01 .002 .10 .906 .001 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .02 .009 .36 .697 .005 
Error 144 3.65 .025    
Total 156 4.21     
 
Study 3 - Misconceptions – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   CRT 
3.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
4.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
5.   Word Count 
 
Table 3.2.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI) – Misconception – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1 .14 .144 10.86 .001 .070 
Gender 1 .00 .002 .16 .688 .001 
Condition 1 .00 .001 .11 .741 .001 
Experience 2 .07 .035 2.65 .074 .036 
G *Cond 1 .00 .003 .20 .652 .001 
G *Exp 2 .07 .037 2.76 .067 .037 
Cond *Exp 2 .01 .003 .19 .825 .003 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .13 .876 .002 
Error 144 1.92 .013    










Analysis of Covariance (CRT) – Misconception – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
CRT 1 .22 .216 16.90 .000 .105 
Gender 1 .00 .002 .14 .714 .001 
Condition 1 .00 .001 .04 .836 .000 
Experience 2 .10 .052 4.03 .020 .053 
G *Cond 1 .00 .001 .09 .761 .001 
G *Exp 2 .03 .017 1.33 .267 .018 
Cond *Exp 2 .01 .002 .19 .831 .003 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .01 .004 .33 .717 .005 
Error 144 1.84 .013    
Total 156 2.35     
 
Table 3.2.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Stats) – Misconception – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .02 .020 1.41 .237 .010 
Gender 1 .02 .022 1.54 .216 .011 
Condition 1 .00 .002 .14 .709 .001 
Experience 2 .14 .070 4.93 .009 .064 
G *Cond 1 .00 .004 .32 .576 .002 
G *Exp 2 .07 .033 2.34 .100 .031 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .13 .877 .002 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .01 .003 .18 .833 .003 
Error 144 2.04 .014    
Total 156 2.35     
 
Table 3.2.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Math) – Misconception – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .02 .021 1.46 .229 .010 
Gender 1 .02 .022 1.55 .215 .011 
Condition 1 .00 .002 .15 .704 .001 
Experience 2 .13 .066 4.67 .011 .061 
G *Cond 1 .01 .005 .35 .558 .002 
G *Exp 2 .06 .031 2.21 .113 .030 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .12 .887 .002 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .01 .003 .20 .822 .003 
Error 144 2.04 .014    
Total 156 2.35     
 
Table 3.2.5 
Analysis of Covariance (Word Count) – Misconception – Study 3 
Source                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              df SS MS F p η2p
Word_Count 1 .00 .002 .11 .741 .001 
Gender 1 .02 .015 1.07 .302 .007 
Condition 1 .00 .003 .24 .623 .002 
Experience 2 .14 .068 4.74 .010 .062 
G *Cond 1 .01 .006 .39 .532 .003 
G *Exp 2 .06 .032 2.23 .112 .030 
Cond *Exp 2 .01 .002 .16 .853 .002 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .01 .002 .16 .851 .002 
Error 144 2.06 .014    
Total 156 2.35     
 151	  
Study 3 - Confidence – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   CRT 
3.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
4.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
5.   Word Count 
 
Table 3.3.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI) – Confidence– Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1 .67 .673 1.36 .245 .009 
Gender 1 .00 .000 .00 .977 .000 
Condition 1 .48 .482 .97 .325 .007 
Experience 2 .42 .210 .42 .656 .006 
G *Cond 1 .05 .052 .11 .745 .001 
G *Exp 2 .82 .409 .83 .440 .011 
Cond *Exp 2 3.09 1.547 3.13 .047 .042 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .49 .247 .50 .609 .007 
Error 144 77.26 .495    
Total 156 77.44     
 
Table 3.3.2 
Analysis of Covariance (CRT) – Confidence– Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
CRT 1 .11 .107 .22 .644 .001 
Gender 1 .01 .008 .02 .898 .000 
Condition 1 .51 .507 1.02 .315 .007 
Experience 2 .59 .296 .59 .554 .008 
G *Cond 1 .06 .057 .12 .735 .001 
G *Exp 2 .67 .333 .67 .515 .009 
Cond *Exp 2 3.22 1.609 3.23 .043 .043 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .52 .260 .52 .595 .007 
Error 144 71.82 .499    
Total 156 77.44     
 
Table 3.3.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement - stats) – Confidence– Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .11 .106 .21 .645 .001 
Gender 1 .04 .040 .08 .777 .001 
Condition 1 .50 .496 1.00 .320 .007 
Experience 2 .60 .297 .60 .552 .008 
G *Cond 1 .07 .068 .14 .713 .001 
G *Exp 2 .77 .385 .77 .464 .011 
Cond *Exp 2 3.24 1.619 3.25 .042 .043 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .56 .278 .56 .574 .008 
Error 144 71.83 .499    










Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement - math) – Confidence– Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .00 .001 .00 .964 .000 
Gender 1 .02 .024 .05 .827 .000 
Condition 1 .54 .537 1.07 .302 .007 
Experience 2 .60 .297 .60 .553 .008 
G *Cond 1 .07 .070 .14 .709 .001 
G *Exp 2 .75 .377 .76 .472 .010 
Cond *Exp 2 3.23 1.613 3.23 .042 .043 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .54 .270 .54 .584 .007 
Error 144 71.93 .500    
Total 156 77.44     
 
Table 3.3.5 
Analysis of Covariance (Word Count) – Confidence  – Study 3 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Word_Count 1 .07 .069 .14 .710 .001 
Gender 1 .02 .017 .03 .854 .000 
Condition 1 .55 .554 1.11 .294 .008 
Experience 2 .60 .299 .60 .551 .008 
G *Cond 1 .10 .098 .20 .659 .001 
G *Exp 2 .75 .372 .75 .476 .010 
Cond *Exp 2 3.11 1.557 3.12 .047 .042 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .56 .277 .56 .575 .008 
Error 144 71.86 .499    
Total 156 77.44     
 
Split Groups Analyses  
Table 3.1.s 
Analysis of Variance – Correct Reasoning – Study 3 – Split Groups 
Group Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Disagree Gender 1 .07 .071 2.66 .107 .029 
 Condition 1 .00 .000 .01 .912 .000 
 Experience 2 .07 037 1.38 .257 .030 
 G *Cond 1 .00 .002 .07 .798 .001 
 G *Exp 2 .10 .048 1.78 .175     .038 
 Cond *Exp 2 .01 .007 .25 .779     .006 
 G *Cond *Exp 2 .00 .001 .03 .968     .001 
 Error 90 2.42 .027    
 Total 101 2.81     
Agree Gender 1 .05 .049 2.28 .138 .050 
 Condition 1 .11 .109 5.07 .029 .105 
 Experience 2 .02 .010 .45 .643 .020 
 G *Cond 1 .01 .014 .65 .424 .015 
 G *Exp 2 .13 .063 2.92 .064   .121 
 Cond *Exp 2 .05 .024 1.13 .331  .051 
 G *Cond *Exp 2 .06 .027 1.27 .290   .056 
 Error 43 .92 .021    





Analysis of Variance – Misconception – Study 3 – Split Groups 
Group Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Disagree Gender 1 .02 .022 1.50 .224 .016 
 Condition 1 .00 .002 .16 .691 .002 
 Experience 2 .11 055 3.83 .025 .078 
 G *Cond 1 .00 .003 .23 .632 .003 
 G *Exp 2 .01 .006 .44 .643 .010 
 Cond *Exp 2 .04 .017 1.20 .306 .026 
 G *Cond *Exp 2 .02 .009 .62 .540 .014 
 Error 90 1.29 .014    
 Total 101 1.55     
Agree Gender 1 .00 .000 .01 .921 .000 
 Condition 1 .00 .002 .12 .726 .003 
 Experience 2 .03 .014 1.08 .349 .048 
 G *Cond 1 .00 .000 .01 .941 .000 
 G *Exp 2 .13 .063 4.83 .013  .185 
 Cond *Exp 2 .00 .001 .10 .902  .006 
 G *Cond *Exp 2 .07 .034 2.61 .085  .108 
 Error 43 .56 .013    
 Total 54 .79     
 
Table 3.3.s 
Analysis of Variance – Confidence – Study 3 – Split Groups 
Group Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Disagree Gender 1 .16 .157 .28 .601 .003 
 Condition 1 .57 .569 1.00 .320 .011 
 Experience 2 .80 .402 .70 .496 .015 
 G *Cond 1 .04 .040 .07 .792 .001 
 G *Exp 2 1.49 .742 1.31 .276         .028 
 Cond *Exp 2 2.79 1.395 2.45 .092          .052 
 G *Cond *Exp 2 .41 .206 .36 .698          .008 
 Error 90 51.18 .569    
 Total 101 56.39     
Agree Gender 1 .04 .035 .08 .773 .002 
 Condition 1 .16 .159 .38 .539 .009 
 Experience 2 .20 .100 .24 .788 .011 
 G *Cond 1 .44 .436 1.05 .311 .024 
 G *Exp 2 .02 .009 .02 .978    .002 
 Cond *Exp 2 1.59 .793 1.91 .160         .083 
 G *Cond *Exp 2 .37 .187 .45 .640         .021 
 Error 43 17.84 .415    









D4. STUDY 4 
Table 4.1 
Analysis of Variance – Correct Reasoning Performance– Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .27 .272 18.74 .000 .088 
Condition 1 .01 .011 .73 .394 .004 
Experience 2 .21 .107 7.38 .001 .071 
G *Condition 1 .00 .000 .00 .987 .000 
G *Exp 2 .02 .026 1.79 .170 .018 
Condition * Exp 2 .00 .002 .148 .863 .002 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .04 .021 1.45 .236 .015 
Error 193 2.80 .015    
Total 204 3.54     
 
Table 4.2 
Analysis of Variance – Confidence– Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 459.46 459.46 1.27 .261 .007 
Condition 1 98.24 98.24 .272 .603 .001 
Experience 2 3009.25 1504.62 4.16 .017 .041 
G *Cond 1 149.96 149.96 .415 .520 .002 
G *Exp 2 258.05 129.02 .357 .700 .004 
Cond * Exp 2 613.55 306.77 .848 .430 .009 
G *Cond *Exp 2 575.3 287.65 .795 .453 .008 
Error 193 69811.84 361.72    
Total 204 75972.46     
 
Study 4 - Correct Reasoning – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   PNI 
2.   CRT 
3.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
4.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
5.   Word Count 
6.   Area of Study 
 
Table 4.1.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI) – Correct Reasoning  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1 .18 .182 13.22 .000 .064 
Gender 1 .10 .103 7.47 .007 .037 
Condition 1 .01 .012 .89 .347 .005 
Experience 2 .16 .080 5.84 .003 .057 
G *Cond 1 .00 .000 .02 .888 .000 
G *Exp 2 .04 .018 1.28 .280 .013 
Cond *Exp 2 .01 .005 .34 .715 .003 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .06 .028 2.00 .139 .020 
Error 193 2.66 .014    











Analysis of Covariance (CRT) – Correct Reasoning  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
CRT 1 .75 .748 68.99 .000 .263 
Gender 1 .04 .044 4.07 .045 .021 
Condition 1 .01 .008 .74 .390 .004 
Experience 2 .12 .060 5.50 .005 .054 
G *Cond 1 .00 .000 .00 .987 .000 
G *Exp 2 .04 .021 1.97 .142 .020 
Cond *Exp 2 .03 .014 1.33 .268 .014 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .03 .016 1.47 .234 .015 
Error 193 2.09 .011    
Total 205 3.56     
 
Table 4.1.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Stats) – Correct Reasoning  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Stats 1 .02 .024 1.62 .204 .008 
Gender 1 .26 .261 17.90 .000 .085 
Condition 1 .01 .014 .97 .326 .005 
Experience 2 .21 .105 7.17 .001 .069 
G *Cond 1 .00 .001 .06 .804 .000 
G *Exp 2 .05 .025 1.69 .187 .017 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .001 .08 .920 .001 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .05 .024 1.64 .196 .017 
Error 193 2.82 .015    
Total 205 3.56     
 
Table 4.1.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Math) – Correct Reasoning  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
SE_Math 1 .03 .032 2.17 .142 .011 
Gender 1 .25 .253 17.36 .000 .083 
Condition 1 .02 .015 1.03 .312 .005 
Experience 2 .21 .106 7.31 .001 .070 
G *Cond 1 .00 .001 .06 .803 .000 
G *Exp 2 .05 .023 1.60 .205 .016 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .001 .08 .923 .001 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .05 .024 1.68 .190 .017 
Error 193 2.81 .015    
Total 205 3.56     
 
Table 4.1.5 
Analysis of Covariance (Word Count) – Correct Reasoning  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Word_Count 1 .00 .001 .06 .814 .000 
Gender 1 .26 .258 17.53 .000 .083 
Condition 1 .01 .014 .94 .334 .005 
Experience 2 .20 .099 6.75 .001 .065 
G *Cond 1 .00 .000 .02 .892 .000 
G *Exp 2 .05 .026 1.75 .176 .018 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .001 .09 .916 .001 
G *Cond *Exp 2 .04 .020 1.36 .258 .014 
Error 193 2.84 .015    
Total 205 3.56     
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Table 4.1.6 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Correct Reasoning  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area_of_Study 1 33.97 33.968 .09 .760 .000 
Gender 1 528.60 528.604 1.46 .229 .008 
Condition 1 77.54 77.539 .21 .644 .001 
Experience 2 3226.44 1613.219 4.45 .013 .044 
G *Cond 1 124.84 124.835 .34 .558 .002 
G *Exp 2 274.45 137.223 .38 .685 .004 
Cond *Exp 2 627.54 313.772 .87 .422 .009 
G *Cond *Exp 2 531.15 265.575 .73 .482 .008 
Error 193 69944.54 362.407    
Total 205 76334.37     
 
Study 4 - Confidence – List of covariates, in order: 
1.   PNI 
2.   CRT 
3.   Stereotype Endorsement - Stats 
4.   Stereotype Endorsement - Math 
5.   Word Count 
6.   Area of Study 
 
Table 4.2.1 
Analysis of Covariance (PNI) – Confidence  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
PNI 1 2258.41 2258.41 6.44 .012 .032 
Gender 1 15.30 15.30 .04 .835 .000 
Condition 1 65.57 65.57 .19 .666 .001 
Experience 2 2343.53 1171.766 3.34 .038 .033 
G*Cond 1 126.62 126.621 .36 .549 .002 
G*Exp 2 382.21 191.107 .55 .581 .006 
Cond *Exp 2 338.86 169.431 .48 .618 .005 
G*Cond *Exp 2 632.83 316.416 .90 .408 .009 
Error 193 843425.33 350.881    
Total 205 76334.37     
 
Table 4.2.2 
Analysis of Covariance (CRT) – Confidence– Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
CRT 1 .75 .748 68.99 .000 .263 
Gender 1 .04 .044 4.07 .045 .021 
Condition 1 .01 .008 .74 .390 .004 
Experience 2 .12 .060 5.50 .005 .054 
G*Cond 1 .00 .000 .00 .987 .000 
G*Exp 2 .04 .021 1.97 .142 .020 
Cond *Exp 2 .03 .014 1.33 .268 .014 
G*Cond *Exp 2 .03 .016 1.47 .234 .015 
Error 193 2.09 .011    









Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Stats) – Confidence  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
ST_Stats 1 .00 .001 .00 .999 .000 
Gender 1 505.00 505.006 1.29 .239 .007 
Condition 1 80.26 80.256 .22 .639 .001 
Experience 2 3192.45 1596.23 4.40 .014 .044 
G*Cond 1 126.70 126.699 .35 .555 .002 
G*Exp 2 295.63 147.815 .41 .666 .004 
Cond *Exp 2 613.94 306.972 .85 .430 .009 
G*Cond *Exp 2 536.32 268.160 .74 .479 .008 
Error 193 69978.51 362.583    
Total 205 76334.37     
 
Table 4.2.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Stereotype Endorsement- Math) – Confidence  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
ST_Math 1 64.88 64.880 .18 .673 .001 
Gender 1 515.27 515.270 1.42 .234 .007 
Condition 1 77.04 77.041 .21 .645 .001 
Experience 2 3192.66 1596.330 4.41 .013 .044 
G*Cond 1 113.98 113.977 .31 .575 .002 
G*Exp 2 310.36 155.179 .43 .652 .004 
Cond *Exp 2 580.78 290.392 .80 .450 .008 
G*Cond *Exp 2 504.44 252.218 .70 .500 .007 
Error 193 69913.63 362.247    
Total 205 76334.37     
 
Table 4.2.5 
Analysis of Covariance (Word Count) – Confidence  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Word_Count 1 33.97 33.968 .09 .760 .000 
Gender 1 528.60 528.604 1.46 .229 .008 
Condition 1 77.54 77.539 .21 .644 .001 
Experience 2 3226.44 1613.219 4.45 .013 .044 
G*Cond 1 124.84 124.835 .34 .558 .002 
G*Exp 2 274.45 137.223 .38 .685 .004 
Cond *Exp 2 627.54 313.772 .87 .422 .009 
G*Cond *Exp 2 531.15 265.575 .73 .482 .008 
Error 193 69944.54 362.407    
Total 205 76334.37     
 
Table 4.2.6 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Correct Reasoning  – Study 4 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area 1 .09 .085 5.96 .016 .030 
Gender 1 .16 .162 11.31 .001 .055 
Condition 1 .03 .025 1.73 .191 .009 
Experience 2 .13 .065 4.52 .012 .045 
G*Cond 1 .00 .001 .055 .815 .000 
G*Exp 2 .06 .029 2.02 .135 .021 
Cond *Exp 2 .00 .002 .128 .880 .001 
G*Cond *Exp 2 .06 .032 2.21 .112 .022 
Error 193 2.76 .014    
Total 205 3.56     
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D5. Study 5 
 
Table 5.1 
Analysis of Variance – Quantitative: Number of Sets – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 17.33 17.334 3.028 .083 .014 
Experience 2 9.55 4.776 .834 .436 .008 
Gender * Exp 2 11.41 5.705 .997 .371 .009 
Error 213 1219.33 5.725       
Total 218 1258.56 17.334    
 
Table 5.2 
Analysis of Variance – Quantitative: Deviations from Ideal – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .20 .199 2.90 .090 .013 
Experience 2 .17 .084 1.23 .295 .011 
G * Exp  2 .11 .053 .77 .463 .007 
Error 213 14.60 .069       
Total 218 15.08     
 
Table 5.3 
Analysis of Variance – Qualitative: Quality of Rationales – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 1.27 1.266 2.97 .086 .014 
Experience 2 3.22 1.607 3.77 .025 .034 
G * Exp 2 .78 .390 .92 .402 .009 
Error 213 90.77 .426    
Total 218 95.72     
 
Study 5 - Number of Sets– List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Area of Study 
2.   Level of Comfort- Formal Stats 
3.   Level of Comfort- Informal Stats 
 
Table 5.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) –Number of Sets- Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area 1 .02 .017 .25 .619 .001 
Gender 1 .16 .160 2.33 .128 .011 
Experience 2 .16 .080 1.16 .315 .011 
G *Exp 2 14.58 .056 .81 .446 .008 
Error 212 59.02 .069    
Total 218 15.08     
 
Table 5.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Comfort - Formal) –Number of Sets- Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort - Formal 1 .02 .017 .25 .619 .001 
Gender 1 .16 .160 2.33 .128 .011 
Experience 2 .16 .080 1.16 .315 .011 
G *Exp 2 14.58 .056 .81 .446 .008 
Error 212 59.02 .069    





Analysis of Covariance (Comfort - Informal) –Number of Sets- Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort - Informal 1 .02 .017 .25 .619 .001 
Gender 1 .16 .160 2.33 .128 .011 
Experience 2 .16 .080 1.16 .315 .011 
G *Exp 2 14.58 .056 .81 .446 .008 
Error 212 59.02 .069    
Total 218 15.08     
 
Study 5 - Deviations from Ideal– List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Number of Sets 
2.   Area of Study 
3.   Level of Comfort- Formal Stats 
4.   Level of Comfort- Informal Stats 
 
Table 5.2.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Number of Sets) – Deviations from Ideal  – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Number_Sets 1 9.92 9.922 450.00 .000 .680 
Gender 1 .01 .005 .22 .639 .001 
Experience 2 .02 .011 .51 .603 .005 
G *Exp 2 .00 .001 .03 .974 .000 
Error 212 4.68 .022    
Total 218 15.08     
 
Table 5.2.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Deviations from Ideal  – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area 1 .02 .017 .25 .619 .001 
Gender 1 .16 .160 2.33 .128 .011 
Experience 2 .16 .080 1.16 .315 .011 
G *Exp 2 14.58 .056 .81 .446 .008 
Error 212 59.02 .069    
Total 218 15.08     
 
Table 5.2.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Formal Stats) – Deviations from Ideal  – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Formal 1 .14 .144 2.12 .147 .010 
Gender 1 .20 .204 2.99 .085 .014 
Experience 2 .15 .075 1.11 .332 .010 
G *Exp 2 .11 .055 .81 .447 .008 
Error 212 14.45 .068    
Total 218 15.08     
 
Table 5.2.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Informal Stats) – Deviations from Ideal  – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Informal 1 .41 .405 6.05 .015 .028 
Gender 1 .25 .246 3.68 .057 .017 
Experience 2 .14 .071 1.06 .347 .010 
G *Exp 2 .09 .047 .70 .498 .007 
Error 212 14.19 .067    
Total 218 15.08     
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Study 5 - Quality of Rationales – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Number of Sets 
2.   Area of Study 
3.   Level of Comfort- Formal Stats 
4.   Level of Comfort- Informal Stats 
 
Table 5.3.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Number of Sets) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Number_of_Sets 1 2.16 2.162 5.17 .024 .024 
Gender 1 1.32 1.316 3.15 .077 .015 
Experience 2 2.70 1.348 3.23 .042 .030 
G *Exp 2 .68 .340 .81 .444 .008 
Error 212 88.61 .418    
Total 218 95.72     
 
Table 5.3.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area 1 1.02 1.021 2.41 .122 .011 
Gender 1 .71 .714 1.69 .195 .008 
Experience 2 2.93 1.466 3.46 .033 .032 
G *Exp 2 .63 .317 .75 .474 .007 
Error 212 89.75 .423    
Total 218 95.72     
 
Table 5.3.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Formal Stats) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Formal 1 2.04 2.037 4.87 .028 .022 
Gender 1 1.53 1.532 3.66 .057 .017 
Experience 2 2.95 1.476 3.53 .031 .032 
G *Exp 2 .82 .409 .98 .378 .009 
Error 212 88.73 .419    
Total 218 95.72     
 
Table 5.3.4 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Informal Stats) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 5 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Informal 1 22.39 22.386 69.40 .000 .247 
Gender 1 .31 .310 .96 .328 .005 
Experience 2 2.03 1.015 3.15 .045 .029 
G *Exp 2 1.23 .613 1.90 .152 .018 
Error 212 68.38 .323    












D6. STUDY 6 
 
 Table 6.1 
Analysis of Variance – Quantitative: Deviations from Ideal – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .02 .024 .36 .550 .002 
Experience 2 .19 .092 1.41 .248 .014 
G *Exp 2 .14 .071 1.09 .340 .011 
Error 202 13.27 .066    
Total 207 13.64     
 
 Table 6.2 
Analysis of Variance – Qualitative: Quality of Rationales – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 2.89 2.894 6.59 .011 .032 
Experience 2 .14 .069 .16 .855 .002 
G *Exp 2 .64 .318 .73 .486 .007 
Error 202 88.66 .439    
Total 207 92.06     
 
Study 6 - Deviations from ideal– List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Area of Study 
2.   Level of Comfort- Formal Stats 
3.   Level of Comfort- Informal Stats 
 
Table 6.1.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Deviations from ideal  – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area 1 .11 .105 1.62 .205 .008 
Gender 1 .06 .064 .98 .323 .005 
Experience 2 .15 .076 1.17 .314 .012 
G *Exp 2 .16 .081 1.25 .289 .012 
Error 200 13.02 .065    
Total 206 13.56     
 
Table 6.1.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Formal Stats) – Deviations from ideal  – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Formal 1 .00 .000 .00 .961 .000 
Gender 1 .03 .126 .39 .533 .002 
Experience 2 .20 .102 1.54 .216 .015 
G *Exp 2 .17 .083 1.26 .285 .013 
Error 199 13.09 .066    
Total 205 13.51     
 
Table 6.1.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Informal Stats) – Deviations from ideal  – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Informal 1 .03 .034 .53 .470 .003 
Gender 1 .03 .032 .48 .488 .002 
Experience 2 .20 .100 1.53 .220 .015 
G *Exp 2 .18 .088 1.35 .262 .013 
Error    200 13.09 .065    
Total 206 13.56     
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Study 6 - Quality of Rationales – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Area of Study 
2.   Level of Comfort- Formal Stats 
3.   Level of Comfort- Informal Stats 
 
Table 6.2.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area_of_Study 1 1.90 1.899 4.38 .038 .021 
Gender 1 4.03 4.034 9.30 .003 .044 
Experience 2 .09 .046 .11 .898 .001 
G *Exp 2 .55 .277 .64 .529 .006 
Error 200 86.73 .434    
Total 206 92.05     
 
Table 6.2.2 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Formal Stats) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area_of_Study 1 1.90 1.899 4.38 .038 .021 
Gender 1 4.03 4.034 9.30 .003 .044 
Experience 2 .09 .046 .11 .898 .001 
G *Exp 2 .55 .277 .64 .529 .006 
Error 200 86.73 .434    
Total 206 92.05     
 
Table 6.2.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Informal Stats) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area_of_Study 1 1.90 1.899 4.38 .038 .021 
Gender 1 4.03 4.034 9.30 .003 .044 
Experience 2 .09 .046 .11 .898 .001 
G *Exp 2 .55 .277 .64 .529 .006 
Error 200 86.73 .434    























D7. STUDIES 5 & 6 
 
 Table 7.1 
Analysis of Variance – Quantitative: Deviations from Ideal – Studies 5 & 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .05 .046 .68 .410 .002 
Experience 2 .34 .172 2.56 .078 .012 
FORMAT 1 .03 .030 .45 .501 .001 
Gender* Exp 2 .18 .088 1.31 .270 .006 
Gender*Format 1 .18 .182 2.71 .100 .007 
Exp * Format 2 .00 .001 .02 .985 .000 
G * Exp * Format 2 .06 .027 .41 .667 .002 
Error 415 27.86 .067    
Total 426 28.75     
 
 Table 7.2 
Analysis of Variance – Qualitative: Quality of Rationales – Studies 5 & 6 
Source Df SS MS F p η2p 
Gender 1 .14 .139 .32 .570 .001 
Experience 2 2.08 1.039 2.40 .092 .011 
FORMAT 1 5.75 5.746 13.29 .000 .031 
Gender* Exp 2 .048 .024 .055 .947 .000 
Gender*Format 1 3.97 3.966 9.17 .003 .022 
Exp * Format 2 1.55 .773 1.79 .169 .009 
G * Exp * Format 2 1.37 .683 1.58 .207 .008 
Error 415 179.43 .432    
Total 426 196.68     
 
Studies 5 & 6 - Deviations from ideal– List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Area of Study 
2.   Level of Comfort- Formal Stats 
3.   Level of Comfort- Informal Stats 
 
Table 7.1.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Deviations from ideal  – Studies 5 & 6 
Source Df SS MS F p η2p 
Area 1 .10 .099 1.48 .224 .004 
Gender 1 .01 .013 .19 .662 .000 
Experience 2 .32 .158 2.37 .095 .011 
FORMAT 1 .03 .033 .49 .486 .001 
Gender* Exp 2 .19 .096 1.44 .238 .007 
Gender*Format 1 .19 .193 2.89 .090 .007 
Exp * Format 2 .00 .001 .02 .985 .000 
G * Exp * Format 2 .07 .034 .51 .604 .002 
Error 413 27.62 .067    












Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Formal Stats) – Deviations from ideal  – Studies 5 & 6 
Source Df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Formal 1 .07 .067 1.01 .317 .002 
Gender 1 .04 .041 .61 .434 .001 
Experience 2 .35 .172 2.57 .078 .012 
FORMAT 1 .03 .031 .46 .499 .001 
Gender* Exp 2 .21 .104 1.55 .214 .007 
Gender*Format 1 .19 .194 2.90 .089 .007 
Exp * Format 2 .00 .002 .03 .967 .000 
G * Exp * Format 2 .06 .030 .45 .638 .002 
Error 412 27.62 .067    
Total 424 28.62     
 
Table 7.1.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Informal Stats) – Deviations from ideal  – Studies 5 & 6 
Source Df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Informal 1 .36 .363 5.48 .020 .013 
Gender 1 .05 .049 .74 .391 .002 
Experience 2 .33 .162 .45 .087 .012 
FORMAT 1 .04 .041 .62 .431 .002 
Gender* Exp 2 .20 .097 .47 .232 .007 
Gender*Format 1 .22 .223 .37 .067 .008 
Exp * Format 2 .01 .002 .04 .964 .000 
G * Exp * Format 2 .08 .037 .56 .569 .003 
Error 413 27.36 .066    
Total 425 28.66     
 
Studies 5 & 6 - Quality of Rationales – List of covariates, in order:  
1.   Area of Study 
2.   Level of Comfort- Formal Stats 
3.   Level of Comfort- Informal Stats 
 
Table 7.2.1 
Analysis of Covariance (Area of Study) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Area_of_Study 1 2.80 2.805 6.56 .011 .016 
Gender 1 .62 .623 1.46 .228 .004 
Experience 2 1.47 .738 1.73 .179 .008 
FORMAT 1 5.92 5.917 13.84 .000 .032 
Gender* Exp 2 .04 .020 .05 .955 .000 
Gender*Format 1 3.94 3.940 9.21 .003 .022 
Exp * Format 2 1.71 .856 2.00 .136 .010 
G * Exp * Format 2 1.23 .563 1.32 .269 .006 
Error 413 176.59 .428    












Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Formal Stats) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Formal 1 .43 .431 1.00 .319 .002 
Gender 1 .12 .119 .28 .599 .001 
Experience 2 1.92 .959 2.22 .110 .011 
FORMAT 1 5.69 5.694 13.18 .000 .031 
Gender* Exp 2 .02 .010 .02 .978 .000 
Gender*Format 1 3.88 3.878 8.98 .003 .021 
Exp * Format 2 1.46 .73 1.69 .186 .008 
G * Exp * Format 2 1.36 .679 1.57 .209 .008 
Error 412 178.02 .432    
Total 424 195.15     
 
Table 6.2.3 
Analysis of Covariance (Level of Comfort- Informal Stats) – Quality of Rationales  – Study 6 
Source df SS MS F p η2p 
Comfort_Informal 1 1.30 1.296 3.01 .084 .007 
Gender 1 .11 .114 .27 .607 .001 
Experience 2 1.94 .967 2.24 .107 .011 
FORMAT 1 5.58 5.577 12.93 .000 .030 
Gender* Exp 2 .08 .041 .10 .910 .000 
Gender*Format 1 4.22 4.217 9.78 .002 .023 
Exp * Format 2 1.48 .738 1.71 .182 .008 
G * Exp * Format 2 1.21 .603 1.40 .248 .007 
Error 413 178.10 .431    




Appendix E – CAOS (including learning outcome for each problem) 
E1. CAOS Questions and Learning Outcomes 
 
QUESTION 1 
Learning outcome: Ability to describe and interpret the overall distribution of a variable as displayed in a 








































Learning Outcomes:  Ability to visualize and match a histogram to a description of a variable (negatively skewed 






Learning Outcome: Ability to visualize and match a histogram to a description of a variable (bell-shaped 
distribution for wrist circumferences of newborn female infants). 
QUESTION 5 
Learning Outcome: Ability to visualize and match a histogram to a description of a variable (uniform distribution 







Learning Outcome: Understanding that to properly describe the distribution (shape, center, and spread) of a 































Learning Outcome: Understanding that boxplots do not provide accurate estimates for percentages of data above or 








Learning Outcome: Understanding of the interpretation of a median in the context of boxplots. 
 
QUESTION 11 
Learning Outcome:  Ability to compare groups by considering where most of the data are, and focusing on 
distribution as single entities.  
 
QUESTION 12 




Learning Outcome: Understanding that comparing two groups does not require equal sample sizes in each group, 
especially if both sets of data are large. 
 
QUESTION 14 
Learning Outcome:  Ability to correctly estimate and compare standard deviations for different histograms. 

























Learning Outcome:  Ability to correctly estimate standard deviation for different histograms. Understands highest 




Learning Outcome: Understanding the statistics from small samples vary more than statistics from large samples. 
 
QUESTION 17 







Learning Outcome: Understanding of the meaning of variability in the context of repeated measurements, and in a 








































Learning Outcome: Ability to correctly describe a bivariate relationship shown in a scatterplot when there is an 
















Learning Outcome: Understanding that correlation does not imply causation. 
 
QUESTION 23 




















Learning Outcome: Ability to recognize a correct interpretation of a p-value 
 
QUESTION 26 









Learning Outcome: Ability to detect a misinterpretation of a confidence level (the percentage of sample data 









A	  high	  school	  statistics	  class	  wants	  to	  estimate	  the	  average	  number	  of	  chocolate	  chips	  in	  a	  generic	  brand	  
of	  chocolate	  chips	  cookies.	  They	  collect	  a	  random	  sample	  of	  cookies,	  count	  the	  chips	  in	  each	  cookie,	  and	  
calculate	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  for	  the	  average	  number	  of	  chips	  in	  each	  cookie	  (18.6	  to	  21.3).	  Items	  
28,	  29,	  30,	  and	  31	  present	  four	  different	  interpretations	  of	  these	  results.	  Indicate	  if	  each	  interpretation	  
is	  valid	  or	  invalid.	  	  
 177	  
QUESTION 29 
Learning Outcome: Ability to detect a misinterpretation of a confidence level (percentage of population data values 




Learning Outcome: Ability to detect a misinterpretation of a confidence level (percentage of all possible sample 







































Learning Outcome: Understanding of the law of large numbers for a large sample by selecting an appropriate 































Learning Outcome:  Understanding of how to calculate appropriate ratios to find conditional probabilities using a 











































Appendix F – 24 problems – Studies 5 & 6 
 
1) One independent variable + Continuous dependent variable  [One-way ANOVA] 
Health 
Problem #5 
Zelazo et al. (1972) report on an experiment to determine the effect of special walking exercises on the age at which 
children begin to walk. Twenty-three infants were randomly divided into four groups. Those infants in groups A and 
B received various exercises, whereas those in groups C and D did not. The following data are the ages (in months) 




Problem #10     
A clinic randomly assigns 24 patients suffering from blisters to receive one of three treatments, one of which is a 
placebo. The number of days for the blisters to completely heal are as follows:  
Demographics 
Problem #21 
A random sample of 20 communities in New England is selected. The following figures are the number of single 











A demographer is interested in the relationship between the birth of a family’s first and second child and the 
eventual family size. She follows 22 families for 20 years, collecting the following data:  
 
Products and Services 
Problem #20  
A bus company plans to begin service between two cities. Four routes, A, B, C, and D, are under consideration. To 
assess differences in the mean time for the four routes, a bus makes the trip between the cities 32 times, taking each 
route eight times. The times (in hours) for each trip are as follows: 
 
Problem #23 
A company records the number of items sold by their salespersons on a sample of six Mondays, six Tuesdays, and 









2) Two independent variables + Continuous dependent variable [Two-Way ANOVA] 
Health 
Problem #16    
A clinic randomly assigns 42 patients suffering from blisters to receive one of three treatments, one of which is a 
placebo. The patients are both runners and non-runners. The number of days for the blisters to completely heal are 






Problem #19     
Zelazo et al. (1972) report on an experiment to determine the effect of special walking exercises on the age at which 
boys and girls begin to walk. Forty infants were randomly divided into four groups. Those infants in groups A and B 
received various exercises, whereas those in groups C and D did not. The following data are the ages (in months) at 










A random sample of 43 communities in New England is selected. The following figures are the number of families 











A demographer is interested in the relationship between the birth of a family’s first and second child and the 
eventual family size, both in rural and in urban settings. She follows 40 families for 20 years, collecting the 








Products and Services 
Problem #1     
A company records the number of items sold by their salespersons on a sample of six Mondays, six Tuesdays, and 
so on. Of the eight sales figures for each day, four referred to days in spring and four referred to days in winter. The 









A bus company plans to begin service between two cities. Four routes, A, B, C, and D, are under consideration. To 
assess differences in the mean time for the four routes, two bus drivers make the trip between the cities 20 times, 




3) One independent variable + Categorical dependent variable [Test of Fit, Chi-Square] 
Health 
Problem #11 
Part of the Framingham heart study (Gordon et al., 1981) focused on the number of deaths from heart attack or heart 
disease among men aged 45-64. Data show that 7% of those who had a daily caloric intake below 2500 died during 
the study. The following table gives the number of deaths from heart attack or heart disease among men aged 45-64 
who consumed more than 2500 calories daily:  
 
 
Problem #24      
 
A new antiulcer drug, T, is being promoted as the more efficient one on the market. The efficiency of the current 
leading drug, Z, is estimated at 64% healing within a month. A group of 200 persons suffering with duodenal ulcers 






A marketing organization selected a random sample of adults in a city. Each respondent is classified by daily 
newspapers read. (The few persons regularly receiving no or two more daily newspapers were omitted.) Their client 
wanted to know if the distribution of newspaper readership is equally distributed among the high-end consumers 








Each of a sample of 805 adult males who have been unemployed for at least 6 months is classified on the basis of 
age. The results are summarized as follows: 
 
Products and Services 
Problem #7 




A random sample of 120 customers who had purchased a new product at a department store was asked whether they 
were satisfied with the product. The company will decide to keep the product on the market only if satisfaction 
reaches 80%. The results are below:  
 189	  
4) Two independent variables + Categorical dependent variable 
 [Test of Independence, Chi-Square] 
Health 
Problem #6 
Gordon et al. (1981) report on some of the outcomes of the Framingham heart study. The following table gives the 









Problem #9  
Two antiulcer drugs, C and W, are to be compared. A group of 200 persons suffering with stomach ulcers are 
randomly divided into two groups of 100 each. The members of group I are given drug C and members of group II, 










A survey organization selected a random sample of adults in a city. Each respondent is classified by annual income 
of the family and by daily newspapers read. (The few persons regularly receiving no or two more daily newspapers 









Each of a sample of 1450 currently unemployed adult males is classified on the basis of age and number of months 
unemployed. The results are summarized as follows: 
 
 
Products & Services 
 
Problem #2 
A random sample of 1315 items in the stockroom of a clothing store is classified by price (‘Under $50’ or ‘Over 









A random sample of 220 customers who had made purchases at a department store were asked whether they were 
satisfied with the service. The results were broken down by age group. 
